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This thesis examines the effects income inequality has on economic growth, 
drawing on data from China. It focuses on two related questions: whether income 
inequality is harmful to economic growth and, if so, why. 
 
The first empirical chapter uses a newly-developed panel dataset at the province 
level to examine the long-run impact of income inequality on economic growth, 
addressing the problem of spurious regression that affects much of the existing 
literature. The empirical results indicate that the long-run effect of income 
inequality on economic growth is non-linear: while income inequality exerts a 
positive impact on economic growth for rich provinces, it is harmful to economic 
growth for poor regions. 
 
The second empirical chapter provides mathematical and empirical evidence that 
demonstrates the deficiencies in existing studies that solely rely on macroeconomic 
data. It examines three mainstream transmission mechanisms by using data at both 
the household and village level. At the village level, the empirical results show that 
income inequality leads to lower economic growth. However, at the household 
level, income inequality is positively linked to income growth for households with 
low levels of initial income. Such seemingly contradictory results agree with the 
predictions of my mathematical example and suggest that the political economy 
channel is responsible for the inequality-growth relationship in rural China. 
 
The last empirical chapter examines whether inequality and growth are linked 
across generations by evaluating the impact of the One Child Policy on fertility and 
education in China. Using a difference-in-differences approach, the empirical 
results suggest that the One Child Policy successfully lowered the probability of 
having a child for Han women and increased the probability of attending school for 
Han children. This empirical evidence indicates that the endogenous fertility 
channel operates in China. 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
I think inequality is not a problem per se. I think inequality up 
to a point can actually be useful for innovation and growth. 
The problem is, it's a question of degree. When inequality gets 
too extreme, then it becomes useless for growth and it can even 
become bad because it tends to lead to high perpetuation of 
inequality over time and low mobility. … And also, extreme 
inequality can be bad for our democratic institutions if it 
creates very unequal access to political voice, and the influence 
of private money in U.S. politics.  
Thomas Piketty 
 
Income inequality has long been one of the core research interests among 
economists and sociologists, and sits at the top of the political agenda in many 
countries around the world. As reported in OECD (2015), the income ratio between 
the top 10 percent of the population and the bottom 10 percent has increased from 
7:1 in the 1980s to 9.5:1 today, reaching its highest level in the past three decades 
in OCED areas. The potential consequences of this dramatic increase in income 
inequality are complicated.1 However, what concerns economists the most is the 
effect of income inequality on economic growth.  
 
Okun (1975) initially proposed the notion that there may be trade-offs between 
equality and efficiency, an idea which has been rooted in policymakers’ 
consciousnesses ever since. On the one hand, an important task for economists is to 
allocate scarce resources in an efficient way, therefore increasing economic 
efficiency and the size of the ‘pie’. On the other hand, such an allocation might 
involve an uneven (but not necessarily unfair) distribution of resources. It seems 
that, to some extent, the goal of limiting income inequality and the goal of 
maintaining a sustainable level of economic growth are contradictive because 
                                                 
1 These consequences, as discussed in Burtless & Jencks, (2003) and Neckerman & Torche (2007), 
relate to the phenomena ranging from welfare state, socio-political instability, intergenerational 
immobility, poverty trap, all of which are tightly linked to our daily life. 
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redistribution may lead to economic inefficiency and shrinkage of the ‘pie’. 
However, more recent research tends to suggest that income inequality, at a 
moderate level, will encourage economic growth and that only extreme inequality 
will be useless for economic growth, as noted by Thomas Piketty in the opening 
quote. Sadly, the definitions of ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ income inequality are 
unclear and the related empirical literature has failed to reach a consensus regarding 
the effects of income inequality on economic growth. The majority of studies run 
standard growth regressions with a measure of income inequality as an extra 
explanatory variable with global data (see Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; and Clarke, 1995; Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000). With different 
estimation techniques and various models, both positive and negative coefficients 
on income inequality are found. 
 
A major concern with the existing literature is that most focus on global data, 
ignoring potential heterogeneity across countries/economies. It is not clear that 
policy makers in one country can rely on the results from other countries. This 
problem is especially serious after Barro’s (2000, 2008) finding that income 
inequality has different effects on economic growth between poor and rich 
countries. Barro’s studies illustrate how failing to take into account a country’s 
level of development will lead to misleading general conclusions. In the past, it was 
difficult to conduct empirical research focusing on a single country due to lack of 
suitable data. However, recently, the development of new surveys and improved 
methods of generating data, especially on income inequality, makes single-country 
research possible. In particular, this thesis will use China as a setting in which to 
look at the inequality-growth nexus in depth. 
 
For scholars who investigate the effects of income inequality on economic growth, 
China is a seemingly promising laboratory. Since the commencement of economic 
reform, increasing income inequality is a critical problem in China in the past 30 
years. According to the World Bank data, the Gini coefficient in China has 
increased significantly from 0.3 from 1987 to over 0.42 in 2010.2 The Gini 
                                                 
2 The Gini coefficient is commonly used to measure the level of income inequality. It ranges from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1(extreme inequality). A Gini coefficient of 0.4 is generally considered as a 
benchmark for extreme inequality. According to World Bank data, the Gini coefficient of Denmark, 
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coefficients announced by the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's 
Republic of China (NBSC) are even higher, peaking at almost 0.5 in 2008, and 
gradually decreasing to 0.465 in 2016.  Even though the degree of income 
inequality in China is not as high as those in Brazil and Honduras (above 0.55), 
China is still one of the most unequal 25% of countries of the world. At the same 
time, the Chinese economy has experienced remarkable development. During 1979 
to 2012, the average annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) was 
9.8%, compared to a global average of 2.8% during the same period. Although most 
mainstream theoretical mechanisms suggest that the impacts of income inequality 
on subsequent economic growth will be negative, these theories might not apply in 
the Chinese context, given that both the level of income inequality and economic 
growth rate in China increased dramatically since economic reform.  
 
This thesis addresses two fundamental research questions: is income inequality 
harmful to economic growth in China? And which transmission mechanism is 
predominant in explaining the impact of income inequality on economic growth? 
 
The answer to the first question is important for China’s policy makers. Although 
China’s central government has realized the importance and urgency of inequality 
alleviation, a high GDP growth rate is still considered as the highest priority since 
this is an important measure for assessing the performance of local government by 
the Chinese bureaucracies. If empirical results show that income inequality is 
harmful to economic growth, policy makers might be able to maintain a high level 
of growth and reduce the degree of income inequality at the same time. However, if 
there exists a positive relationship between inequality and economic growth, growth 
would need to be sacrificed under any inequality reduction programme. 
 
The first empirical chapter in this thesis (Chapter 3) looks at the long-run effects of 
income inequality on economic growth in China, drawing on panel time series 
techniques. Developments in data collection and computation have allowed the 
investigation of the inequality-growth relationship to evolve from large cross-
                                                 
a country that is commonly considered as relatively equal, is highest at 0.291 in 2011. Brazil, which 




section analysis to (dynamic) panel data analysis. However, few researchers have 
paid enough attention to the issue of spurious regression arising from the time-
series properties of the data. Drawing on new inequality data at the provincial level 
provided by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), Chapter 3 addresses 
the spurious regression concerns by employing autoregressive distributed lag 
models (ARDL). This study is the first to examine the inequality-growth 
relationship using the ARDL framework. An additional contribution of Chapter 3 is 
to employ an improved measure of income inequality at the province level, which 
has not been used in previous studies. 
 
The answer to the second research question is equally important. Authors have put 
forward several explanations for why income inequality might impact economic 
growth: the credit market imperfection channel (see, Galor and Zeira, 1993; 
Banerjee and Newman, 1993); the political economy channel (see, Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994; Bertola, 1993; and Persson and Tabellini, 1994); and the socio-
political stability channel (see, Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Gupta, 1990; Perotti, 
1996). However, there are few studies to support any of these transmission channels 
with their empirical results. Wrong remedies might be implemented to deal with the 
trend of increasing income inequality if policy makers do not know how income 
inequality affects economic growth exactly. For example, if the political economy 
is predominant, income inequality may retard economic growth in part because the 
efforts on redistribution caused by the unequal society themselves exert 
distortionary effects on growth. In this case, taxes and transfers may be thoroughly 
inappropriate policies (Ostry el al., 2014). 
 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) of this thesis tests the transmission 
mechanisms underlying the inequality-growth relationship from a special angle. In 
particular, the existing related empirical literature has not paid enough attention to 
the potential issues with macroeconomic (aggregated) data and wrongly specified 
growth functions, which could have exaggerated the negative impacts of income 
inequality on economic growth (if it indeed exists). The first part of the chapter 
demonstrates these concerns with both mathematical examples and empirical 
evidence. The second part of the chapter addresses the second research question by 
examining three mainstream transmission mechanisms directly, namely, the 
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political economy, the socio-political instability, and the imperfect credit market 
channel. The analysis is done at both the village (‘macro’) and household (‘micro’) 
level. Chapter 4 makes two major contributions. Firstly, it illustrates the 
deficiencies of the existing empirical literature that relies on aggregated data and 
uses wrong specifications for the growth function. Secondly, it provides a new 
method of testing multiple transmission mechanisms, which has not been done by 
any previous study. 
 
In addition to its potential impact on economic growth within a single generation, 
income inequality might reduce the economic growth of subsequent generations. 
The endogenous fertility channel predicts that high levels of inequality in one 
generation will reduce economic growth rate in the next generation due to different 
fertility preferences between the rich and the poor (see, Galor and Zang, 1997; 
Morand, 1999; Kremer and Chen, 2002; de la Droix and Doepke, 2003). The last 
empirical chapter (Chapter 5) builds on the analysis of Chapter 4 and provides an 
indirect test of the endogenous fertility channel by evaluating the introduction of 
the One Child Policy in the late 1970s. The One Child Policy was designed to curb 
the population growth rate and to improve the ‘quality’ of the next generation. 
Therefore, if the One Child Policy significantly increased education participation, it 
is evidence in favour of the endogenous fertility channel. The chapter evaluates the 
effects of the One Child Policy on fertility and education, treating the introduction 
of the policy as a huge natural experiment. An innovation of this study is the 
creation of a retrospective panel dataset reflecting the entire fertility histories of 
each woman in the sample. Compared to previous studies, this improves the 
accuracy in identifying the treatment group within the difference-in-differences 
framework.  
 
Overall, the thesis makes three major contribution. First, examining the 
transmission mechanisms is difficult especially when the related data is unavailable 
or unobservable. To concur this difficulty, this thesis is first to provide new method 
to examine the political economy, the socio-political instability, and the imperfect 
credit market channel. In addition, taking the advantage of the One Child Policy, 
this thesis also examines the endogenous fertility channel, even when the inter-
generational data is unavailable. Second, it criticises the previous literature that 
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solely relies on macroeconomic data, providing both mathematical and empirical 
evidence in favour of using more disaggregated data. Third, apart from the new 
method, the empirical results of the thesis are mostly based on updated or newly-
developed data that aims at mitigating and improving on the data used in the 
previous literature. The insights from the results that are reported are potentially 
important for policy makers, as the implications of previous empirical studies – 
which mostly use aggregated data and do not identify specific transmission 
mechanisms – might be misleading. 
 
Apart from the current introduction chapter, the remainder of this thesis is 
organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review of both 
theoretical and empirical research on this topic, both at the global level and single-
country level. Chapter 3 answers the first research question and Chapter 4 and 5 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides an overview that how the previous literature has approached 
to the research questions that have been raised in the last chapter. It begins with the 
introduction of four mainstream theoretical mechanisms: the credit market 
imperfection, the political economy, the socio-political instability, and the 
endogenous fertility channel. Then this chapter reviews the related empirical 
evidence obtained from the data at the global level, and from focusing on one 
specific country, including China. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Mechanisms 
The relationship between income inequality and economic growth has obtained 
enormous attention among economists since 1950s. Kuznets (1955), the pioneering 
work, firstly put forward that income inequality increases in the early stage of 
economic development and decreases in the later phase of economic growth, which 
is generally referred as ‘inverted U’ hypothesis. If this theory can be applied to the 
China’s context, ‘inverted U’ hypothesis implies that the level of income inequality 
will decline with the future economic development. However, Kuznets hypothesis 
might be invalid in many cases. Deininger and Squire (1998) considered the 
Kuznets hypothesis is flawed due to problematic cross-country data. By using 
longitudinal data, Deininger and Squire (1998) show that per capita income does 
not always change along with changes in inequality in most of countries. They also 
find that many counties that were initially poor did not experience any increase in 
inequality while their per capita income grew rapidly. 
 
Since early 1990s, theoretical explanations of the impacts of income inequality on 
economic growth have grown considerably. Generally, income inequality affects 
growth through various channels. The mainstream explanations include (1) the 
imperfect credit market; (2) the political economy; (3) the socio-political instability; 
and (4) the endogenous fertility. 
 
Credit Market Imperfection 
One link between income inequality and economic growth is known as the credit 
market imperfection channel. Through this mechanism, some previous literature has 
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concluded that income inequality is harmful to economic growth. The main idea of 
this mechanism is that poor people would have less opportunity to obtain loans 
from the credit market due to strict borrowing constraints. If the chance of 
investment relies on one’s level of incomes and wealth, impoverished families, 
which have limited access to loans, would have fewer chance to invest on both 
physical and human capital. As Barro (2000) points out, a reallocation of wealth 
and incomes from affluent individuals to needy ones would improve the 
productivity of investment.1 As a result, policies that aim at inequality reduction 
might improve the investment efficiency and therefore the economic development, 
which implies a negative inequality-growth relationship. 
 
The pioneering study of credit market imperfection is Galor and Zeira (1993). In 
this research, they construct an intergenerational framework to explain the 
relationship between borrowing constraints, the allocation of initial wealth, and 
total investment level within an economy. In their intergenerational model, 
individuals are assumed to live for two periods and they can leave bequest for their 
offspring. In each period, Galor and Zeira (1993) also assume that the only product 
in the economy could be produced only by employing skilled labour and capital; or 
by using unskilled labour only. Specially, in the first period, people could choose 
either to invest in human capital such as receiving education or acquiring 
qualifications, or to work as an unskilled worker. In the second period, one could be 
skilled or unskilled labour according to their education level, and could leave a 
bequest to their children. Also, individuals are supposed to share the same 
preferences and capacities; the only difference between each other is the initial 
wealth that they inherited from older generations. 
 
In an imperfect credit market, the cost of monitoring borrowers becomes higher due 
to asymmetric information, which drives up the interest rate for borrowers. For poor 
households, if obtaining a loan from credit market is difficult and costly, they are 
not capable to accumulate human capital and working as unskilled labour. In other 
                                                 
1 It is worth to note that Barro (2000) explains that if the business involves certain level of set-up 
cost, then the reallocation of wealth and income enable more poor people to invest, therefore 
increasing the overall investment and economic growth. However, if the set-up is too high relate to 
the median income, wealth concentration is needed to meet the investment threshold. In this 
sense, inequality might be useful for economic growth.  
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words, only rich people (with large amount of initial inheritance) are able to access 
education, to become a skilled labour, and to accumulate physical capital. As a 
result, in the short run, distribution of initial wealth determines the total level of 
investment and the labour structure of this economy. This theory also holds in the 
long run. Considering the dynamics of this economy, the inability of human capital 
accumulation for poor people would lead to a lower amount of inheritance in the 
next period. If this situation continues generations to generations, Galor and Zeira 
(1993) put forward that this economy would reach a long run equilibrium with two 
types of households. The first one is referred as rich dynasties, which implies that 
all generations in this group will have enough initial wealth to accumulate human 
capital, then work as skilled labour and leave a large amount of wealth for their 
offspring. The other type of household is poor dynasties, which means that people 
within this group will have fewer inheritances, less chances of access to education, 
and will become unskilled workers. Thus, impoverished families will be caught in a 
poverty trap, that is, poor people will end up being poor. As a result, if the size of 
the latter group is sufficiently large, then high initial inequality of wealth 
distribution will lead to a low level of economic growth. 
 
In the same line, Banerjee and Newman (1993) develop a theoretical framework to 
analyse the interplay between credit market imperfections and occupational choice.2 
One the one hand, their research point out that the dynamics of occupational choice 
could affect economic growth since the decisions of choosing a job could influence 
the distribution of wealth and income. Then such distribution would have effects on 
factors (such as savings, and investment) that are closely linked to economic 
growth. On the other hand, Banerjee and Newman (1993) also put forward that the 
economic development could conversely influence the occupational pattern within 
the economy. 
 
Barro (2000) holds a different view in terms of the negative impacts of income 
inequality on productivity of investment in an imperfect capital market. In his 
research, he puts forward that if capital markets and legal institution improve with 
                                                 
2 This model is different from the one that is proposed in Piketty (1997a),assuming that all the 
agents are treated as entrepreneurs that only differ in the amount of their investments. 
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the development of the economy, the overall impacts of inequality on subsequent 
growth is uncertain because of the offsetting effect derived from the setup cost 
along with investment. For instance, a business would require a certain amount of 
setup cost in order to be beneficial and productive. In some cases, Barro (2000) 
predicts that the reduction of income inequality would also reduce the investment, 
therefore lower the economic growth. 
 
Political Economy 
Another mechanism that could explain impacts of income inequality on economic 
growth refers to the political economy channel. Most of previous studies (such as 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Bertola (1993)), have 
concluded that income inequality is negatively associated to the subsequent 
economic growth via two theories, namely, the median voter theorem and the lobby 
behaviour. The main idea of political economy channel is that highly unequal 
income distribution would result in a higher tax rate in order to redistribute social 
resources from rich people to poor ones, which have been named as ‘political 
mechanism’ in Perotti (1996). Then ‘economic mechanism’ implies that the 
redistribution and tax policies, in turn, impede economic development through its 
distortionary impacts on investment and saving behaviour (Perotti, 1996). 
 
Median voter theorem implies that under certain assumptions, the elected result via 
a majority rule voting system is closest to the median voter’s preference.3 Meltzer 
and Richard (1981) propose a model with proportional taxation where income 
distribution is normally asymmetric. Under the majority voting system, the median 
voter theorem predicts that the elected outcome will represent the median voter’s 
preference. For this reason, if the gap between the median pre-tax income and the 
mean pre-tax income, there will be more incentive for the median voter to vote for a 
higher tax rate on income. They conclude that this redistribution process is 
                                                 
3 There are two key assumptions for median voter theorem. First, voters could clearly place all their 
given choices on a left-to-right continuum, which makes all the political candidates one-
dimensional. Second, the preferences of each voter must be single-peaked, which implies that 
voters select the political candidates that can represent their will most. Under these two 
assumptions, the median voter theorem indicates that voters are encouraged to choose the 
candidates that can best represent their true preference (Downs, 1957). 
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detrimental to the economic development since it discourages incentive to work, 
save, and investment. 
 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) put forward that in a one sector endogenous growth 
model with productive government spending and different optimal tax rate among 
agents, median voter theorem in this context implies that the more unequal is 
distribution in an economy, the lower endowed is the median voter with capital. As 
a result, it leads to a higher tax rate on capital and a lower subsequent economic 
growth rate. However, Li and Zou (1988) find out a result that is inconsistent with 
the negative inequality-growth nexus proposed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994). In Li 
and Zou (1988), government spending should be divided into production services 
and consumption services. The latter one should enter the utility function. With this 
extension, Li and Zou (1988) analyse the impact of income inequality on economic 
growth in another extreme case, that is, all government spending is used for 
consumption, which is exactly opposite to the case in Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Li 
and Zou (1988) also conclud that both extreme assumptions that government 
expenditure only enters the production function and completely enters the 
consumption function are not realistic. Considering that the real case should be 
somewhere between these two extremes, the effects of income inequality on growth 
is uncertain from their theoretical model. 
 
Apart from median voter theorem, another channel that can be used to explain the 
inequality-growth nexus within the political economy framework is lobby 
behaviours. Barro (2000) puts forward that affluent individuals could prevent the 
redistributive policies via bribery, lobbying, and buying of votes. However, such 
behaviours would worse the case and lead to a more unequal inequality in this 
economy, which in turn requires further political interventions to avoid further 
redistribution. However, the lobbying or bribery activities could consume resources 
that should have been put into the productive activities. Hence, even if there is no 
transfer from the rich to poor in the steady state, a negative inequality-growth nexus 





Other researchers have stressed that income inequality affects economic 
development through socio-political instability. Under a highly economic polarized 
economy, the return outside from the normal market activities tends to be higher. 
For this reason, Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001) argue that unequal income distribution generates strong 
motivations for people, who pursue their interests, to engage in rent seeking 
activities and social disrupting behaviours such as revolution, crimes, or coups. 
Based on this argument, more studies have focused on the adverse effect on socio-
political instability on the total level of investment, and economic growth. Alesina 
and Perotti (1996) point out that socio-political instability could adversely affect 
investment for at least two aspects. First, it generates uncertainty in terms of the 
legal and political environment. As a result, total investment would be lower since 
people who are risk averse would postpone their projects or invest in other 
countries with less uncertainty. Second, disruptive activities such as riots and crime 
interrupt the normal market order and therefore lower the productivity. This 
argument is also supported in Barro (2000) by stating that antisocial actions or 
social conflicts induce a direct waste of resources, the resources that should have 
been devoted to productive activities. 
 
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) provide a game-theoretical framework to show the 
interplay between levels of wealth, socio-political instability, and motivation for 
capital accumulation. They conclude that inequality is adversely affecting economic 
growth at any given level of wealth.4 These authors state that the interest groups in 
the unequal economy would capture a larger share of total output by direct 
appropriation or by controlling political system. If the degree of income inequality 
is too severe, individuals in the disadvantaged position would exert redistributive 
pressures and discourage capital accumulation, leading to an underinvestment 
equilibrium. Specially, this effect could be even stronger in poor countries with low 
level of wealth. 
 
                                                 




Focusing on another game-theoretical model, Rodrik (1999) emphasizes that the 
differences of economic performance can be explained by the reaction of the 
domestic social conflicts.  In his model, it is assumed that two groups have equal 
share of the resource. Then they should choose ‘cooperative’ or ‘fight’ to jointly 
determine the redistribution of the shrunk output due to the external shocks. They 
would receive equal share of the reduced resource if both groups choose 
cooperative. Alternatively, they could choose to fight and retain the previous 
benefit before the shocks. Under this framework, social conflicts will occur if the 
agents reject to cooperate with each other to share the shrunk pie of economy, 
which leads to the magnification of the cost of the external shocks as well as the 
further shrink of the available resource stock. 
 
Endogenous Fertility 
Last but not the least, endogenous fertility channel has been put forward as one 
main explanation to reveal the impacts of income inequality on subsequent 
economic growth (Galor and Zang (1997); Morand (1999); Kremer and Chen  
(2002); de la Droix and Doepke (2003)). Assuming income is positively associated 
to one’s educational level, families with higher income level (or higher educational 
background) will normally prefer less children and invest more on each child 
because the opportunity cost of child rearing is too high for them. As time goes by, 
the children who are invested more from the affluent households are more likely to 
become skilled labour and to earn much more, then they will choose less children 
due to the same reason, the high opportunity cost of taking care of children. On the 
other hand, poor families will choose more children and with fixed income, they 
can only invest little per child. A vicious circle can be generated when the poor 
children enter the labour market as unskilled workers and earn tiny salaries. Then 
again, with various reason apart from low opportunity cost, these adults from the 
poor families will choose more children who will be unskilled labour in years later. 
5 In an unequal economy, at the macro level, the aggregate level of human capital 
                                                 
5 Apart from lower opportunity cost of rearing children, for the poor, choosing more children can 
also be motivated by insufficient old-age-support (Khoo and Dennis (1999); Morand (1999)), low 




will be diluted due to the increasing proportion of unskilled labour, therefore 
impeding the economic growth.  
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Over the past twenty years, along with the explosion of the theoretical research on 
the inequality-growth nexus, there are considerable empirical studies have been 
developed. Despite of the variation of selected data source and indicators of 
inequality, traditional empirical studies, such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) and Clarke (1995) consistently conclude that the impact of 
inequality on economic growth is negative. More recently, with the introduction of 
the improved dataset and latest panel estimation, some researcher such as Forbes 
(2000) and Barro (2000) challenge the previous empirical evidence. However, in 
spite of an enormous strand of empirical literature on this topic, economists still fail 
to reach any consensus on the impacts of inequality on growth so far. Several 
reasons have been suggested to explain the variation of empirical results, such as 
problematic quality of data, or appropriateness of model specification. This 
subsection provides a review of the empirical studies on inequality-growth nexus, 
beginning with the description of the traditional as well as the current state 
empirical evidence at the international level, complemented by a detailed discussion 
of the empirical evidence focused on the regional data. 
 
Evidence from Studies Focusing on Cross-Sectional Data 
Pioneering empirical research including Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) and Clarke (1995), and Perotti (1996), initially focus on reduced 
form estimations of the direct impact of inequality on future growth prospects by 
employing cross-country data. In general terms, these studies commonly regress a 
measure of economic growth rate on a measure of inequality and on a set of other 
explanatory growth-driven variables through a linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation.6 The research interests of these literatures are the sign of the coefficient 
of inequality and its statistical significance. Despite the difference in data source of 
income distribution, indicators in measuring inequality, and selected time periods, 
                                                 
6 These variables include a measure of initial output level, of human capital stock, physical capital 
investment ratio, and regional dummies, the variables which have been proven to be significant 
determinants of economic growth in Barro (1991). 
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including Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Clarke 
(1995), and Perotti (1996) consistently obtain significant and negative coefficients 
on inequality variables, implying that inequality is detrimental to growth in the long 
run. In addition, by splitting up the sample into different categories, Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) put forward that the negative impacts of inequality on growth are 
only significant in democratic countries, whereas Perotti (1996) obtains a result that 
adverse effect of inequality on growth only exists in rich countries. 
 
By the late 1990s, other economists criticized the general consensus on the negative 
relationship between inequality and growth since this relationship is invalid when 
other econometric techniques or dataset have been used. Through the analysis of the 
more recent literature, the major concerns of the pioneering empirical research can 
be concluded as the quality of data on income distribution, data comparability 
among countries, estimation techniques, and the model specification that is 
employed to capture the impact of inequality on growth. 
 
According to Knowles (2005), majority of the previous existing empirical research 
on exploring the impact of inequality on growth suffer from two main potentially 
serious data issues, namely the data quality and the data comparability. The first 
data problem has been emphasized by Deininger and Squire (1996). These authors 
argue that the data set on income distribution that allows comparison across 
countries should meet the minimum quality standards. They require that, data on 
inequality should be based on household surveys, rather than the information drawn 
from the national account statistics; observation must not only cover wages, but 
also cover all sources of income including nonmonetary ones; coverage of the 
observation should be representative of the whole population at the national level, 
rather than dealing with, for instance, the urban residence or taxpayers only. Based 
on these criteria, Deininger and Squire (1996) assemble an improved dataset that 
contains 682 (out of 2600) qualified observations, the dataset which has been kept 
employing by some empirical research thereafter. Furthermore, in their following 
empirical work, Deininger and Squire (1998) find out that some of the 'unqualified' 
observations have been used in the traditional empirical studies. For instance, 
Deininger and Squire (1998)  point out that only 18 of 55 observations in the 
dubious dataset that used in Persson and Tabellini (1994) could meet their 
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minimum standard. Using their own high-quality dataset, Deininger and Squire 
(1998) find out a negative relationship between initial income inequality and 
subsequent economic growth. However, this relationship is not robust when the 
regional dummy variables are introduced. 
 
Apart from the quality of data, another potential data deficiency of previous studies 
is data incomparability. Knowles (2005) emphasizes that majority of the empirical 
investigation on the inequality-growth nexus does not measure income inequality in 
an identical manner. She stresses that the mixed non-comparable inequality indices 
that have been used in cross-country studies might be based on various income 
definitions (net income, expenditure, gross income) and on different survey unit 
(individuals or household). One example is that the distribution of income after tax 
should be more equal than the one measured before tax under the progressive tax 
system. Another example stressed in Fields (1994) is that the distribution of income 
is supposed to be less equal than the indices based on expenditure if the individuals 
(or households) allocate their resource more evenly over their life time. Therefore, 
without enough consideration of data comparability, these discrepancies may result 
in serious data problems when combining income data across countries. 
Empirically, Knowles (2005) points out that there is no empirical evidence of a 
significant relationship between income inequality and economic growth once the 
income inequality indices are consistently measured as gross income, which 
challenges the general consensus on negative inequality-growth nexus. However, 
when income inequality is identically captured by the expenditure data, Knowles 
(2005) obtains strong evidence supporting that the impact of income inequality on 
growth is negative. 
 
Another main concern of the traditional consensus on negative impact of inequality 
on growth is limitation of econometric estimation techniques. One main drawback 
of the studies employed cross-country estimation techniques is that the estimation 
results might be biased due to the neglect of time-invariant country specific 
variables. Forbes (2000) argues that potential bias on estimation could be derived 
from omitted country specific variables that have significant impacts on growth and 
inequality at the same time, but in the opposite direction, for instance, corruption 
and fertility rates. Moreover, Deininger and Squire (1998) also suspect that 
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previous cross-country studies suffer from omitted variable bias from the evidence 
that the significance of inequality coefficient would be dramatically weakened once 
regional dummy variables are included. 
 
The introduction of the high-quality dataset provided by Deininger and Squire 
(1996), or its subsequent extensions (e.g. the World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID)), has allowed economists to examine the relationship between income 
inequality and growth with panel estimation methods such as fixed effects and 
general method of moments (GMM). These new econometric techniques, by 
controlling the unobserved fixed-effects, have the important advantage of 
eliminating time-invariant effects that might cause the omitted variable bias. The 
first set of empirical papers that have used panel data estimation techniques include 
Li and Zou (1988) and Forbes (2000). The latter study employs fixed effects, 
random effects, and first-differenced GMM to estimate the growth regression that 
has been used in Perotti (1996). The empirical results in Forbes (2000) show that 
the coefficients on the income inequality variable are never negative, implying that 
an increase in income inequality has a significant and positive effect on the 
economic growth in the short term. In the same line, Li and Zou (1988) also obtain 
positive coefficients on income inequality in fixed effects, random effects, and even 
in all sensitivity analysis, suggesting that in the short-run income inequality 
encourages the subsequent economic performance. Similar evidence also could be 
found from the empirical studies that are focusing on one country. Partridge (1997) 
and Panizza (2002) obtain different signs on inequality when they both examine 
state-level data within the United State of America. Panizza (2002) therefore 
conclude that tiny differences either in data or in the selected methodology between 
inequality and growth would generate significant different results.7 
 
Different in model specifications that have been used to capture the impacts of 
inequality on growth would also bring about the opposite results. Barro (2000) 
states that the relationship between income inequality and economic growth might 
not be linear and this argument has been supported by his empirical evidence. He 
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that the estimation techniques used to examine the inequality-growth nexus are 
not the only difference between Partridge (1997) and Panizza (2002). 
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estimates a system of equations with instrument variables to explore the impacts of 
initial level of income inequality on the average growth rate of a broad panel of 
countries over successive spell of ten years covering from 1965 to 1995. When 
estimating with the whole sample, the empirical results that are obtained from 
three-stage least squares estimation reveal that the coefficient on income inequality 
is close to zero, implying that the relationship between initial inequality and 
economic growth is weak. However, considering that the Gini coefficient is allowed 
to depend on the level of economic development, Barro (2000) finds that the 
impacts of income inequality on growth is negative in the poor countries, and is 
positive for the rich ones, therefore suggesting a non-linear relation. This 
relationship has been confirmed by his recent research, Barro (2008), with an 
improved dataset, World Income Inequality Dataset (WIID). 
 
Evidence from Studies Focusing on One Country 
There are some problems that are still needed to be resolved. Foremost, due to the 
issue of data unavailability, especially for the income distribution data, majority of 
existing empirical studies have been forced to employ the averaged data that 
include large amount of countries in order to increase the sample size. Apart from 
the issue of data incomparability as pointed out by Knowles (2005) and Partridge 
(2005), another potential problem of this practice is that the same model 
specification might not be applied to all countries due to heterogeneity. For 
instance, Partridge (Patridge, 1997) states that the data have been used in Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) include Chad and United States, the countries which are in 
every different stage of economic growth. In this case, the estimated results might 
represent an average relationship that does not validate equally for the rich 
countries and poor ones. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) point out that one deficiency of 
the data set at the international level is derived from the differences in national 
characteristics such as cultural background, population, and financial institutions. 
This argument is also supported by Frank (2009). He argues that the heterogeneity 
of the structural differences across international panels, such as corruption levels, 
education system, type of economy, etc, might be more likely to contribute to 




The second problem is due to the practice of averaging data to test the relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth. Subject to the difficulty to collect 
the successive data on income distribution (or other explanatory variables), one 
common way to construct a panel data set is to divide the time belt evenly into 
several intervals and calculate its mean value. However, this practice is not without 
its drawbacks. On the one hand, Wan et al. (2006) emphasize that the division of 
the time horizon would be a pure guesswork since there is no consensus regarding 
the definition of short-, medium-, or long-term. For instance, some economists 
might consider a 10-year period as short run, whereas other researchers think this 
would be long enough to be a medium term. On the other hand, the conventional 
averaging process might be problematic since it is possible that conflicts results 
could be obtained from two different ways of time division. For example, Forbes 
(2000) obtains a positive effect of inequality on economic growth in the short-run 
(over 5-year intervals), whereas the inequality-growth relationship is not significant 
while the author employed the 10-year intervals. 
 
To resolve the abovementioned problems with the empirical research at the 
international level, some economists start to explore the relationship between 
income inequality and economic growth by narrowing the research scope to one 
country. The motivation of such type of empirical research is threefold. First, one 
key advantage of using regional data instead of the international ones is that states 
(counties or provinces) should share similar features such as education level, 
government expenditure, which would be more reasonable to use the same 
specification. Second, as Panizza (2002) suggests, one possible solution to deal 
with the data incomparability issue is to use the regional data, which is more like to 
be measured in a consistent manner. Third, limiting the scope of the research to 
regions within the same country/economy could provide policy makers with more 
straightforward evidence of inequality-growth nexus rather than the general 
conclusion obtained from the global data. Nevertheless, given the advantages listed 
above, the related literatures on regional level are relatively scarce due mainly to 




By using the U.S. state level data, Partridge (1997) supports a positive relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth.8 Based on the panel estimation 
(fixed effects, differenced-GMM, and system-GMM) with U.S. state level data 
from 1940 to 1980, Panizza (2002) could not find the presence of a positive 
inequality-growth nexus as proposed in Partridge (1997). Furthermore, he points 
out that the empirical result of inequality-growth nexus is sensitive since tiny 
changes in the method of measuring inequality, and in the econometric model could 
generate enormous differences in the estimated results. Via the panel error 
correction estimators: the fixed effects estimator, the mean group (MG) estimator of 
Pesaran and Smith (1995), and the pooled MG estimator of Pesaran, et al. (1999), 
Frank (2009) finds a positive long run relationship between inequality and growth 
with large and balanced size of dataset covering state level data from 1945 to 2004 
on annual basis. Frank (2009) also uses various measure of inequality (such as 
Atkinson index, and Theil entropy index) and concludes that such positive 
inequality-growth nexus might be mainly caused by the income concentration 
within the upper end of the income distribution. 
 
Nahum (2005) and Cialani (2013) provide relevant empirical evidences by focusing 
on the Swedish case. The former study investigates the relationship between 
income inequality and economic growth based on county level data for Sweden 
covering from 1960 to 2000. Nahum (2005) considers both annual data and 
averaged information as well to test the appropriateness of averaging data. By using 
fixed effects and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, she finds a significant 
positive partial correlation between Gini coefficients and economic growth on in 
the cases of yearly data, averaging by 3-year interval, and averaging by 5-year 
interval. However, the corresponding impacts of Gini coefficient on economic 
growth averaged on 10-year is proved to be not significant. The latter study 
supports this positive relationship with a new data set at the Swedish municipal 
level covering from 1992 to 2007. Via the fixed effects and 2SLS estimation, 
Cialani (2013) regresses economic growth (measured by growth rate of average 
income) on a set of explanatory variables including the initial level of average 
                                                 
8 Partridge (1997) measures income inequality by Gini coefficient and by income share of the 
middle quintile. The coefficients on both measures are positive and statistical significant. 
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income, a measure of initial level income inequality, and other growth-driven 
factors.9 The author concludes that the income inequality in Sweden (measured by 
Gini coefficient or top income share) is positively correlated to the income growth. 
Specially, allowing the income inequality could be depended on the municipal 
income level, Cialani (2013) also points out that the income inequality would 
encourage the economic growth in the municipalities with higher average income 
level. In conclusion, in the case of Sweden, both studies considered the share of age 
groups in the adult population as instrumental variable for the income inequality 
when they used 2SLS estimation. Furthermore, taking the advantage of the data 
availability on income distribution, both research try to measure the inequality in 
different ways (such as income share of top 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%) or to test the 
regression in different ways of averaging data (such as 10-year, 5-year, and 3-year), 
concluding a positive inequality-growth nexus in Sweden. 
 
Ghosh and Pal (2004) collect the state-level data covering from 1960 to 1994 in 
India to test the relationship between inequality and economic growth via simple 
cross-sectional OLS estimates and panel data estimation. In the OLS estimation, 
these authors regress the growth of per capita state domestic product on initial level 
of income, the rural Gini, urban Gini, intersectoral inequality component, a measure 
of human capital, and a measure of physical capital, prevailing in the initial period 
1960. They find out that the impacts of rural inequality on growth are significantly 
negative while the effects of urban inequality were insignificant positive.10 Also, 
the coefficient on the intersectoral inequality index is significantly negative, which 
they suspect that this might be caused by ignoring the state-specific characteristics. 
To deal with this potential concern, Ghosh and Pal (2004) then employ fixed effects 
estimator, concluding that both rural Gini and intersectoral inequality component 
are significantly and negatively associated with the subsequent economic growth 
                                                 
9 It is worth noting that the explanatory variables that have been used in Nahum (2005) and Cialani 
(2013) are different from the traditional specifications that have been used in the related studies at 
the international level. In Nahum (2005), the author controls for the urbanization and the age 
structure, the stock of human capital, the initial level of income per capita, and a measure of 
income inequality. By contrast, Cialani (2013) employs the share of expenditure on education, child 
care, family care, and elderly care, respectively, a measure of inequality, stock of human capital, 
and political stability as explanatory variables. 
10 Gini coefficients that have been used in Ghosh and Pal (2004) are based on consumption 
inequality instead of income inequality. 
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whereas the urban Gini still fail to exert significant effects on growth.11 The main 
conclusion of their study is that the rural inequality discouraged the subsequent 
economic performance while the urban inequality have no impacts on growth. 
 
The empirical work on exploring the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth in China is even fewer. One main obstacle of the developing 
relevant literature is that related data, especially on income distribution, is 
unavailable due to the political reasons. Even though the National Statistics Bureau 
of China has published some Gini coefficients, the need for more informative data 
is urgent for research purpose.12 Extending the work of Forbes (2000) and 
Lundberg and Squire (2003), Wan et al. (2006) explicitly estimate the inequality-
growth nexus in the short and long run. These authors introduce the polynomial 
inverse lag (PIL) framework to the simultaneous systems of equations to deal with 
the reverse causality from economic growth to income inequality.13 In addition, 
since Wan et al. (2006) criticize the practice of averaging data in the previous 
literature such as (Forbes, 2000), another motivation to employ PIL framework is 
the flexibility in exploring the true lag structure, which enabled the identification of 
the impacts of inequality on growth on different time horizons. By using the 
provincial panel data covering from 1987 to 2001, they find out that income 
inequality (measured by the income ratio between the urban and rural resident) 
discourage economic growth irrespective of time horizons. Through the system 
estimation, Wan et al. (2006) also point out that the positive effect of inequality on 
human capital is overtaken by the negative effects of income disparity on physical 
investment. Chen (2010) employs a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model and 
simulated the effects of shocks to the growth and Gini coefficient by analysing the 
impulse response functions (IRFs). After confirming the stationarity of both of 
inequality and growth, he concludes that increase in economic growth discourage 
inequality in short run and long run. Also, the author also puts forward that a lower 
                                                 
11 Due to the missing data on Gini indices for certain years, Ghosh and Pal (2004) divide the whole 
sample into seven subperiods based on a 5-year interval. 
12 National Statistics Bureau announced the national Gini coefficient from 2003 to 2012 on January 
2013, and from 2013 to 2016 on January 2017. 
13 Wan et al. (2006) propose a system that contained four reduced form equations. Apart from 
income inequality and economic growth proxies, these authors also endogenize the human capital 
variables and investment. 
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economic growth will be accompanied by reducing inequality in the short run, and 
such effects would disappear in the long run. With the household-level data, 
Benjamin et al. (2011) also find out that the negative impacts from inequality to 
growth fade away by the end of observed time period. Other literature calculate 
Theil index based on data at city level (Reuter, 2004) or at prefecture level 
(Gravier-Rymaszewska, et al., 2010), finding positive impacts from income 
inequality on economic growth rate in China. 
 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
To answer the two research questions that have been proposed in the beginning, this 
chapter provided a general review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the effects of income inequality on the subsequent economic growth. On 
the theoretical side, this chapter mainly reviews four transmission mechanisms, 
namely, the credit market imperfection, the political economy, the socio-political 
instability, and the endogenous fertility channel. One should note that the list of the 
transmission mechanisms is longer than what have been discussed in this chapter. 
For example, the adverse effects of income inequality on economic growth might 
through the transmission mechanism of lobbying, corruption and misallocation o 
resources (see, Barro 2000; Easterly, 2001; Fogel, 2006; Galor et al., 2006), or the 
channel of small size of demand (see, Zweimuller, 2000; Foellmi and Zweimuller, 
2006). However, this thesis will only focus on the empirical analysis with the 
channels that have been discussed in detailed in this chapter, considering the 
relevance of the channel itself and the availability of the data. For instance, 
although the increasing level of corruption is also a concern in China, due to the 
unavailability of the measure of corruption, the related research is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Anything that have not been discussed or tested should count for the 
limitation of this work rather than denying their importance in the field.  
 
On the empirical side, this chapter reviews the econometrics estimates of the 
impacts of income inequality on subsequent economic growth from global data to 
regional data, from cross-sectional techniques to dynamic panel data estimation 
methods. Although the empirical results do not reach a consensus on the impacts of 
income inequality on economic growth, the one thing that could be learnt from this 
literature review is that the estimation results could change significantly depending 
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on the estimation techniques, the quality of the data, or even the sample that have 
been chosen. It is worth to note that several aspects that are not paid enough 
attentions. First, among the all the empirical works, when the economic growth and 
income inequality are in different integrated orders, the potential spurious 
regression are rarely discussed. Second, the examinations of the related 
transmission mechanisms, particularly focusing on regional data, are rare. Hence, to 
answer the research questions, this thesis will investigate the impacts of income 
inequality on economic growth specifically focusing on a superior estimation 
technique (Chapter 3) and on new methods to identify the discussed transmissions 
(Chapter 4 and 5). Admittedly, other concerns are equally important, which should 
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Chapter 3. Long-Run Effects of Income 
Inequality on Economic Growth: A New 
Insight from China 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the commencement of economic reform, increasing income inequality is a 
critical problem in China in the past 30 years. According to the World Bank data, 
the Gini coefficient in China has increased significantly from 0.3 from 1987 to over 
0.42 in 2010, exceeding the international warning level.1 The Gini coefficients 
announced by the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 
(NBSC) are even higher, peaking at almost 0.5 in 2008, and gradually decreasing to 
0.465 in 2016.2 Even though the degree of income inequality in China is not as high 
as those in Brazil and Honduras (above 0.55), China is still one of the most unequal 
25% of countries of the world. At the same time, the Chinese economy has 
experienced remarkable development since 1978. During 1979 to 2012, the average 
annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) is 9.8%, which is significantly 
higher than the global averaged rate of 2.8% during the same period.3 Although 
most of mainstream theoretical mechanisms suggest that the impacts of income 
inequality on subsequent economic growth is negative, these theories might not be 
applied in the Chinese context, given the fact that both the level of income 
inequality and economic growth rate in China increased dramatically since 
economic reform.4 The research question of this chapter is to empirically 
investigate the overall impact of income inequality on economic growth in the 
Chinese context using macroeconomic data.  
                                                 
1 The Gini coefficient is commonly used to measure the level of income inequality. It ranges from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). A Gini coefficient of 0.4 is generally considered as a 
benchmark for extreme inequality. According to World Bank data, the Gini coefficient of Denmark, 
a country that is commonly considered as relatively equal, is highest at 0.291 in 2011. Brazil, which 
is treated as one of the most unequal countries, has Gini coefficients that are consistently higher 
than 0.5. 
2 NBSC releases the latest national Gini coefficients only from 2003 to 2016. They are 0.479 (2003), 
0.473 (2004), 0.485 (2005), 0.487 (2006), 0.484 (2007), 0.491 (2008), 0.490 (2009), 0.481 (2010), 
0.477 (2011), 0.474 (2012), 0.473 (2013), 0.469 (2014), 0.462 (2015), 0.465 (2016). 
3 The raw data are derived from World Bank and computed by the author. 
4 As been discussed in the literature review chapter, the mechanisms that suggest the income 
inequality is harmful to economic growth include the imperfect credit market, the political 




Although the China’s central government has realized the importance and urgency 
of inequality alleviation, a high GDP growth rate is still considered as the highest 
priority since GDP growth rate is still an important measure for assessing the 
performance of local government by the Chinese bureaucracies. If the empirical 
results show that income inequality is harmful to economic growth, the policy 
makers could maintain high level growth and reduce the degree of income 
inequality at the same time. Otherwise, economic growth should be sacrificed with 
the inequality reduction if there exists positive inequality-growth nexus.  
 
The relationship between income inequality and economic growth in China has 
obtained enormous attention among economists. Wan et al. (2006) employ the 
income ratio between urban and rural resident as a measure of income inequality 
and conclude that the income inequality is negatively associated to the long-run 
economic growth. By using the same inequality indicator, Chen (2010) finds out 
that a reduction in inequality has a marginal negative impact on growth in the short 
run.5 Similarly, with the household-level data, Benjamin et al. (2011) also find out 
that the negative impacts from inequality to growth fade away by the end of 
observed time period. Other literature calculate Theil index based on data at city 
level (Reuter, 2004) or at prefecture level (Gravier-Rymaszewska, et al., 2010), 
finding positive impacts from income inequality on economic growth rate in China. 
 
The novelty of the current empirical research is two-fold. First, I will use an 
improved measure on income inequality, Theil index assembled by University of 
Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), in hope of mitigating the data issues in previous 
studies. One advantage of Theil index is that it can be calculated with aggregate (or 
group-level) data. This calculation requires that the subgroups of a population 
should be categorized into mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive groups. 
However, Theil index calculated with geographical sub-province data, such as 
Chinese city data (e.g., Reuter (2004) ) and prefecture data (e.g., Li and Xu (2008) 
), is less ideal. Due largely to the upgrading of county-seat towns into county-seat 
                                                 
5 Chen (2010) also employs the Theil index at the national level as a measure of income inequality, 
calculated by GDP per capita at the province level. 
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cities, the number of cities are increasing over time, leading to data inconsistency 
and incompletion in related regional Statistics Yearbook. When calculating the 
Theil Index, this data incompletion concern violates the completely exhaustive 
groups requirement, which lower the quality of the measure of income inequality.6 
By comparison, since the number of sector are unlikely changing over time, UTIP 
Theil index calculated with sectoral information tend to be less problematic. 
Another superiority of UTIP Theil index is that it employs wage data instead of 
GDP per capita as a measure of income. When computing the income inequality 
index, with less ideal data, previous literature that have employed the regional GDP 
as a proxy for income. However, according to an IMF report (Callen, 2017), GDP 
sums the incomes generated by production, including not only wages, but also 
profits, rent, taxes less subsides. As a result, GDP overestimate the income level 
and introduce measurement error in the income inequality index. Compared to 
GDP, sectoral wage data reflects income information more directly. 
 
Second, I will use two newly proposed models by Chudik et al. (2013c), namely 
cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributive lag model (CS-ARDL) and 
cross-sectionally augmented distributed lag model (CS-DL), to investigate the long-
run impacts of income inequality on economic growth, in hope of dealing with the 
econometrics challenges that have not been solved in the previous literature. In 
particular, from an econometric point of view, there are at least three major 
concerns in existing related empirics: spurious regression due to non-stationarity 
process in the regression, cross-sectional dependence (CSD), and slope 
heterogeneity. Ignoring any of these concerns would lead to severely biased 
estimation when examining the impacts of income inequality on economic growth 
in the long run. However, the traditional dynamic panel data approaches that have 
been used in existing empirics (as in Forbes (2000), Lee and Zou (1998)), including 
Fixed Effects estimator (FE), and Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, cannot 
address any of them. Instead, given the great features of allowing mixture of 
different stationary processes of variables, heterogeneity slopes and adjusting the 
                                                 
6 It is worth to note that the increase of administrative unit (such as county or city) itself is not 
detrimental to the measure of income inequality with Theil Index. The concern will be arisen while 
the data is incomplete. Unfortunately, the data incompletion in regional level is not uncommon, 
especially in early 1990s. For this reason, Reuter (2004) has to reduce the selected city only to 215 
(out of 662 cities in 2011). 
40 
 
cross-sectional dependence, the CS-ARDL and CS-DL together with the Mean 
Group (MG) estimator that will be employed in this chapter are superior to the 
pervious methodologies, providing a more reliable estimation regarding the long-
run effects of income inequality on economic growth. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first study releases the assumption of slop homogeneity and cross-section 
independent to investigate the inequality-growth nexus in the Chinese context. In 
the subsequent chapters, all the mentioned econometric concerns and new 
methodologies will be further discussed.  
 
3.2 Data 
Measuring Income Inequality and Economic Growth 
Among the most common metrics used to measure income inequality are the Gini 
coefficient, Theil index, and Mean Log Deviation (MLD). They have all desirable 
properties that are postulated to define a proper measure on inequality, namely, 
anonymity, scale independence, population independence, and transfer principle. 
This chapter aims at providing new empirical evidence on the relationship between 
income inequality and economic growth by employing a new dataset on income 
distribution at the China's provincial level, which is assembled by UTIP. The UTIP 
measure of China's inequality is mainly based upon Theil index, which is equal to 
the sum of Theil elements for every subgroup as shown in the following equation. 
 












  (3.1) 
 
where m is the number of subgroup in the population; 𝑝𝑖 is the population of 
subgroup i; P is the entire population; 𝑦𝑖 corresponds to the mean income in group i 
while 𝜇 is the average income within the whole population. Under perfect equality, 
the last term of equation 3.1 becomes zero, leading to the value of Theil index is 
zero. If one individual (or group) occupies all of income, the maximum value of 
Theil index, 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 = 𝑙𝑛 𝑚, is obtained.7 UTIP uses wage and employment data 
                                                 
7 It is worth to note that the first product in the equation 3.1, 
𝑝𝑖
𝑃
, could lead to a relatively small 
value of Theil Index, especially when there are many groups with smaller population. The scatter 




from various issues of annual China Statistic Yearbook. The employment data are 
derived from the total number of staffs and workers at year-end, while the income 
data refers to the total wage bills for these staffs and workers before tax and other 
expenses are deducted. Due to the availability of related employment and wage 
data, the Theil index assembled by UTIP covers only from 1987 to 2012 for 31 
provinces.  
 
The major motivations for using UTIP Theil index is threefold. First, instead of 
finding a geographical sub-province data, UTIP employs sectoral data which is 
more practical compared to the data at city or prefecture level. This advantage is of 
importance in this study. Due largely to the upgrading of county-seat towns into 
county-seat cities, the number of cities are increasing over time, leading to 
geographical data inconsistency and incompletion in related Statistics Yearbook. 
Second, unlike previous literature, the calculation of provincial Theil index in UTIP 
adopts the wage data rather than the regional GDP per capita for measuring income 
information, which offers a closer measure of income inequality. Third, to the best 
of my knowledge, UTIP inequality data covers the most provinces (31 provinces) 
and longest time span (26 years) on an annual basis, enlarging the size of total 
observations. 
 
Regarding economic growth, as some studies use logarithmic real GDP per capita 
(such as Herzer and Vollmer (2012), and Simões (2012)), I will use first-difference 
of logarithmic real GDP per capita to proxy economic growth, in line with the 
growth empirics such as Huang and Yeh (2012), and Barro (2000). One concern 
that stops Herzer and Vollmer (2012) from using first-difference indicator is that 
spurious regression would be generated because they argue that first-difference 
GDP is commonly a stationary process, whereas inequality or other variables are 
not. However, even this concern might be the case, new econometric models (such 
as ARDL model) and new estimators (such as mean group (MG) estimator) can 
tackle with the regression including both stationary and non-stationary processes. In 
addition, if the logarithmic real GDP per capita should be in place, it will be more 
likely to explore the relationship between economic development and income 




Measuring Other Variables 
Apart from income inequality and economic growth, other two key variables are a 
measure of physical capital, and a measure of human capital. Particularly, education 
is a measure of human capital, which has been treated as one of the most important 
growth determinants among previous growth literature. Theoretical literature (such 
as Romer (1990)) point out that the major contribution to research and development 
that promotes technologies is human capital. Its role of ordinary as well as 
intellectual input into productive activities exerts stimulating effects on economic 
development (Mankiw, et al., 1992). In addition, investment has been commonly 
considered as a measure of physical capital. Based on the neoclassical model 
(Solow, 1956), in a closed economy, the saving rate is exogenous and equivalent to 
the ratio of investment to output. A higher saving rate drives up the steady-state 
level of output per effective worker and therefore enhances the economic 
performance with a certain initial level of GDP. Empirical evidence at the 
international level (such as Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992)) or at the 
national level (such as Chen (2000)) also reveal the positive effects of education 
and investment on the economic growth. According to these theoretical predictions 
and empirical experiences, it is reasonable to expect that investment and education 
are growth stimulator. 
 
To measure investment, I will employ the investment-GDP ratio, which is 
computed as total fixed capital investment over regional nominal GDP.8 Following 
the growth empirics from Chen and Feng (2000), and Wan et al. (2006), I will use 
higher education enrolment rate as the indicator for measuring education. Unless 
indicated otherwise, the provincial annual data of these variables are derived from 
the NBSC dataset. The length of the period chosen is dictated by the data 
availability on inequality data, which covers from 1987 to 2012. In total, I have 
twenty-nine provinces (N = 29) and twenty-six years of data (T = 26), for a total 
of 754 observations.9 This dataset, with detailed sources, definition, means, and 
                                                 
8 The inflation effect will be cancelled out since both GDP and fixed capital investment are 
measured in the nominal term. 
9 This study eliminates the data from Chongqing and Tibet for the following reasons. First, the 
related data of Chongqing do not available until 1997 when Chongqing officially became a direct-
controlled municipality. Second, part of real GDP per capital for Tibet province cannot be 
calculated since the CPI data does not exist from 1987 to 1989. 
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standard deviations for each of the variable is listed in the Appendix Table 3A-1. In 
addition, a plot it the dependent variable, economic growth for each province is also 
provided in the Appendix Figure 3A-1. 
 
From an empirical perspective, other factors, other than the measures of physical 
capital and human capital indicated by the neoclassical growth model, could also 
have impacts on economic growth. For example, Nahum (2005) controls for the 
urbanization and the age structure in the reduced form growth regression. Cialani 
(2013) also employs a measure of political stability as a regressor. However, this 
chapter will only focus on the measure of income inequality, physical capital, and 
human capital. Although the sample size is the largest compared to the previous 
Chinese growth empirics, there will be trade-offs between avoiding omitted 
variable bias and keeping a parsimonious model. Particularly, the inclusion of more 
independent variables will be significantly detrimental to the estimation with CS-
ARDL and CS-DL model due largely to the huge loss of degrees of freedom.10 
Hence, the future research could improve the model by including more exogenous 
variables that could affect economic growth, if more relevant data are available. 
 
3.3 Potential Econometric Issues with Panel Time Series Data 
Majority of previous empirical research focusing on inequality-growth investigation 
can be characterized as ‘micro panel analysis’ or ‘longitudinal panel analysis’ since 
the time span is relatively short (less than 10 periods in time dimension). By 
comparison, the dataset that will be used in this study contains annual data spanning 
from 1987 to 2012 (T=26), which can be normally classified as ‘macro panel 
analysis’ or ‘panel time-series analysis’. The length of time span is of vital 
importance because the general estimators (such as FE estimator, and difference-
GMM estimator) that have been used in micro panel analysis are not valid for panel 
time-series analysis. With a longer time span, several potential econometric 
concerns should be considered, namely, non-stationarity, slope heterogeneity, and 
cross-sectional dependence (CSD). 
 
                                                 
10 This will be discussed in the empirical result subsection in detailed. Particularly, when I include 
only the measure of income inequality, physical capital and human capital, there are insufficient 
observations already with the CS-ARDL model (Table 3-4), and CS-DL model (Table 3-5). 
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Potential Issue 1: Non-stationarity 
Short-periods averaged panels (for example, 5-year intervals) has become a 
standard practice in growth-inequality nexus empirics in the hope of mitigating the 
uncertainty induced by business cycle, and of dealing with the related data scarcity 
(such as inequality, and education attainment), without any concern on the time 
properties of data itself. However, other studies point out that it is reasonable to 
treat the variables such as the level of gross output or capital stock as ‘non-
stationary’ series because these variables often show high degrees of persistence in 
the long term (Bai and Ng (2004); Pedroni (2007); and Eberhardt and Teal (2010)). 
In the case of a non-stationary variable, there is no extra useful information 
regarding the distribution (such as mean, and variance) could be obtain by simply 
adding more observations. What makes the situation worse is that the practice of 
time-averaging would not alter this property at all, which would cause serious 
effects on the estimation and inference (Granger and Siklos (1995); and Caselli 
(1996)). For example, in the time-series context, regressing a non-stationary 
variable on a set of non-stationary variables in a linear equation would cause 
‘spurious regression’ problem if the estimated error term is not a stationary process. 
With this issue, the standard tests for significance and goodness of fit will be not 
suitable at all. Therefore, as the time span in dataset becomes longer, non-
stationarity property should be taken into account prior to further empirical 
analysis. 
 
Potential Issue 2: Slope Heterogeneity 
It is not uncommon in existing growth empirics with short-panels to assume that the 
estimated coefficients are identical across countries/regions, which is normally 
referred as slope homogeneity assumption. Generally speaking, for studies that 
have used data at the global scale (e.g., Barro (2000), and Forbes (2000)), this 
restriction implies that each country with different level of economic development, 
such as Zimbabwe and United States of America, will have same parameters in 
growth regression.11 However, this is a strong assumption, which is likely to be 
violated in reality. If slope parameters are in fact differed across each unit, fixed 
                                                 
11 According to World Bank data, the GDP per capita in United States is about 46405 dollars, which 
is 100 times as much as the GDP per capita in Zimbabwe in 2014. 
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effect estimator, or first difference GMM estimator will generate inconsistent 
estimates for coefficients even when T becomes larger (Pesaran, et al., 1996). 
 
Potential Issue 3: CSD 
Apart from slope homogeneity, another assumption in previous empirical research 
is cross-sectional independence. Phillips and Moon (1999) point out ‘...quite 
commonly in panel data theory, cross section independence is assumed in part 
because of the difficulties of characterizing and modelling across section 
dependence.’ However, the assumption that the covariance of the error terms is zero 
could be easily violated. Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) also support this point by 
saying ‘When studying macroeconomic and financial data..., cross-sectional 
dependencies are likely to be the rule rather than the exception, because of strong 
inter-economy linkages.’ Over recent years, penal data econometrics have 
witnessed an increasing research interest in characterizing and modelling CSD, and 
its impacts on estimation. 
 
The impacts of CSD on estimation is determined by various factors such as the size 
of the correlation between individual (in our current research interest: province in 
China), and the nature of CSD itself. On the one hand, if CSD is induced by the 
unobserved common factors but it is not correlated to the dependent variables in the 
regression, FE estimator and RE estimator are still consistent, although they are 
inefficient and biased. On the other hand, the estimation through FE and RE 
estimators will be neither unbiased nor consistent if the covariances between 
interdependencies introduced by unobserved common shocks and regressors are not 
equal to zero. In the case of dynamic panel data econometrics, the effects of CSD 
on regression would be more complicated. But the consequence of neglecting CSD 
would be serious. Phillips and Sul (2003) put forward that pooling may decrease the 
efficiency dramatically over single equation OLS. In addition, ignoring CSD would 
lead to severely biased estimation especially for panel unit root tests and 
cointegration tests. 
 
Preliminary Data Analysis 
Prior to further empirical analysis, I firstly use the Pesaran's CSD test to detect the 
potential CSD. Pesaran (2004) formulates a test to detect systematic residual 
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correlation across different unit in the panel by employing pairwise correlation 
coefficients between regressors or residual series. The CSD test result followed by a 
standard FE estimation is reported in the table 3-1. It shows the existence of CSD as 
the result strongly rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence at 1% 
significance level. 
 
Table 3-1. Results of FE Estimation and Pesaran's CSD Test 
FE Estimation 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Inequality 0.428 0.291 
Investment 0.001 0.000*** 
Education 0.030 0.000*** 
Pesaran’s CSD test 
CSD statistic 49.507 0.000*** 
Note: The FE estimation results are obtained from the regression 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑜,𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖
′𝒙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. With respect to the 
Pesaran’s CSD test, the null hypothesis is that the CSD is not present is the errors. 
 
Then I test the time series properties of key variables with panel unit root tests, 
assuming homogeneous slopes and heterogeneous slopes, respectively. The test 
with former assumption is proposed by Levin, et al. (2002) (LLC). When allowing 
heterogeneous coefficients across province, I use the panel unit root test developed 
by Im et al. (2003) (IPS). In addition, in order to deal with the CSD, I also employ 
cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) suggested by Pesaran (2007), the test 
which allows for correlation between error terms across province to address the 
potential spurious inferences. 
 
As reported in Table 3-2, individual trends and constants are included in the tests 
for inequality, investment, and education measure, while only deterministic time 
trends are excluded for economic growth in all panel unit root tests. Unlike other 
variables that normally exhibit a clear upward trend, economic growth is commonly 
not to be trending. LLC results in Table 3-2 show that the null hypothesis of unit 
root for all provinces could be firmly rejected at 1% significance level for both 
growth and education series, implying that these two series seem to follow I(0) 
processes. Similarly, IPS test results also show that growth and education are I(0) 
processes at 1% significance level. For the variables that are not stationary in its 
level form at 5% significance level, I further explore the time-series properties by 
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applying LLC and IPS panel unit root tests to their first difference values, which are 
shown in the bottom of the Table 3-3. For the first-differenced inequality and 
investment, only intercepts are included and all p-values imply that the null 
hypothesis should be rejected at 1% significance level, meaning that the level of 
inequality and investment are following I(1)  processes, in both LLC and IPS tests. 
 
Table 3-2. LLC, IPS, and CIPS Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 Deterministic Trend LLC IPS CIPS 
A. Tests on its level form 
Economic Growth Intercept 0.000*** 0.000*** -3.398*** 
Inequality Trend, intercept 0.056* 0.987 -2.426 
Investment Trend, intercept 0.060* 0.999 -2.171 
Education Trend, intercept 0.000*** 0.000*** -2.981*** 
B. Tests on its first-difference form 
ΔInequality Intercept 0.000*** 0.000*** -4.291*** 
ΔInvestment Intercept 0.000*** 0.000*** -3.509*** 
Note: I use Akaike Information Criterion to choose the optimal lag length by setting the maximum 
lag as 3. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Δ is an operator 
that calculate the difference between the value of variable at time t and t-1.In all the unit root tests, 
the null hypothesis is that the process is non-stationary. 
 
3.4 Estimation Strategy 
The next question in this chapter is how to examine the impacts of income 
inequality on economic growth in China. The empirical framework is the one based 
on a conditional convergence, which is derived from an extended version of the 
neoclassical Solow growth model (Barro, 1991, 1997, 2000). In the neoclassical 
model, the diminishing returns to the accumulation of physical and human capital 
imply that an economy’s growth rate is depended on its initial level of 
development. In this sense, the previous literature that investigates the impacts of 
income inequality on economic growth use a reduced form regression, including 
economic growth as dependent variable, and measures of initial level of economic 
development, physical capital, human capital as independent variables. To address 
the issues of non-stationarity, slope heterogeneity, and CSD, I extend the traditional 
model with the ARDL, CS-ARDL, and CS-DL framework, allowing more 
dynamics of all variables. Under the context of growth empirics, I start with a 










+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.2) 
 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾′𝑖𝐟𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (3.3) 
 
Where the number of units 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁; the number of time periods 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇; 
𝐱𝑖,𝑡−ℓ is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of regressors; 𝛽𝑖,ℓ are the 𝑘 × 1 coefficient vectors; 𝜑𝑖,ℓ are 
scalars; 𝐟𝒕 is an 𝑚 × 1 vector of unobserved common factors; 𝛾′𝑖 is the 
corresponding factor loading. Model 3.2 can also be rewritten as the following 
Error Correction Model. 
 
 ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜃𝑖








+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.4) 
 
Where 𝜆𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝜑𝑖,ℓ
𝑝
ℓ=1 ), which captures the speed of adjustment for any 
deviation from the long-run relationship; individual short-run coefficients are 𝜑𝑖,ℓ
∗  
and 𝛽𝑖,ℓ
∗ ; the ARDL relation can be calculated as 𝜑𝑖,ℓ
∗ = ∑ 𝜑𝑖,𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=ℓ+1  (ℓ =
1,2, … , 𝑝 − 1), and 𝛽′𝑖,ℓ
∗ = − ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑚
𝑞
𝑚=ℓ+1  (ℓ = 1,2, … , 𝑞 − 1). The vector of long-
run coefficients 𝜃𝑖, which is of particular importance for investigating long-run 
relationships, is given by the equation 3.5. It is worth noting that 𝜃𝑖 can be 
consistently estimated regardless of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1), or 











One common way to estimate the long-run coefficients is to obtain the fitted value 
?̂?𝑖,ℓ and ?̂?𝑖,ℓ in the ARDL regression (equation 3.2), and then to plug the 
corresponding fitted values into equation 3.5 to compute 𝜃𝑖. Alternatively, Chudik 
et al. (2013c) propose a new approach to estimate these long-run coefficients 
directly, which is referred as ‘distributed lag’ (DL) approach. They show that the 




 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖x𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼
′
𝑖(𝐿)∆𝐱𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀?̃?,𝑡 (3.6) 
 
Where 𝜀?̃?,𝑡 = 𝜑(𝐿)
−1𝜀𝑖,𝑡;  𝜑𝑖(𝐿) = 1 − ∑ 𝜑𝑖,ℓ
𝑝
ℓ=1 𝐿
ℓ; 𝜃𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖(1); 𝛿𝑖(𝐿) =
𝜑𝑖
−1(𝐿)𝛽𝑖(𝐿) = ∑ 𝛿𝑖,ℓ
∞
ℓ=0 𝐿
ℓ; 𝛽𝑖(𝐿) = ∑ 𝛽𝑖,ℓ
𝑞
ℓ=0 𝐿




ℓ=0 .  
Chudik et al. (2013c) point out that there are several conditions that should be met 
in order to obtain a consistent estimate of 𝜃𝑖. First, all the roots of 𝜑𝑖(𝐿) should lie 
outside the unit circle. Second, the coefficients of 𝛼𝑖(𝐿) are assumed to be 
exponentially decaying. Third, there is no reverse causality from lagged dependent 
variables to independent variables.12 Similar to the ARDL approach, the strict 
exogeneity regarding the regressors is not a necessary assumption for the 
consistency of DL framework. Once the individual long-run coefficients 𝜃𝑖 are 
estimated, either through ARDL or DL method, then these values are used to 





3.5 Main Empirical Results 
Estimate Based on Panel ARDL Model 
To explore the long-run impacts of income inequality of economic growth in China, 
I also include lags of both the dependent and the independent variables to capture 
the dynamics of the regression. Specifically, I initially employ the traditional 
ARDL model as baseline specification, which is shown in the following equation: 
 








+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.7) 
 
Where g corresponds to the growth rate of real GDP per capita; 𝐱𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡)
′
, the definition of these variables could be 
referred to the Table 3A-1 in appendix 3A, respectively; p corresponds to the lag 
length for each variable; 𝜃0,𝑖 is the unobserved province-specific and time-invariant 
factors. In model 3.7, the panel ARDL representation allows that parameters are 
                                                 
12 If the feedback effects from the lagged values of left-hand-side variable to the regressors are 
present, the correlation between  𝜀?̃?,𝑡 and 𝐱𝑖,𝑡 will be non-zero, which invalidates the consistency of 
DL approach (Chudik, et al., 2013c). 
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different across each province, taking into account the fact that impacts of income 
inequality and other regressors on economic growth might vary for different 
provinces. In addition, through the panel unit root tests for all the variables of 
interest in our data, it can be concluded that economic growth and education 
measures are stationary process while investment and inequality index are 
following I(1) process (as shown in Table 3-3). Regarding the lag length for 
independent or dependent variables, same lag orders p are applied to equation 3.7 
but in different values, restricting the maximum lag length as 3. This practice has 
also been used in the empirical studies that have applied ARDL approach with 
similar sample size regarding T and N.13 Even though exactly specified lag lengths 
are necessary for the consistency of ARDL approach, Chudik et al. (2013c) argue 
that growth rates are moderately persistent so that the setting of up to 3 lags is 
enough to fully account for the short-run dynamics. Otherwise, using too much lags 
will lose much degrees of freedom in estimation, which would deteriorate the small 
sample performance. 
 
The estimations of averaged long-run coefficients (across provinces) of inequality, 
investment, and education on economic growth, together with the mean estimate of 
the speed of adjustment from the panel ARDL model are reported for two cases, (a) 
and (b), in Table 3-3. Case (a) illustrates the estimation only includes inequality as 
regressor, while case (b) also contains investment and education measures. Panel A 
in Table 3-3 provides FE estimation which restrict the same parameters across 
provinces. By comparison, results obtained through MG estimator, which allows 
slope heterogeneity, are summarized in Panel B. For FE estimators and MG 
estimators, each panel provides the results across different lag lengths, namely, 𝑝 =
1,2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 3. 
  
                                                 
13 Chudik et al. (2013c) employ ARDL approach to estimate the long-run relationship between 
growth, debt, and inflation with at least 40 countries spanning from 1965 to 2010. Mohaddes and 
Raissi (2014) investigate the long-run relationship between growth and inflation by using the 14 
state level data from 1989 to 2013 in an ARDL framework. In addition, under the ARDL framework, 
Huang and Yeh (2012) study the growth-inequality nexus in America across 48 states from 1945 to 





Table 3-3. FE and MG Estimates Based on ARDL Approach 
 ARDL (p=1) ARDL (p=2) ARDL (p=3) 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 













































CD test† 52.097*** 45.215*** 33.345*** 22.724*** 33.307*** 18.460*** 













































CD test† 44.61*** 40.20*** 26.72*** 14.08*** 22.01*** 11.54*** 
Note. †CD test reports the CS statistics, instead of p-values. The panel ARDL specification is given 
by 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0,𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖,ℓ𝑔𝑖,𝑡−ℓ
𝑝





ℓ=0 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The reported standard errors in parenthesis 
are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and residual serial correlation. In particular, the 
standard errors are adjusted by clustering at the province level. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The estimation results from Table 3-3 suggest that there is no long-run relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth in China. Across all the 
specifications, the long-run coefficients of inequality are not statistically significant 
(expect for the coefficients in case (a) when 𝑝 = 1, and in case (b) when 𝑝 = 3 are 
only significant at 10% significance level). It cannot be predicted that there is 
positive or negative impact from inequality on growth because the signs of the 
coefficients are changing across different lag lengths. Under case (a) when only 
inequality and growth are considered, the results reveal the tendency that the effects 
of inequality are negative on economic growth. But the opposite result (even still 
insignificant) can be obtained when investment and education variables are 
included as shown in case (b) in both panels. Regarding the magnitude of the 
estimation results on inequality, the values ranging from -7.102 to 39.072 across 
various estimation techniques and lag orders. To be more specific, the absolute 
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value of coefficients on inequality are less than one by FE estimation while the 
larger absolute values are obtained by MG estimator. 
 
Focusing on case (b) in both panels, it can be concluded that the long-run impact 
from investment and education on economic growth are positive. Specifically, 
different assumptions on parameters do not affect the absolute magnitude of 
investment coefficients as they are close to zero (ranging from -0.03 to 0.001). It is 
worth noting that the long-run coefficients of investment are negative and 
insignificant when I employ MG estimator, while its values are significantly 
positive based on FE estimators. For the long-run impacts of education, the results 
show that the coefficients on education are insignificant only in the case of 𝑝 = 3, 
suggesting that once allowing for longer lags 𝑝 = 3, the positive long-run effect of 
education on economic growth is no longer evident. Overall, the results presented 
in Table 3-3 imply inconclusive long-run inequality-growth nexus in China, and 
positive investment and education impact on long-run economic growth. However, 
the estimated results differ considerably with different lag lengths and assumption 
on slope homogeneity/heterogeneity. Another important result is that the CD-test 
statistics are so large that the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence are 
strongly rejected at 1% in all cases. 
 
Estimate Based on Panel CS-ARDL Model 
The hypothesis of cross-sectional independent is strongly rejected at 1% level as 
shown in the bottom of Table 3-3, indicating that CSD should be a concern. 
Ignoring the correlation between error terms across provinces would lead to 
misleading results (Phillips and Sul (2003)). To address the presence of CSD, I will 
use cross-sectionally augmented version of panel ARDL approach, proposed by 
Chudik et al. (2013c). These authors suggest to augment the original ARDL with 
cross-sectional averages of independent variables, the dependent variables, and a 
series of their lag values. In this chapter, I will follow the same practice as Chudik 
et al. (2013c), and Mohaddes and Raissi (2014) applied in a similar size of dataset 
regarding T and N by setting the lag length of averaged dependent and independent 


















+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.8) 
 ?̅?𝑡 = (?̅?𝑡, ?̅?′𝑡)′ (3.9) 
 
Table 3-4 provides the MG estimation for CS-ARDL model. Case (a), which 
include only economic growth and income inequality, and case (b), which 
additionally includes investment and education measures, are estimated with mean 
group estimator for 𝑝 = 1, 2, and 3. For the long-run coefficients on inequality, 
again, there is no evidence to support for the existence of growth-inequality nexus 
in the long term as these parameters are not statistically significant. When 
accounting for the effects of CSD, compared to the results from previous 
estimation, the range of 𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 even dramatically larger (falling between -77.103 to 
63.763) and with indeterminate signs. 
 
Apart from the insignificance of the income inequality coefficients, investment and 
education measures become insignificant as well, implying that when controlling 
for the CSD with the averaged lagged of dependent and independent variables, the 
long-run effects from both education and investment are no longer evident. What is 
even striking is that the sign of education, even though the coefficients are 
insignificant, are negative, suggesting that education would deteriorate the long-run 
economic growth. Compared to the previous results in Table 3-3, the magnitude of  
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡 do not vary much, even though they are not statistically significant even at 
10% level. It is worth noting that the total observation is not enough when 
considering the CS-ARDL model under 𝑝 = 3, and when I try to implement the 
Pesaran' CD test in case (b) for all p values. These cases are marked as ‘n.a.’ in the 
table. As for the estimate of ?̂?, the speeds of convergence are generally faster 
compared to the case without CS augmentation in previous tests. The CD test 
statistics in Table 3-4 confirm a significant decrease in the average pair-wise 
correlation of error terms across provinces. However, it still cannot be rejected that 




Table 3-4. MG Estimates Based on the CS-ARDL Approach 
 ARDL (p=1) ARDL (p=2) ARDL (p=3) 







































CD test† -2.80*** n.a. 2.08** n.a. -1.87* n.a. 
Note. †CD test reports the CS statistics, instead of p-values. 
          ‡n.a. stands for not applicable due to insufficient observation for relevant estimations when 
using certain lags to deal with potential serial correlation issues and CSD. 
The panel CS-ARDL specification is given by 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0,𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖,ℓ𝑔𝑖,𝑡−ℓ
𝑝










ℓ=0 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Standard errors are reported inside parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Estimate Based on Panel CS-DL Model 
Even though the CS-ARDL approach have tackled the issue of cross-sectional 
dependence caused by common factors, Chudik et al. (2013c) point out that both 
ARDL and CS-ARDL approaches are not without its disadvantages. Based on their 
Monte Carlo simulation results, these authors conclude that the sampling 
uncertainty for ARDL and CS-ARDL model could be large especially for the case 
that the time periods is moderate. In addition, another drawback of ARDL model is 
that the slight misspecification of the model regarding the lag length would 
deteriorate the estimation performance severely. Therefore, Chudik et al. (2013c) 
propose a new approach to estimate the long-run coefficients, 𝜃𝑖 directly without 
estimating the short-run dynamics, which is referred as DL approach as introduced 
in equation 3.6 previously. The DL approach features better small sample 
performance for moderate 𝑇. Furthermore, the DL model only requires that a 
truncation lag order is selected since it is robust to residual serial correlation, and 
possible breaks in the error terms, which are appealing features in empirical 
research. 
 
In order to account for the effect of CSD, CS-DL approach augments the equation 
3.6 with the averaged lag values of independent variables, and the averaged value 
of first-differenced dependent variable. However, at the same time, this new 
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method drops out the autoregressive term in the right-hand-side. In the following 
context, I will use the MG estimator to run the CS-DL regressions in case (a) 
(includes only income inequality and economic growth), and case (b) (also includes 
investment and education). Similarly, different lag lengths are considered for 𝑝 =
1,2,3 whereas I set a fixed lag order of 3 for averaged values for regressors in all 
specifications. 
 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0,𝑖 + 𝜽′𝒊𝐱𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿′𝑖,ℓ∆𝐱𝑖,𝑡−ℓ
𝑝−1
ℓ=0





+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.10) 
 
Table 3-5 summarizes the MG estimation based on CS-DL framework. It is worth 
noting that this estimation is not applicable for the case (b) when 𝑝 = 2 and 𝑝 = 3 
since there is not enough observations in the panel. Overall, in all specification, the 
long-run coefficients on income inequality, are still statistically insignificant even at 
10% level, even though all of them are positive, suggesting that the long-run impact 
of income inequality on growth is encouraging. Focusing on the only estimable 
specification of case (b), the magnitude of the long-run coefficient of inequality are 
unusually high (reaching 22.410). Meanwhile, the coefficients on investment 
(insignificant) and education (significant at only 10% level) measure are negative, 
which is similar to the results obtained by CS-ARDL (see Table 3-4). At the bottom 
of the Table 3-5, the Pesaran's CD test statistics suggest that the CSD caused by 
common factors have not completely ruled out by augmenting the regression with 





Table 3-5. MG Estimates Based on the CS-DL Approach 
 DL (p=1) DL (p=2) DL (p=3) 



















 n.a.  n.a. 
CD test† -3.10*** -0.83 2.96*** n.a. -2.64*** n.a. 
Note. †CD test reports the CS statistics, instead of p-values. 
          ‡n.a. stands for not applicable due to insufficient observation for relevant estimations when 
using certain lags to deal with potential serial correlation issues and CSD. 
The panel CS-DL specification is given by 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0,𝑖 + 𝜃′𝑖𝐱𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿′𝑖,ℓ∆𝐱𝑖,𝑡−ℓ
𝑝−1
ℓ=0 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑔∆?̅?𝑡 +
∑ 𝜔′𝑖,𝑥ℓ?̅?𝑡−ℓ
3
ℓ=0 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Standard errors are reported inside parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
As Chudik et al. (2013c) discussed, however, the consistency of the CS-DL 
estimation requires that there is no reversed effect running from the lagged of the 
dependent to the regressors, which has been proved by their Monte Carlo 
simulation. Practically, to ensure the CS-DL method is valid, one should assume 
that the economic growth rates in previous period do not affect the current or 
previous investment ratio, or education enrolment. Having said that,  
Chudik et al. (2013c) emphasize that the CS-DL approach itself is not a superior 
model compared to CS-ARDL model because both technique involve a trade-off. 
For example, it is easier to calculate the long-run relationship by collecting the 
short-run coefficients in ARDL framework. But the bad small sample performance 
and correct model specification regarding lag length are disadvantages. While DL 
model offer better small sample performance and robust results to different lag 
order, it leaves the feedback effects problem unsolved. 
 
3.6 Robustness Analysis 
OLS Estimation for Each Period 
In the first part of this section, simple OLS estimation will be employed for each 
period to test the relationship between income inequality and economic growth with 
the following specification: 
 




Where i denotes province while subscript -1 means the value in the last period for 
this variable. For example, when testing the model 3.11 for year 1988, economic 
growth rate, as the dependent variable, will choose its value in 1988. But for other 
independent variables, their values in 1987 will be selected in this case. This model 
specification is following previous empirical research such as Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), Li and Zou (1988), Forbes (2000), and Panizza (2002). This practice not 
only rules out the possible reverse causality from the current economic growth to 
the regressors in the current realization (Persson & Tabellini, 1994), but also takes 
the lag effect into account since it is common that the current change in education 
or investment will not have immediate effect on the economic growth. Table 3-6 
shows the results of OLS estimation for model 3.11 from 1988 to 2012. The results 
reveal that the coefficients for the lagged valued of Theil index are not statistically 
significant at 5% confidence level (three exceptions happened in 1991, 2008 and 
2011). Similar results could also be obtained regarding lagged investment and 
education, which violates the general believe and previous empirical evidence. 
With respect to lagged value of education measures, none of the coefficient is 
significant at 5% level. It can be concluded that from the simple OLS estimation for 
model 3.11, the correlation of current inequality, investment, and education do not 
have significant relationship with the subsequent economic growth. 




Table 3-6. OLS Result for Each Period 
Year L.Theil L.Investment L.Education Constant N 
1988 0.557 0.001 -0.005 0.014 28 
1989 -0.108 0.001 -0.029 0.062 29 
1990 1.978 -0.002 -0.053 0.127** 29 
1991 3.669* -0.001 -0.067 0.110* 29 
1992 2.196 0.001 -0.078 0.089 29 
1993 -0.043 0.001 -0.056 0.068 29 
1994 0.825 -0.001 -0.012 0.081* 29 
1995 1.271 -0.003* 0.023 0.142** 29 
1996 0.024 -0.002 0.012 0.124** 29 
1997 0.410 -0.001 0.031 0.084*** 29 
1998 0.287 -0.000 0.017 0.077*** 29 
1999 -0.029 -0.000 0.022 0.068*** 29 
2000 -0.877 0.001 0.026 0.059* 29 
2001 0.158 -0.000 0.002 0.086*** 29 
2002 0.481 -0.000 0.008 0.106*** 29 
2003 0.281 0.001 0.002 0.100*** 29 
2004 -0.339 0.001 0.011 0.104** 29 
2005 -0.885 0.001 0.004 0.107** 29 
2006 -0.438 0.001 -0.001 0.098*** 29 
2007 0.191 0.001* -0.005 0.070* 29 
2008 -2.291* 0.003* 0.019 -0.029 29 
2009 -0.577 0.001 0.010 0.009 29 
2010 -1.033 0.000 -0.004 0.097* 29 
2011 -0.847* 0.001*** -0.010 0.063** 29 
2012 -0.279 0.001** -0.003 0.006 29 
Note. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The OLS specification is 
given by 𝑔𝑖 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖,−1 + 𝜃2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,−1 + 𝜃3𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,−1 + 𝜀 
 
Analysis with Subsamples 
From previous estimation via ARDL, CS-ARDL or CS-DL model, it can be 
concluded that the long-run relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth in China is not significant since the long-run coefficients on Theil index are 
statistically insignificant at 10% significance level for most of the cases. With the 
worldwide dataset, Barro (2000) concludes that the relationship between inequality 
and economic growth is non-linear: he finds that there is positive growth-inequality 
nexus in rich countries whereas the correlation between inequality and growth is 
negative among poor countries. However, when the whole sample is considered, the 
overall relationship between income inequality and growth rates are not evident. In 
addition, such non-linear inequality-growth nexus is also obtained in Reuter (2004) 
and Wan et al. (2006). Therefore, following these thoughts, it is reasonable to 
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assume that the impacts of income inequality on economic growth might vary in 
provinces with different economic performance. To verify this assumption, I 
categorize the whole sample into three subsamples, namely, top10, middle10 and 
bottom9. 
 
Figure 3-1. Economic Development of top10, middle10 and bottom9 Provinces 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from NBS 
 
First, all provinces are ranked from the highest to the lowest by the averaged real 
GDP per capita from 1987 to 2012. In this sense, the richest 10 provinces fall in the 
group of top10 while the 9 provinces with the lowest averaged GDP per capita will 
grouped as bottom9. The remaining provinces belong to the middle10 
classification. The result reveals that the overall averaged real GDP per capita is 
3562 renminbi (approximately 350 GBP based on the current exchange rate in 
2015) during 1987 to 2012, with the highest at 8762 renminbi (Shanghai) and the 
lowest at 1292 renminbi (Guizhou). The real GDP per capita for the top 10 
provinces are equal to or above 4244 renminbi whereas its value for the bottom 9 
provinces is equal to or under 2254 renminbi. Table 3-7 summarized the whole 
ranking and related descriptive statistics regarding real GDP per capita for every 
province. Also, Figure 3-1 shows the distribution of top10, middle10 and bottom9 




Table 3-7. Real GDP Per Capita and Ranking for Provinces in China 
Top10 Middle10 Bottom9 
Rank Province GDP Rank Province GDP Rank Province GDP 
1 Shanghai 8762 11 Hebei 3533 21 Jiangxi 2254 
2 Tianjin 7571 12 Jilin 3428 22 Qinghai 2223 
3 Beijing 7272 13 Heilongjiang 3287 23 Hunan 2183 
4 Zhejiang 5502 14 Xinjaing 2774 24 Guangxi 2099 
5 Jiangsu 5277 15 Henan 2762 25 Anhui 2084 
6 Guangdong 5149 16 Hubei 2642 26 Sichuan 2017 
7 Liaoning 4708 17 Shanxi 2635 27 Yunnan 1765 
8 Fujian 4431 18 Ningxia 2532 28 Gansu 1697 
9 Shandong 4369 19 Shaanxi 2418 29 Guizhou 1292 
10 Neimenggu 4244 20 Hainan 2380    
Mean 3562 Medium 2762 
Source: Author’s own calculation from NBS. 
 
As shown in the Figure 3-1 and Table 3-7, the top 10 richest provinces are normally 
distributed around the east coastal line (except for Neimenggu), while the poorest 
provinces are in the western part of China (except for Xinjiang). Also, the middle 
10 provinces are laying between the eastern richest and the western poorest in the 
map. In the following subsection, this study will provide the estimation results via 
the estimators and models that have been used in whole sample: dynamic FE and 
MG estimators for ARDL model, CS-ARDL model, and CS-DL model, 
respectively. 
 
Estimation Results for Top10 
Table 3-8 summarizes the estimation results obtained from ARDL, CS-ARDL and 
CS-DL model. FE estimation results for the richest 10 provinces show that the 
long-run coefficient on all regressors are insignificant even at 10% confidence level 
when 𝑝 = 2. In the case of ARDL(1) and ARDL(3) specification, the results reveal 
that coefficients on Theil index are mostly positive and significant (4 out of 6 cases) 
at least at 10% confidence level, ranging from 0.449 to 1.218. With regard to other 
variables, the results show that there is no long-run relationship between education 
and economic growth, while investment has been proved to exert encouraging 
effects on growth. However, similar results could not be further confirmed by using 
MG for the identical specifications. Specifically, the long-run coefficients on Theil 
index are not significant in all cases when considering the MG estimator on ARDL 
model. Interestingly, the results in panel B obtained via MG estimator show that 
investment has nothing to do with economic growth due to insignificant parameters, 
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while it can be concluded that education has negative effects on economic growth 
for the richest 10 provinces. Both results violate from traditional theories and 
empirical results. 
 
Since the number of cross-sections are at most 10 for each subsample (𝑁 = 10), 
there is not enough observation to calculate the related coefficients via CS-ARDL 
and CS-DL model. Therefore, in the similar analysis to Middle10 and Bottom9 
provinces, I cannot provide analysis when considering the case of four variables in 
CS-ARDL(2) and CS-ARDL(3) specifications. For CS-ARDL results, only one 
coefficient of interest (Theil index) is significant at 10% confidence level, implying 
that the long-run relationship between inequality and growth is positive. However, 
compared to the parameters obtained from model without cross-sectional augment, 
the magnitude of this coefficient (7.01) is significantly larger than the ones obtained 
via fixed effects (maximum 1.22). With respect to CS-DL model, it can be 
concluded that there is no long-run inequality-growth nexus, but both investment 
and education are negatively affect the economic growth, which violate our 





Table 3-8. Estimation Results for Top10 Subsample 
 ARDL (p=1) ARDL (p=2) ARDL (p=3) 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Panel A. FE for ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 10.30*** 1.22** -0.11 0.47 -0.45* 0.87*** 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  0.001***  0.0004  0.0005* 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  0.00  0.001  0.000 
?̂? -0.48*** -0.70*** -0.59*** -0.83*** -0.54*** 0.084*** 
Panel B. MG for ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 1.81 1.51 -1.66 0.081 -4.97 -3.63 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  0.00  -0.002*  -0.0002 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  -0.01  0.06*  0.06* 
?̂? -0.59*** -0.87*** -0.65*** -1.10*** -0.62*** -1.68*** 
Panel C. MG for CS-ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 -0.91 7.01* 0.26 n.a. -0.16 n.a. 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  0.20  n.a.  n.a. 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  -0.25  n.a.  n.a. 
?̂? -1.02*** -1.41*** -1.41*** n.a. -1.45*** n.a. 
 DL (p=1) DL (p=2) DL (p=3) 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Panel D. MG for CS-DL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 -0.19 11.86* 0.44 n.a. 0.86 n.a. 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  -0.006**  n.a.  n.a. 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  -0.41***  n.a.  n.a. 
Note. n.a. stands for not applicable due to insufficient observations for relevant estimation while 
using certain lags to deal with potential serial correlation issue and CSD. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Estimation Results for Middle10 
The estimation results from middle 10 provinces, as shown in Table 3-9, reveal a 
different story compared to those in Top10. Specifically, focusing on FE estimator, 
the long-run coefficient on Theil index turn to be negative and significant in most 
of cases (except for ARDL(2) case (b), and ARDL(3) case (b)), implying that 
income inequality will impede the economic growth in the long-run, ranging from -
9.03 to -4.21. This result also can be confirmed by the MG estimator, even though 
the range of the significant coefficients are marginally larger than those obtained by 
FE estimator (from -13.01 to -9.66). Also, even though FE estimation do not 
provide clear evidence regarding the impact of investment on economic growth, all 
education long-run coefficients are positive and significant at least at 5% 
significance level. This evidence also is strengthened by the MG estimator for the 
same specifications. Except for the ARDL(1), the case that reveal that education is 
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negatively associated to economic growth, all of other cases show that education is 
one of economic growth stimulators. 
 
With regard to the cases when cross-sectional dependence is taken into 
consideration, overall coefficients on Theil index are much larger than those of 
previous estimation. However, there is only one case to show that inequality-growth 
nexus is positive (at 10% confidence level), which is also opposite to the prediction 
of what have been concluded by ARDL model. As for other regressors, none of 
them are statistically significant in all cases in CS-ARDL specifications. 
 
Table 3-9. Estimation Results for Middle10 Subsample 
 ARDL (p=1) ARDL (p=2) ARDL (p=3) 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Panel A. FE for ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 -9.03*** -4.53*** -4.21** 0.61 -7.23* -1.782 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  0.0003  -0.001  0.001 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  0.002**  0.047***  0.036** 
?̂? -0.64*** -0.90*** -0.66*** -0.93*** -0.66*** -1.01*** 
Panel B. MG for ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 -11.62*** 12.32 -9.77 109.6 -9.66 -13.01* 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  -0.001  -0.011  -0.001* 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  -0.048**  0.227*  0.076*** 
?̂? -0.68*** -1.07*** -0.75*** -1.09*** -0.88*** -1.85*** 
Panel C. MG for CS-ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 9.46 1.36 10.93 n.a. 10.71* n.a. 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  0.015  n.a.  n.a. 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  -0.394  n.a.  n.a. 
?̂? -1.04*** -1.54*** -1.22*** n.a. -1.43*** n.a. 
 DL (p=1) DL (p=2) DL (p=3) 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Panel D. MG for CS-DL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 12.99 76.76 14.54 n.a. 17.48 n.a. 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  -0.003**  n.a.  n.a. 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  -0.587***  n.a.  n.a. 
Note. n.a. stands for not applicable due to insufficient observations for relevant estimation while 
using certain lags to deal with potential serial correlation issue and CSD. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Estimation Results for Bottom9 
Table 3-10 summarizes the estimation results for the poorest 9 provinces. Through 
the tests (FE estimator and MG estimator) for ARDL model, the long-run 
coefficients, 𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙, are insignificant in most of the cases (8 out of 12). Focusing on 
the significant results, it can be concluded that the income inequality is negatively 
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associated to the long-run economic growth at least at the 10% significance level, 
ranging from -11.67 to -3.328. Also, the significant long-run coefficients on Theil 
index for the poorest 10 provinces share the similar magnitude to the ones in the 
Middle10 subsample. With regard to other variables, results through FE estimator 
show that there is no long-run relationship between investment and growth, and 
between education and growth, as all the parameters of interests are not significant 
at 5% significance level. When MG estimator is considered for ARDL 
specification, it can be concluded that education exerts positive impacts on 
economic growth in the long-run. Such positive education-growth nexus also is 
supported by the results from CS-ARDL and CS-DL specification. However, when 
considering the CSD, the size of the coefficients changes dramatically. For 
example, on the one hand, in the case of CS-ARDL(1), the coefficient of education 
is about 10 times as much as the one obtained from ARDL(1). On the other hand, in 
the case of CS-DL(1) specification, the corresponding coefficient on education is 
0.0039, which is only less than one-tenth as much as the one obtained from 
ARDL(1). With respect to other variables such as inequality and investment, results 
from CS-ARDL and CS-DL do not reveal clear inequality-growth nexus and 






Table 3-10. Estimation Results for Bottom9 Subsample 
 ARDL (p=1) ARDL (p=2) ARDL (p=3) 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Panel A. FE for ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 -9.98** -3.11 -2.51 0.61 -11.67** -3.328* 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  0.001  -0.001  0.001* 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  0.02  0.047***  0.002 
?̂? -0.62*** -0.95*** -0.56*** -0.93*** -0.42*** -0.80*** 
Panel B. MG for ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 -11.72*** -10.94* 6.37 109.6 -6.74 -2.19* 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  -0.001  -0.011  -0.002 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  0.08*  0.227*  0.122** 
?̂? -0.80*** -1.20*** -0.75*** -1.09*** -0.73*** -1.76*** 
Panel C. MG for CS-ARDL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 14.93 19.24 14.48 n.a. -5.23 n.a. 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  0.008  n.a.  n.a. 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  0.83*  n.a.  n.a. 
?̂? -1.21*** -1.54*** -1.58*** n.a. -1.97*** n.a. 
 DL (p=1) DL (p=2) DL (p=3) 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Panel D. MG for CS-DL 
𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 13.26* -12.74 14.83** n.a. 12.86 n.a. 
𝜃𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡  -0.004*  n.a.  n.a. 
𝜃𝑒𝑑𝑐  -0.357***  n.a.  n.a. 
Note. n.a. stands for not applicable due to insufficient observations for relevant estimation while 
using certain lags to deal with potential serial correlation issue and CSD. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This study divides the full sample in three subsamples according to the averaged 
real GDP per capita during 1987 to 2012 for each province. To examine the 
subsamples, similar techniques (FE and MG estimators for ARDL, MG estimator 
for CS-ARDL and CS-DL model) to the ones that have been employed to the full 
sample are used to three subsamples. Due to insufficient panel observations, the 
estimation on CS-ARDL and CS-DL model with 𝑝 = 2 and 𝑝 = 3 via MG 
estimator cannot be conducted. Therefore, there are ‘n.a.’ in the corresponding 
areas in Table 3-8, Table 3-9, and Table 3-10. In addition, the coefficients obtained 
through CS-ARDL and CS-DL specification are more likely larger and insignificant 
compared to those from ARDL specifications. For this reason, the subsample 
analysis only focuses on FE and MG estimators for ARDL specification allowing 




Overall, the estimation results for subsamples imply that there is a relatively weak 
positive relationship between income inequality and economic growth in the long-
run for the richest 10 provinces, whereas the impacts of income inequality on 
economic growth for the rest of provinces are negative during the same observed 
time periods. In comparison, when considering the same model specification and 
estimators for the whole sample, the results imply that the long-run correlation 
between income inequality and economic growth in China is not evident. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the relationship between inequality and growth is non-
linear, which supports the findings in Barro (2000). Focusing on the size of the 
coefficients on Theil index among the subsamples, the absolute values of 𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 are 
much smaller in Top10 than their counterpart provinces (Bottom9 and Middle10), 
indicating that the impacts of inequality in rich areas are weaker than that of in the 
poor and medium provinces. However, the statistical significance of the long-run 
coefficients of Theil index are not robust across different lags. It is shown in Table 
3-8, Table 3-9, and Table 3-10 that the number of insignificant 𝜃𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙  almost 
accounts for half of the total cases in each subsample. 
 
Similar to the long-run coefficients on Theil index, the coefficients on other 
variables are not persistently significant across models in different lag lengths. 
Surprisingly, the estimation results do not show that investment exert any 
significant impact on long-run economic growth for Middle10 and Bottom9, as 
majority of the coefficients on investment are insignificant, which is different from 
the expectation that investment is one of the promoters of economic growth. In 
comparison, in the case of the Top10 rich provinces, only half of the coefficients on 
investment are positively significant, suggesting that investment encourages the 
long-run growth rate. However, the effects of investment on growth, no matter for 
Top10 or for the whole sample, are marginal. With regard to education, the related 
results from Middle10 and Bottom9 consistently deliver the message that education 
is positively correlated to the economic growth in the long-run. However, the 
results from rich provinces show an opposite story that education is negatively 
linked to the long-run growth, even though the majority of long-run coefficients on 




In conclusion, when splitting the whole sample into subsamples by the real GDP 
per capita in each province, the results show that there is a positive inequality-
growth nexus among richest 10 provinces while its relationship is negative for the 
rest of China. In addition, investment is not significant in the most of cases, even 
for cases in subsamples. Furthermore, similar to the results from whole sample, 
education in middle 10 and poorest 9 provinces exerts positive impacts on long-run 
economic growth. However, this relationship is not evident among the richest 10 
provinces. 
 
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
The impacts of income inequality of economic growth have long been a core 
research interest among economists for the past decades, which is the very first 
research question of this thesis. Especially, China is an interesting case because it 
has been witnessed a remarkable economic growth accompanied by a dramatic 
increase in the level of income inequality since the commencement of the economic 
reform from 1978. Empirically, this chapter identifies the long-run impacts of 
income inequality on economic growth. 
 
The current research aims at overcoming some data deficiencies in existing 
empirical research in Reuter (2004), Wan et al. (2006), and Gravier-Rymaszewska 
et al. (2010) by employing the new dataset assembled by UTIP. Also, with a larger 
panel in both cross-section units and time span, new panel time series estimation 
techniques, taking non-stationarity, parameter heterogeneity, and CSD into 
consideration. These methods include FE and MG estimators for ARDL, CS-
ARDL, and CS-DL model. 
 
The empirical results show that there is no significant correlation between income 
inequality and economic growth in China when the tests are conducted for the 
whole sample as the estimation results are consistently insignificant. However, 
when the whole sample is categorized by the economic performance, the results 
become different. The long-run coefficients on Theil index for the richest 10 
provinces are positive while those are negative for the Middle10 and Bottom9 
areas. This finding is similar to what have been concluded in Barro (2000), the 
study which points out a non-linear relationship that the inequality-growth nexus is 
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positive for rich countries while the impact of inequality on growth is negative for 
poor countries. But the estimation results regarding the long-run effect coefficients 
of the income inequality are not persistently significant across different lag lengths 
for each subsample. 
 
Compared to the findings in previous empirical research in China, the results are 
similar to Gravier-Rymaszewska et al. (2010), the study which finds out that the 
impact of inequality on industrial growth is positive in coastal areas. However, 
different Theil index employed in both research is not the only different in both 
research. Therefore, anything different or similar of the result between these two 
studies cannot be explained by the improved of the dataset only. 
 
One important policy implication of current research is that the inequality-
reduction-policy should be considered in a region-by-region case as the impacts of 
inequality have different effects on rich and the rest of the provinces in China. For 
the poor areas, since the inequality-growth nexus is negative, meaning that the 
policies that could lower the level of inequality would encourage the economic 
growth. However, one should be concerned that the same policies might not be 
applied to the rich provinces unless that the prior goal of the government to reduce 
the inequality at the expense of high growth rate. 
 
There are several aspects can be done in the future to improve current research. 
First of all, even though the data that this chapter have the largest coverage at the 
best of my knowledge in the Chinese context, the dataset itself has still not enough 
observations. The results are shown in the empirical results section contain some 
‘n.a.’ as there is not enough panel observation to calculate the needed coefficients. 
For this reason, if longer time periods can be covered, the time-series properties can 
be more clearly tested, and more lags can be selected with ARDL, CS-ARDL, and 
CS-DL model, to better tackle with the CSD issue. Second, even though the cross-
sectional dependence has been taken into account in this chapter, with limit data 
and limit lags that can be exploited in the cross-sectionally augmented terms, the 
CSD problem still cannot be ruled out completely. In future work, researchers can 





So far, this chapter has examined the long-run effect of income inequality on 
economic growth in China with the macro economic data at the province level. But 
what can we tell the impact of income inequality at the micro level? It will be 
interesting to look at this issue from the household/individual perspective. In the 
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Appendix 3A Information Regarding the 
Variables 
 
Table 3A-1. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Definition Source Mean S.D. 
Growth  Δlog(real GDP per capita)* NBSC 0.0872 0.056 
Inequality Theil Index UTIP 0.001 0.011 
Investment (%) Fixed capital/Investment and GDP NBSC 41.207 16.603 
Education (%) Higher Education Enrolment Rate NBSC 0.797 0.748 
Note: *Δ is an operator that calculates the difference between the value of variable at time t and t-1. 
 
Figure 3A-1. Scatter Plot (Growth vs. Theil) 
 
Data Source: Author’s computation based on the raw data from NBSC and UTIP. 
Note: Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Guangdong are the richest provinces (as can 
be seen in Table 3-7, while the poorest 5 provinces are Guizhou, Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan, and 
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Chapter 4. Effects of Inequality on Growth: 
Aggravation from Aggregation? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The impacts of income inequality on economic growth has long been one of core 
research interests among economists, politicians, or sociologists. Although the 
related studies on this line remains controversial, the notion of a trade-off between 
equity and efficiency seems deeply rooted in policymakers’ consciousness, which is 
originally proposed in Okun (1975). From a perspective of policy makers, it seems 
that, to some extent, the goal of preventing income inequality from increasing and 
the goal of maintaining a sustainable economic growth are contradictive. Is it really 
the case? Related literature has been motivated to investigate the inequality-growth 
nexus. Interestingly, so far, the effects of income inequality on economic growth is 
still inconclusive. In terms of empirical studies, majority of them run a standard 
growth regression with a measure of income inequality as an extra explanatory 
variable with global data (see Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 
1994; and Clarke, 1995; Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000). With different estimation 
techniques and various models, both positive and negative coefficients on income 
inequality are found.1 
 
There are several drawbacks to the majority of the existing empirical literature in 
this area. Most of research focuses on global data, ignoring potential heterogeneity 
across countries/economies. Given the variation results across countries, policy 
makers need to ask whether particular conclusions may be applied to their 
countries. This question is especially critical after Barro’s (2000, 2008) finding that 
income inequality has different effects on economic growth between poor and rich 
countries. These studies offer great examples to illustrate that failure in considering 
the degree of development will lead to a misleading general conclusion for all 
countries. 
 
                                                 
1 Initially, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Clarke (1995) conclude that 
the impacts of inequality on economic growth is negative. However, with introduction of the 
improved dataset and panel data estimation techniques, Forbes (2000) and Barro (2000) challenge 
the previous empirical evidence and find a positive inequality-growth relationship. 
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The second drawback relates to macro data (or aggregate data) that have been 
widely used to investigate the impacts of income inequality on economic growth. 
There are at least two potential issues that will affect the estimation result. The first 
is that the previous literature pays little attention to the curvature of the growth 
function at the micro level. When testing whether economic convergence occurs 
across countries, traditional growth empirics normally assume that the economic 
growth is linearly correlated with the initial income level, ignoring the possibilities 
of curvature (such as quadratic or inverse correlation) at the micro level. This 
chapter finds that different curvatures of the income growth function at the micro 
level will have different impacts on the marginal effect of income inequality on 
aggregate income growth. Specifically, if a quadratic term of initial income level is 
introduced to the micro growth function, then the association between income 
inequality and macro income growth will not necessarily to be negative. A 
mathematical example is offered to illustrate this issue in the next section. Another 
potential concern is the aggregating variables to produce macro data. Ideally, the 
macro data should be the algebraic mean of the micro index. However, aggregation 
effect will be raised in the macro growth empirics. For example, economic growth 
of an economy, a core variable in this study, is the growth rate at the mean income 
per capita, not the mean of the growth rate of income per capita. Ravallion (1998) 
points out that aggregation effects in growth regressions at the macro level may 
severely bias conventional tests and generate spurious impacts of inequality on 
economic growth.2 
 
Last but not the least, authors have put forward several explanations for why 
income inequality might impact economic growth: the credit market imperfection 
channel (see, Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993); the political 
economy channel (see, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Bertola, 1993; and Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994); and the socio-political instability channel (see, Alesina and 
Perotti, 1994; Gupta, 1990; Perotti, 1996). However, there are few studies to 
                                                 
2 Ravallion (1998) investigates the impacts of asset inequality on consumption growth regression 
under the Cass-Koopmans-Ramseys framework at both household level and aggregate level. In his 
analysis, two assumptions should be met when examining the effects of inequality on growth: first, 
there is no underlying spatial externalities of average wealth; second, the change of consumption 




support any of these transmission channels with their empirical results.3 Wrong 
remedies might be implemented to deal with the trend of increasing income 
inequality if policy makers do not know how income inequality affects economic 
growth exactly. For example, if the political economy channel is predominant, 
income inequality may retard economic growth in part because the efforts on 
redistribution caused by the unequal society themselves exert distortionary effects 
on growth. In this case, taxes and transfers may be exactly inappropriate policies 
(Ostry el al., 2014). 
 
In order to test the potential transmission mechanisms, micro data from a single 
country is needed. Due largely to the lack of such data, to the best of my 
knowledge, there is no such empirical work. This chapter contributes to the 
literature and fits in this research gap. First, a mathematical example is provided to 
demonstrate the problems of aggregating data when ignoring the curvature of the 
micro growth function. Next, by using Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 
survey data, this chapter verifies the predictions from the mathematical example. In 
addition, the current study will compare the estimation results both at the aggregate 
(village) level to the ones at the micro (household) level, in the hope of providing 
new empirical evidence for examining mainstream transmission mechanisms from a 
household perspective. 
 
The estimation results show that at the macro level, a one percentage point increase 
in the Gini coefficient will lead to a 0.75 percentage point decrease in village 
income growth. At the micro level, empirical evidence shows that household 
income growth is a quadratic function of initial household income level and that no 
spill-over effect from village income inequality exists. Both results confirm the 
prediction from the mathematical example. In addition, combining the empirical 
results from both micro and macro level, it is suggested that the political economy 
channel is predominant in rural China. 
 
The remainder of the current study is organized as follows. The second section 
provides a mathematical example and discusses how the specification of the micro 
                                                 
3 There are some exceptions. Perotti (1996) examines all the discussed channels. 
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growth function matters when investigating the inequality-growth nexus with macro 
data. The following section is a brief review of the mainstream transmission 
mechanisms of inequality-growth nexus, and discusses how they might apply to 
rural China. Section 4.4 describes the empirical strategy and discusses the predicted 
estimation results. Section 4.5 provides information of the data, while section 4.6 
shows empirical evidence at both household and village level and discussion. The 
last part concludes and outlines policy implications. 
 
4.2 Mathematical Example 
In traditional growth empirics, it is normal to examine a growth function including 
a measure of initial income level on the right-hand-side in hope of examining the 
catch-up effect (or known as economic convergence). If the coefficient of initial 
income is statistically negative, it can be concluded that the growth for the poor is 
faster than their rich counterparts. However, the assumption that economic growth 
is linearly correlated to initial income might be too restrictive and ignore other 
shapes (or curvatures) of the growth function. If this assumption does not hold, the 
problem of misspecification regarding the growth regression may raise. This section 
provides a simple mathematical example to demonstrate this issue by introducing a 
quadratic term of initial income to the growth function. Other cases of different 
curvatures regarding the household income growth function are discussed in the 
Appendix 4C. 
 
Suppose that in village v, there are only two households (𝐻 = 2) and each 
household has only one resident in every period (𝑛1
ℎ = 𝑛2
ℎ = 1), therefore the total 
population (𝑁𝑣) of village v is 2. The initial level of household income per capita 
for ℎ1 ((𝑦1
ℎ)−1) and ℎ2 ((𝑦2
ℎ)−1) are identical as 𝑌. To monitor the impact of 
income inequality on economic growth, it is assumed that there is a mean-
preserving income transfer from household ℎ1 to household ℎ2 by the non-zero 
amount of 𝜎. After the income transfer, ℎ1 has 𝑌 − 𝜎, while ℎ2 has 𝑌 + 𝜎, 
enlarging the degree of income inequality (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑣 > 0). It is worth noting that 𝜎 is 
standard deviation in this case, measuring the dispersion of household income per 
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capita from the mean after the income transfer. The larger the 𝜎, the more unequal 
in this village.4 
 
Equation 4.1 is growth regression where 𝑔ℎ is defined as growth rate of household 
income per capita. For capturing catch-up effect, it is assumed that the coefficient 
on the level of initial household income per capita (𝛼1) is negative, which suggests 
that poor families will have relatively higher income growth rate compared to their 
richer counterparts. In addition, following Barro (1991), this model also allows for 
a quadratic term of initial household income per capita and assumes that the change 
of household growth rate will be slower with the increase in initial income level 
(𝛼2 > 0).
5 Furthermore, for the purpose of simplicity, it is also assumed that there 
is no spill-over effect from income inequality at the household level, suggesting that 
the measure of income inequality does not enter the equation 4.1. This assumption 
will be verified in the empirical section of this chapter. 
 
 𝑔ℎ(𝑦ℎ) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦
ℎ + 𝛼2(𝑦
ℎ)2 , 𝛼1 < 0, 𝛼2 > 0  (4.1) 
 
At the village level, growth rate of income per capita (𝑔𝑣), conventionally, can be 
computed as the growth rate of the mean income per capita of village v. By 
plugging in all the settings and assumptions discussed above, after the income 
transfer, the village income per capita growth rate (equation 4.2) is not merely the 





                                                 
4 Gini coefficient in this case can be computed as 
𝜎
2𝑌
. It is clear that Gini coefficient is positively 
correlated to the standard deviation 𝜎 in this case. 
5 Barro (1991) also relaxes the linear assumption of the growth function. Although the coefficient 
of the quadratic term is positive, it is marginally significant with the t-value of 1.4 only. In empirical 
result section of this study, the assumption of 𝛼2 > 0  is affirmed. 
6 Since the income growth rate for household can be expressed as 𝑔ℎ =
∆𝑦ℎ
𝑦ℎ
, then the household 
income change could be expressed as ∆𝑦ℎ = 𝑦𝑖
ℎ × 𝑔ℎ. Together with the assumption that 
𝑔ℎ(𝑦ℎ) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦
ℎ + 𝛼2(𝑦
ℎ)2, for ℎ1, ∆𝑦1
ℎ = 𝛼0(𝑌 − 𝜎) + 𝛼1𝑌(𝑌 − 𝜎)
2 + 𝛼2(𝑌 − 𝜎)
3; for ℎ2, 
∆𝑦2
ℎ = 𝛼0(𝑌 + 𝜎) + 𝛼1(𝑌 + 𝜎)
2 + 𝛼2(𝑌 + 𝜎)
3. Therefore, the village growth rate could be 

























































To observe the relationship between 𝜎 and 𝑔𝑣, first order partial derivative with 
respect to 𝜎 has been practised as shown in equation 4.3. The computational result 
suggests that the sign of 
𝜕𝑔𝑣
𝜕𝜎
 depends on the curvature of the household growth 
function (𝛼1, 𝛼2), and the size of the mean household income level (𝑌). To one 
extreme, if no curvature of growth function 𝑔ℎ(𝑦ℎ) in equation 4.1 is allowed 






) of equation 3 will be a negative value, under the 
conditions that 𝜎 > 0, 𝑌 > 0, and 𝛼1 < 0. In other words, for the macro growth 
empirics, the conclusion of negative inequality-growth nexus might be purely 
caused by ignoring the non-linearity of initial income. Equation 4.3 clearly shows 
that the marginal effect of income inequality on economic growth could be positive 







(𝛼1 + 3𝛼2𝑌)  (4.3) 
 
One important insight from this simple mathematical example is that, 
misspecification of the household income growth function might lead to misleading 
conclusion regarding the relationship between income inequality and growth at the 
macro level. This brings about a concern on existing literature focusing on 
inequality-growth nexus with macro level data: the findings of negative impacts of 
income inequality on growth might be purely driven by the assumption that 
household income growth is linearly correlated to its initial income level. 
Alternatively, as explained in this mathematical example, the negative inequality-
growth nexus might not exist once curvature of growth function is introduced. 
 
4.3 Why Might Village Inequality Affect Household Income Growth 
There are several transmission mechanisms to explain that how income inequality 
would have impacts on economic growth. In the first class of explanations, Alesina 
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and Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1993), and Persson and Tabellini (1994) discuss the 
political economy that links income inequality and economic growth. At the macro 
level, the political economy channel works through political mechanism and 
economic mechanism. The first link illustrates that highly unequal income 
distribution would result in stronger needs for a higher redistributive tax rate in 
order to guarantee a more equal environment, which is mainly based on the median 
voter theorem proposed in Melzer and Richard (1981). Regarding economic 
mechanism, if policy makers levy a tax proportionally on one’s physical and human 
capital endowments directly to meet the need of redistribution, it will lower the 
after-tax return on individual investments. This would bring about lower rates of 
aggregate capital accumulation, therefore impeding subsequent economic growth. 
In other words, it is the redistribution and tax policies that impede economic 
development through its distortionary impacts on investment in physical and human 
capital. Hence, in this sense, together with the effects from both mechanisms, 
income inequality is predicted to be negatively associated to growth.7 At the micro 
level, the redistribution policies caused by high inequality, might have different 
impacts depending on one’s position of income distribution. Generally speaking, 
individuals who are located at the top of income distribution might be demotivated 
by the high tax rate because the after-tax return on individual investments will 
reduce significantly. Ideally, with the progressive taxation system, poor households 
will be better off trough the redistribution.  
 
The second explanation that links income inequality and economic growth is the 
socio-political instability channel (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Gupta, 1990; Perotti, 
1996). Unequal income distribution generates strong motivations for people, who 
pursue their interests outside from normal market, to engage in rent-seeking 
activities and social disrupting behaviours such as revolutions, crimes, or coups. 
The resulting political and social instability increase production costs, reduce 
protection of property rights, and undulate investment environment, therefore 
exerting adverse impacts on economic growth at the macro level.8 Also, socio-
                                                 
7 Empirical evidence with cross-country data can be found in Perotti (1996). 
8 Further theoretical discussion of the interplay between the socio-political instability, levels of 
wealth, and motivation for capital accumulation can be found in Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), 
and Rodrik (1999). 
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political unrest, caused by severe income disparity, might also result in greater 
pessimism for the future, therefore lead to less trust and social cohesion (Brown and 
Uslane, 2005). In this case, there will be more economic and social cost in 
economic activities, lowering productivity and economic efficiency, and therefore 
reducing economic growth. Similarly, at the micro level, high income inequality 
might redirect the resources to non-productive activities for the poor and the rich. 
For example, due to the fear from social unrest caused by high income inequality, 
the rich tend to invest more on security such as hiring body guards and lawyers. For 
the poor households, engaging in social disrupting behaviours also drive them away 
from normal productive activities, therefore deteriorating their income growth.  
 
Several models (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993) emphasize 
the third transmission mechanism, which is referred as the credit market 
imperfection channel. Studies in this line stress that the cost of monitoring 
borrowers becomes higher due to asymmetric information in an imperfect credit 
market, which drives up the interest rate for borrowers. It is the stricter borrowing 
constraints in imperfect credit market that protect individuals, especially for the 
poor ones, from accessing to the loans against future income. If the initial level of 
inequality is high, then there will be more poor people who cannot assess to loans 
due to stricter borrowing constraints, therefore lowering the aggregate level of 
investment and human capital accumulation, and resulting in lower economic 
growth rate. At the micro level, the impoverished households have limit access to 
loans as the under developed credit market, might potentially be stuck in ‘poverty 
trap’ and therefore have lower income growth. 
 
These are, by no means, the only explanations to reveal the potential effects of 
income inequality on economic growth. However, these mechanisms might play 
important roles in explaining inequality-growth nexus under the context of rural 
China to some extent. In principle, all three mechanisms could have been in effect. 
Village is at the lowest tier of the rural administrative rank and its government 
plays important roles in providing public services such as education, healthcare, and 
infrastructure, which heavily determines the living standard and local household 
income opportunities. From the perspective of the political economy explanation, 
inequality at the village level may put pressure on local government to tailor related 
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village policies and therefore have effects on household income. Credit market 
imperfection might also be in effect as well. Although the economic reform since 
1978 has brought about outstanding economic fruit, the credit and factor markets in 
rural area, so far, are still under developed (Benjamin, et al., 2011). Regarding the 
socio-political instability, the unrest caused by inequality would cause waste of 
social resource and worsen the social cohesion, which is intuitive no matter at the 
village level or the national level.  
 
4.4 Empirical Strategy 
The previous empirical literature has found that income inequality is negatively 
associated to economic growth the macro level. However, through the mathematical 
example as discussed in section 4.2, the negative inequality-growth nexus might be 
invalid once certain level of curvature is introduced to the income growth function 
at the micro level. For instance, if the quadratic form of initial household income 
should be included in the household growth function, the impact from income 
inequality on aggregate income growth should be jointly determined by the degree 
of curvature and the initial averaged income at the micro level. To confirm this 
inference, the first task of this empirical research is to test the model (4.4), which is 
a household income growth function that contains both household income per 
capita and its quadratic form. 
 
 𝑔𝑖,𝑡
ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
ℎ + 𝛽2𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
ℎ 2 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑣 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙
+ 𝛽5𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(4.4) 
 
𝑔 is growth rate of per capita income; 𝑦 is the level of income per capita, the 
superscript ‘h’, stands for household level data while the subscripts ‘i’, ‘t’ are the 
labels for households and time, respectively. For instance, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡
ℎ  implies household 
income growth rate for household i at time t. In equation 4.4, it should be expected 
that 𝛽1 < 0. This assumption is based on the economic convergence theory, also 
known as catch up effect in growth theory (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004), which suggests that the growth rate for the poor tends to be faster than the 
rich. This is a common practice for majority of previous growth empirics (see, 
Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Benjamin et al., 2011). Corresponding to the 
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mathematical example, it is assumed that 𝛽2 should be a positive value, suggesting 
that the income growth rate will drop slower with the increase in household income 
per capita.9 In addition, according to the mathematical example, it is also assumed 
that there is no spill-over effect from the income inequality at the village level, 
which implies that 𝛽3 is expected to be not significantly different from zero.
10 In 
equation 4.4, if both 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are statistically significant and the corresponding 
signs meet the expectations, it suggests that the linear assumption regarding the 
household income growth function is not appropriate. Furthermore, with the 
computed average household income per capita ?̅?ℎ and the estimated coefficients 
?̂?1 and ?̂?2 in equation 4.4, the direction of impacts from income inequality to 
income growth at the village level can be predicted with the equation 4.3.  
 
The second task of this chapter is to verify this prediction via running regression 4.5 
for two main reasons. First, it will offer a clear comparison between the estimation 
with data at different level (macro/micro) for the same specification. Second, due to 
the complex of non-linearity in equation 4.2, equation 4.5 offers a simplified 
version to monitor the association between the village income inequality and the 
village income growth. The research interest is focusing on the coefficient on the 
measure of village income inequality (𝛾3). As discussed in the mathematical 
example, the sign of 𝛾3 should be the same as the computational result of 
(?̂?1 + 3?̂?2 × ?̅?
ℎ). Specifically, if the transmission mechanisms that are discussed in 
section 4.3 are in place at the macro level, it should be expected that 𝛾3 is negative. 
 
 𝑔𝑗,𝑡
𝑣 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑣 + 𝛾2𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑣 2 + 𝛾3𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑣 + 𝛾4𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙
+ 𝛾5𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
(4.5) 
 
Similarly, 𝑔 is growth rate of per capita income; 𝑦 is the level of income per capita, 
the superscript ‘v’, stands for village level data while the subscripts ‘j’, ‘t’ are the 
label for village and time, respectively. The computation of 𝑔𝑣 is the growth rate of 
                                                 
9 This is also following the practice of the growth empirics in Barro (1991). 
10 This is the same as the equation 4.1, which assumes that there is no spill-over from the income 




the mean value of the household income per capita within that village (𝑦𝑣), the 
practice which is in accordance with the definitions in the previous mathematical 
example. 
 
The third task of this chapter is to identify the transmission mechanisms, which is 
tested through the same regression at the macro level (equation 4.6) and at the 
micro level (equation 4.7), respectively. In addition to the equation 4.4 and 4.5, the 
new set of regressions (4.6 and 4.7) also include an interaction term of the 
household initial income and the measure of income inequality. If the 
abovementioned mechanisms are in place, it can be concluded that income 
inequality exerts adverse impacts on the subsequent economic growth at the macro 
level. In this case, the coefficient on the measure of income inequality for the 
equation 6 should be statistically significant and negative for all transmission 
mechanisms (𝜃3 < 0). However, to identify which mechanism is predominant, 
regression 4.7 should be of help. Based on the discussion in the section 4.3, given 
that 𝜃3 < 0 in the equation 4.6, different coefficients on 𝜏3, 𝜏4 in equation 4.7 will 
inform a specific transmission mechanism. Table 4-1 has provided the related 




𝑣 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑣 + 𝜃2𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1




𝑣 + 𝜃5𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝜃6𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
(4.6) 
   
 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡
ℎ = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
ℎ + 𝜏2𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1




𝑣 + 𝜏5𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝜏6𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(4.7) 
 
If the political economy channel (model 1) is in effect in rural China, it indicates 
that the rich will suffer from lower growth rate while the poor will be better off 
through the redistribution caused by the high level of income inequality. In an 
extreme case, when one has zero initial income, then the interaction term should 
become zero as well. Therefore, the expectation of 𝜏3 > 0 is to make sure this poor 
man is better off after redistribution. In the socio-political instability channel 
(model 2), the impacts of income inequality can be treated as negative externality 
since it is harmful to everyone regardless the position in income distribution. 
85 
 
Therefore, if the socio-political instability is predominant, the sign on the 
coefficient of income inequality should be negative. However, the sign on the 
interaction term is uncertain since the exact impacts from income inequality to the 
rich and to the poor are unclear. If the imperfect credit market channel (model 3) is 
in place, then it should be expected that the coefficients on the measure of income 
inequality are statistically insignificant. As discussed in the credit market 
imperfection, the initial poor will be stuck in the poverty trap. In equation 4.7, since 
the initial household income has been controlled, if the coefficient on the measure 
of income inequality, it suggests that other factors besides imperfect credit market 
should be sources of the relationship.11  
 
Table 4-1. Predictions for Different Mechanisms for Micro Regression 
Model Transmission Mechanisms Expected signs 
1 Political Economy 𝜏3 > 0, 𝜏4 < 0 
2 Socio-political Instability 𝜏3 < 0 
3 Credit Market Imperfection 𝜏3 = 0 
Note: Expected signs of the coefficients are referred to the equation 4.7. 
 
Location dummy variables in all regressions are ‘central’ and ‘west’, with the 
baseline as ‘east’, indicating the central China, Western China, and Eastern China, 
respectively. Consistent with most of the existing growth empirics on China, the 
provinces in three categories are demonstrated in Figure 4-1. The provinces in west 
of China are known as less developed areas, which are highlighted in dark in the 
Figure 4-1, while the richest regions, the east or the costal part of China, are 
coloured in light grey in the same figure. The remaining part should be the central 
China. It should be expected that the coefficients on location dummies are negative, 
indicating that both economic growth in western and central China are slower than 
the ones in eastern China.12 
 
                                                 
11 This practice is also employed in Benjamin et al. (2011) for testing the imperfect credit market 
channel. 
12 Conventionally, Chinese provinces can be divided into three categories based on their economic 
development, namely western, eastern and central. The richest provinces are from the eastern of 
China, they are Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanghai, Shandong, 
Tianjin and Zhejiang. The less developed provinces are from the western of China, they are 
Chongqing, Guizhou, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), and 
Yunnan. The remaining provinces should belong to the central region, including Anhui, Guangxi, 
Henan, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, and Shanxi. 
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4.5 Data and Key Variables 
The data used in the current chapter is mainly derived from CHIP, which was 
initiated by researchers from Beijing Normal University and Australian National 
University, and is supported by the China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and 
the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA). The surveys were implemented by NBS 
through a series of face-to-face questionnaire-based interviews, covering both rural 
and urban areas in China in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, 2008, 2013. CHIP collects 
data at both individual and household level, including sources of incomes and 
expenditures, employment status, education level, and social and economic 
characteristics. 
 
Figure 4-1. Economic Regions in China 
 
Note: The provinces covered in the sample are marked by dots. 
 
Even though six waves of CHIP are available already, I will use only CHIP2007 
and CHIP2008 in this chapter because the survey traced the same individuals and 
households in these two waves. This is of extreme importance since income growth, 
the dependent variable in equation 4.4, needs the information of the income level 
for the same households in each period. This requires panel data, instead of 
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repeated cross section data. In this study, income growth is computed by the ratio 
between the change of income from 2007 to 2008, to the income level in 2007.13 
 
In addition, this chapter will only employ data from rural China. For some 
transmission channels, there are significant differences between the rural and urban 
residents. For example, if I consider the whole sample combining both rural and 
urban household, the fact that the development of credit market in urban areas is 
significantly better than in rural areas will be ignored, and therefore may lead to 
misleading estimation results. All in all, data collected in CHIP2007 and CHIP2008 
include more than 8000 rural households in each wave, covering about 350 villages 
from nine provinces in China. The selected provinces in CHIP2007 and CHIP2008 
are marked as dots on the map in Figure 4-1, including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and 
Guangdong from eastern China; Anhui, Hebei, Henan, and Hubei from central 
China; Chongqing and Sichuan from western China.  
  
Before the estimation, several definitions should be further explained clearly. First, 
the definition of household in CHIP survey is based on Chinese residency and 
registration (hukou system). Second, regarding the definition of income, I will use 
gross income (e.g. wage income, income from family-run business) for each 
household member. Also, the calculation of income inequality index and income 
growth are based on the same definition of the household income per capita as well. 
With respect to the measure of income inequality, I will initially use Gini 
coefficients and then use Theil index and Mean-log-deviation as a robustness check 
for the estimation results.14 
 
Table 4-2 provides the descriptive statistics including the mean, standard deviation, 
and quantiles of key variables at the household level (panel I) and village level 







× 100, where 𝑦 is the income level. 
14 Gini coefficient is the most popular measure of income inequality, which is calculated by 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =
1
𝑛







)), where n and y are number of household for each village, and 
household net income per capita. The other two measures are from the generalized entropy 











− 1𝑁𝑖=1 ]. 𝛼 is the weight given to 
the distances between incomes at different parts of the income distribution. 𝐺𝐸(0) is mean-log-
deviation and 𝐺𝐸(1) is Theil index in this chapter. With a lower 𝛼, 𝐺𝐸(𝛼) becomes more sensitive 
to changes for the bottom percentile in the income distribution. 
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(panel II), respectively. At the household level, except for the income per capita at 
10th percentile, the income per capita in other positions of the distribution increased 
slightly. For example, the mean income per capita boosted from 5293 yuan in 2007 
to 5924 yuan in 2008 (12% higher). It is worth noting that the poorest 10th 
percentile, as shown in Table 4-2, has zero income per capita in both observed 
periods. This might be caused by the unresponsive interviewees. In other words, 
part of the interviewees did not report (or report only in one year) their income 
information.15 With respect to the income per capita growth rate, the mean is 110%, 
significantly higher than the 90th percentile of 96%. Further, considering this to the 
fact that the income growth rate for the 50th percentile is 0, it can be inferred that 
the growth rate of super rich (posited above 90th percentile) is high.  
 
Table 4-2. Sample Summary Statistics 
     Percentiles 
 Year Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 10th 50th 90th 
I. Household-level Data 
Income pc. 
(Yuan) 
2007 5293.16 6781.58 7984 0 4500 12000 
2008 5924.77 7747.97 7971 0 4800 12600 
Growth (%)  1.10 30.54 5528 -1.00 0.00 0.96 
        
II. Village-level Data 
Income pc. 
(Yuan) 
2007 5347.88 3725.79 355 1735.39 4700.00 9175.39 
2008 6071.89 5488.43 353 2089.93 4877.78 11384.62 
Growth (%)  0.20 0.60 346 -0.32 0.08 0.84 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2007 0.25 0.09 348 0.15 0.25 0.34 
2008 0.26 0.10 347 0.15 0.26 0.36 
Mean-log-
deviation 
2007 0.14 0.11 348 0.04 0.12 0.25 
2008 0.14 0.11 347 0.04 0.12 0.26 
Theil index 2007 0.13 0.10 348 0.04 0.11 0.20 
2008 0.14 0.12 347 0.04 0.11 0.25 
Note: The currency listed in this table is Chinese Yuan. The America Dollar (USD)-Chinese Yuan 
(CNY) exchange rate in 2008 was around 1 USD=6.95CNY. 
 
Regarding the aggregate data at the village level, in general, income per capita in 
each category increased slightly from 2007 to 2008. However, the income 
                                                 
15 In the raw CHIP data, the genuine unresponsive interviewees will leave the income as missing 
value, which will not be considered in the sample. However, some might want to underreport their 
income and leave it as 0 income. Since there is no way to distinguish who genuinely earns 0 
income. I cannot treat every respondent reporting 0 income as unresponsive interviewee in this 
case. Instead, I keep them all in the sample.  
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distribution at the macro level seems more equal compared to the case with 
household level data. For example, income per capita for 10th and 50th percentiles 
are higher at the village level than the ones in household level, while the income per 
capita for the rich (90th percentile) at the village level is relatively lower. Similar 
pattern can be found regarding the village income growth rate. The mean of village 
income growth rate is about 20% annually. But the rich villages (the 90th percentile) 
growth much faster than the average level with the rate of 84%. With respect to the 
measures of income inequality, they show a slight increase from 2007 and 2008. 
The mean of Gini is around 0.25, indicating a low level (or acceptable level) of 
income disparity in observed sample. Gini is as low as 0.15 for 10th percentile, just 
less than half of the worst part, 0.34 for 90th percentile. Mean-log-deviation and 
Theil index show the similar trends.  
 
4.6 Estimation Results 
Table 4-3 summarizes the empirical results regarding equation 4.4 to 4.7, including 
the analysis at both micro and macro level. The empirical results of the robustness 
checks with different measure of income inequality are provided in the Appendix 
Table 4A-1 (with mean-log-deviation) and Table 4A-2 (with Theil index). Each 
column in Table 4-3 contains empirical results corresponding to their regression 
models that have been discussed in previous section. The first column contains the 
related explanatory variables for each regression, which is in accordance to their 
corresponding level of data (household/village). All results are derived from the 
ordinary least squares (OLS). For the regressions at the village level (equation 4.4 
and 4.7), the standard errors are corrected by clustering the village. For better 
understanding the impact of income inequality on subsequent economic growth, 
variables of growth, and Gini coefficients are rescaled as percentage, and the unit 
for village income is in hundred Chinese Yuan.16 
 
The estimation results for the regression 4.4 is shown in the column (ⅰ) in Table 4-3. 
The coefficients on 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
ℎ  and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
ℎ 2 are statistically significant at 5% level and 
have the expected signs, suggesting that although the household growth rate will be 
                                                 
16 Since the value of income inequality lies between 0 and 1, it is common to use Gini coefficient as 




lower with the increase of income, the rate of decreasing will be slower during this 
process. In addition, as assumed, the coefficient on the measure of income 
inequality is not significantly different from zero, implying that there is no spill-
over effect from income inequality at the household level. As demonstrated in the 
mathematical example, since the household income growth function is not purely a 
linear relationship to initial household income, the association between income 
inequality and income growth at village level might not be negative. According to 
equation 4.3, the sign of marginal effect of income inequality on growth should be 
jointly determined by the curvature of the household income growth function and 
the initial average household income. Given the results of equation 4.4 and the 
descriptive statistics in Table 4-2, it can be computed that (?̂?1 + 3?̂?2 × ?̅?
ℎ) < 0, 
predicting that income inequality is negatively associated to the village income 
growth in rural China.17 This prediction is verified by the equation 4.5, the results 
of which has been shown in column (ⅱ) in Table 4-3. 
 
Similar to the household income growth function, the growth function at the village 
level also shows certain concavity given that the signs on coefficients 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are 
the same as the ones in 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, and are statistically significant at even 1% level. 
The research interest is focusing on the coefficient of income inequality measure, 
which is -0.75 and significant at 5% level. It implies that about one percentage 
point increase in Gini coefficient is associated to 0.75 percentage point decrease in 
village income growth. Such adverse correlation confirms the prediction computed 
with the household level estimation results. Also, this finding supports the previous 
empirical literature. It is worth noting that from the estimation results both equation 
4.4 and equation 4.5, not all location dummies have expected empirical results. 
While the coefficient on central is not significant at all, the coefficients on west are 
negative and significant, indicating that the income growth in central rural China 
and eastern rural China has no different but the one in western area is significantly 
lower. 
 
Given the estimation results from equation 4.5 that income inequality is adversely 
correlated to village income growth, the next question is: which transmission 
                                                 
17 ?̂?1 = −11.188, 𝛽2̂ = 0.030, ?̅?
ℎ = 52.9 
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mechanism could potentially explain this inequality-growth nexus in rural China? 
The last two columns of Table 4-3 are estimation results for the regression 4.7 and 
4.6, respectively. At the village level, with the additional interaction term between 
income inequality and initial income per capita in equation 4.6 (column ⅳ), the 
empirical results do not change significantly compared to the ones in regression 4.5. 
However, the interaction term is not significantly different from zero, suggesting 
that the negative impacts of income inequality do not vary with the development of 
the village. At the household level (column ⅲ), the coefficient on the measure of 
income inequality is positive while the one on the interaction term is negative, 
suggesting that village level income inequality is actually in favour of the poor 
household, but harmful to the rich. Both coefficients are significant at 10% level. In 
general, both results of regression 4.6 and 4.7 show that the growth rates in western 
China are significantly lower than the ones in eastern China, but there is not 
significant difference between central China and the eastern. Combining the 
empirical results from regression 4.6 (𝜃3 < 0) and regression 4.7 (𝜏3 > 0, 𝜏4 < 0), 
it seems that the theories of political economy channel is potentially predominant 





Table 4-3 Estimation Results for Model 4.4 – 4.7 
 Inequality Measure: Gini Coefficient 
Independent Variables (ⅰ) (ⅱ) (ⅲ) (ⅳ) 
𝑦𝑡−1 -11.188** -0.880*** -4.447* -1.099*** 
 (4.443) (0.168) (2.411) (0.240) 
𝑦𝑡−1
2 0.030** 0.003*** 0.038** 0.003*** 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑣  6.311 -0.750** 28.448* -1.175** 
 (4.181) (0.359) (15.591) (0.488) 
𝑦𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑣  - - -0.286* -0.008 
   (0.156) (0.006) 
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 -0.387 -7.673 -0.901 -7.352 
 (105.412) (7.100) (105.551) (7.097) 
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 -181.229** -18.689** -174.08** -17.949** 
 (88.891) (8.689) (86.203) (8.699) 
Constant 567.116** 81.632*** -14.093 92.902*** 
 (224.965) (11.104) (233.628) (14.149) 
Data Level Household Village Household  Village 
Equation 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.6 
R-square 0.007 0.108 0.009 0.113 
N 5528 346 5528 346 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 5 
percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level. Household (village) in Data Level row indicates the 
regression are examined with household (village) level data. The standard errors are corrected by 
clustering the village and are shown in the parentheses for the estimations at the household level. 
The dependent variable is growth rate of income. Both growth rate and Gini coefficients are rescaled 
in percentage while the income per capita is rescaled in hundred.  
 
4.7 Discussion  
It is obvious that estimation results from micro and macro level regressions are 
inconsistent: while the macro regression shows that income inequality is negatively 
associated to the subsequent income growth, the micro regression results do not 
support this finding with household data. If a policy maker solely believes in the 
results derived from macro empirical evidence, he/she will make completely wrong 
remedies against income inequality. 
 
Why are the outcomes so different? One possible explanation is aggregation effect. 
Ravallion (1998) is the first study to point out that macro data might misreport the 
true relationship and generate spurious impacts of inequality on growth. In this 
chapter, aggregation effect will be in place when macro data is not purely the mean 
value from the micro data. These variables, in current study, include the squared 
initial income per capita, and income growth. Appendix 4B has illustrated how 
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growth rate at the aggregate level and aggregate squared initial income level are not 
simply the mean of their micro corresponding values. 
 
To demonstrate the aggregate effect, figure 4-2 depicts the differences in growth 
rates with macro and micro data. The horizontal axis is the level of initial income 
per capita while the vertical axis is the income growth rate. Particularly, the dots in 
figure 2 are the income growth rate for villages against its corresponding initial 
village income per capita. If the household initial incomes are identical across 
village (the extreme income equality), then the growth at the macro level is exactly 
the mean of the growth income. In other words, if there is no initial income 
variation in the villages, then the dots in the figure 4-2 should be on the quadratic fit 
of the household income-growth function. In this case, then aggregating the data at 
the macro level would not cause any trouble.  
 
The aggregation effect will raise when there are variations of initial income among 
households. As shown in the figure 4-2, the economic growth at the village level 
(shown as blue dots) are spreading around zero and less diverse because the 
household income variations are averaged at the macro level. In addition, it is also 
worth to note that the blue dots (village economic growth rates) are not always 
lower than the predicted household income growth, implying that the actual 
direction of the error when aggregating the household level data is uncertain.18 It is 
suggested in the figure 4-2 that the village economic growth is overall lower once 
the household level income is aggregated because the majority of the dots are 
laying under the predicted household income growth. This will be mistakenly 
counted as the adverse impacts of income inequality, if policy makers do not realize 
the existence of aggregation effect. As a result, the negative impact of income 
inequality on economic growth (if it exists) might be amplified by aggregate effect. 
 
                                                 
18 Further discussions are provided in the Appendix B. 
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Figure 4-2. Actual Village Growth vs. Predicted Household Growth
 
Note: The scatter plots are the income growth rate to the initial income per capita at the village level. 
The curve is the quadratic fit of the household initial income level and income growth. The 
horizontal axis is the initial income per capita while the vertical axis is the income growth rate. 
 
To sum up, the whole discussion of this subsection delivers a message for the 
macro empirics focusing on inequality-growth nexus. Even if the specification of 
the growth function is correct, the aggregation effect still would cause errors that 
will be mistakenly taken into account as the impacts of income inequality on 
growth. 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
Is income inequality harmful to economic growth? This question has long been one 
of the core research questions among politicians, economists, and sociologists. 
Although majority existing empirical paper conclude that the impacts of income 
inequality on economic growth are negative, these studies might ignore the 
problems with aggregate data, namely, aggregate effects and the non-linearity of 
micro growth function. If these issues are not considered when using aggregate 
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empirical literature might be spurious. This chapter intends to answer this question 
with micro data in hope of addressing with the potential concerns on macro data. 
 
To confirm the concerns of macro data, the current study explores the effects of 
income inequality on economic growth at both micro (household) level and macro 
(village) level, with Chinses Household Income Project survey data. Similar to 
most of the existing literature, the estimation results with macro data show that the 
income inequality exerts adverse effect on economic growth. However, the 
estimation results obtained from micro data tell another story: the coefficients of 
income inequality are positive and statistically significant. In addition, this positive 
effect will be impaired with the increase of initial household income level. 
Specifically, the households whose initial income per capita is greater than 9947 
yuan will suffer from the adverse effects of income inequality, while the ones who 
live below this threshold will have a better income growth, keeping other factors 
unchanged. This result suggests that income inequality in rural China is an income 
growth driver for majority of the rural dwellers since the threshold (9947 yuan) is 
much higher than the mean of the household income per capita. In addition, 
combining the empirical evidence from both macro and micro regressions, they 
suggest that the political economy mechanism (as discussed as model 1 in Table 4-
1) is predominant in rural China, and taxes and transfers are exactly the 
inappropriate policies, which has been discussed in (Ostry el al., 2014).  
 
Given two identical villages except for different degrees of income inequality, if 
you want to have a higher income growth, which village should you live in? Based 
on the empirical results from this chapter, you will find that it is more depended on 
how much you earn at the moment. According to the economic convergence theory, 
although high initial income will lead to a relatively lower income growth, but it 
will be even slower in the village with higher income inequality. On the other hand, 
for the low initial household income, one’s income growth will be accelerated in 
the village with higher income inequality. Instead, for policy makers, it is extremely 
important to notice the potential errors brought by the misspecification and 
aggregation effect. Ideally, combining both macro and micro empirical evidence 





Alesina, A. & Perotti, R., 1996. Income Distribution, Political Instability, and 
Investment. European Economic Review, 40(6), pp. 1203-1228. 
Alesina, A. & Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), pp. 465-490. 
Banejee, A. V. & Duflo, E., 2003. Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?. 
Economic Growth, 8(3), pp. 267-299. 
Banerjee, A. V. & Newman, A., 1993. Occupational Choice and the Process of 
Development. Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), pp. 274-298. 
Banerjee, A. V. & Newman, A., 1993. Occupational Choice and the Process of 
Development. Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), pp. 274-298. 
Barro, R., 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countires. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 106(2), pp. 407-443. 
Barro, R. J., 2000. Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 5(1), pp. 5-32. 
Barro, R. J., 2000. Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 5(1), pp. 5-32. 
Barro, R. J., 2008. Inequality and Growth Revisited. Working Papers on Regional 
Economic Integration 11, Volume Asian Development Bank. 
Benhabib, J. & Rustichini, A., 1996. Social conflict and growth. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 1(1), pp. 125-142. 
Benhabib, J. & Rustichini, A., 1996. Social Conflict and Growth. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 1(1), pp. 125-142. 
Benjamin, D., Brandt, L. & Giles, J., 2011. Did Higher Inequality Impede Growth 
in Rural China?. The Economic Journal, 121(557), pp. 1281-1309. 
Bertola, G., 1993. Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth. American 
Economic Review, 83(5), pp. 1184-1198. 
Chen, A., 2010. Reducing China's regional disparities: Is there a growth cost?. 
China Economic Review, 21(1), pp. 2-13. 
Cialani, C., 2013. Growth and Inequality: A study of Swedish municipalities. 
Working papers in transport, trouism, information technology and microdata 
analysis. 
Clarke, G. R., 1995. More evidence on income distribution and growth. Journal of 
Development Economics, 47(2), pp. 403-427. 
Dahan, M. & Tsiddon, D., 1998. Demographic transition, income distribution and 
economic growth. Journal of Economic Growth, Volume 3, pp. 29-52. 
de la Croix, D. & Deopke, M., 2003. Inequality and Growth: Why Differential 
Fertility Matters. American Economic Review, 93(4), pp. 1091-1113. 
Deininger, K. & Squire, L., 1996. A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality. 
World Bank Economic Review, 10(3), pp. 565-591. 
Deininger, K. & Squire, L., 1998. New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and 
growth. Journal of Development Economics, 57(2), pp. 259-287. 
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. 
Journal of Political Economy, 65(2), pp. 135-150. 
Fields, G. S., 1994. Data for Measuring Poverty and Inequality Changes in the 
Developing Countries. Journal of Development Economics, 44(1), pp. 87-102. 
Forbes, K. J., 2000. A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and 
Growth. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 90(4), pp. 869-887. 
97 
 
Frank, M. W., 2009. Inequality and Growth in the United States: Evidence from a 
New State-level Panel of Income Inequality Measures. Economic Inquir, 47(1), pp. 
55-68. 
Galor, O. & Zang, H., 1997. Fertility, income distribution, and economic growth: 
Theory and cross-country evidence. Japan and the World Economy, 9(2), pp. 197-
229. 
Galor, O. & Zeira, J., 1993. Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review of 
Economic Studies, 60(1), pp. 35-52. 
Galor, O. & Zeira, J., 1993. Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review of 
Economic Studies, 60(1), pp. 35-52. 
Ghosh, S. & Pal, S., 2004. The Effect of Inequality on Growth: Theory and 
Evidence from the Indian States. Review of Development Economics, 8(1), pp. 164-
177. 
Gupta, D., 1990. The Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political 
Instability on Economic Growth. s.l.:Praeger. 
Khoo, L. & Dennis, B., 1999. Income Inequality, Fertility Choice, and Economic 
Growth: Theory and Evidence. Volume Working Papers from Harvard - Institute 
for International Development. 
Knowles, S., 2005. Inequality and Economic Growth: The Empirical Relationship 
Reconsidered in the Light of Comparable Data. The Journal of DEvelopment 
Studies, 41(1), pp. 135-159. 
Kremer, M. & Chen, D., 2002. Income Distribution Dynamics with Endogenous 
Fertility. Journal of Economic Growth, 7(3), pp. 227-258. 
Kuznets, S., 1955. Economic growth and income inequality. The American 
economic review, 45(1), pp. 1-28. 
Li, H. & Zou, H.-f., 1988. Income Inequality is not Harmful for Growth: Theory 
and Evidence. Review of Development Economics, 2(3), pp. 381-334. 
Lundberg, M. & Squire, L., 2003. The simultaneous evolution of growth and 
inequality. The Economic Journal, 113(487), pp. 326-244. 
Meltzer, A. H. & Richard, S. F., 1981. A Rational Theory of the Size of 
Goverment. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), pp. 914-927. 
Morand, O., 1999. Endogenous Fertility, Income Distribution, and Growth. Journal 
of Economic Growth, 4(3), pp. 331-349. 
Nahum, R.-A., 2005. Income Inequality and Growth: A Panel Study of Swedish 
Counties 1960-2000. Institute for Future Studies, Volume 5. 
Okun, A. M., 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Ostry, J., Breg, A. & Tsangarides, C., 2014. Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth. 
IMF Staff Discussion note., Issue SND/14/02. 
Panizza, U., 2002. Income Inequality and Economic Growth: Evidence from 
American Data. Journal of Economic Growth, 7(1), pp. 25-41. 
Patridge, M. D., 1997. Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Comment. The American 
Economic Review, 87(5), pp. 1019-1032. 
Patridge, M. D., 2005. Does Income Distribution Affect U.S. State Economic 
Growth?. Journal of Regional Science, 45(2), pp. 363-394. 
Perotti, R., 1996. Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the data say. 
Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), pp. 149-187. 
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1994. Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?. The 
American Economic Review, 84(3), pp. 600-621. 
98 
 
Pesaran, H. M., Shin, Y. & Smith, R. P., 1999. Pooled Mean Group Estimation of 
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
94(446), pp. 621-634. 
Pesaran, M. & Smith, R., 1995. Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic 
heterogeneous panels. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), pp. 79-113. 
Ravallion, M., 1998. Does aggregation hide the harmful effects of inequality on 
growth?. Economics 1Letters, Volume 61, pp. 73-77. 
Rodrik, D., 1999. Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, 
and Growth Collapses. Journal of Economic Growth, 4(4), pp. 385-412. 
Rodrik, D., 1999. Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, 
and Growth Collapses. Journal of Economic Growth, 4(4), pp. 385-412. 
Uslaner, E. M. & Brown, M., 2005. Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement. 
American Politics Research , 33(6), pp. 868-894. 
Wan, G., Lu, M. & Chen, Z., 2006. The inequality–growth nexus in the short and 
long run: Empirical evidence from China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 






Appendix 4A. Robustness Checks with 
Different Measures on Inequality 
 
Table 4A-1 Estimation Results for Model 4.4 – 4.7 with Mean-log-deviation 
 Inequality Measure: Mean-log-deviation 
Independent Variables (ⅰ) (ⅱ) (ⅲ) (ⅳ) 
𝑦𝑡−1 -10.255** -0.948*** -2.485 -0.964*** 
 (4.106) (0.165) (2.200) (0.192) 
𝑦𝑡−1
2 0.026** 0.003*** 0.045** 0.003*** 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑣  2576** -25.786 7799.61** -31.334 
 (1126.1) (30.089) (3452.751) (44.502) 
𝑦𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑣  - - -66.900** 0.082 
   (31.127) (0.486) 
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 -46.270 -8.659 -38.004 -8.639 
 (104.278) (7.135) (102.053) (7.146) 
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 -140.430* -20.182** -109.862 -20.148** 
 (75.244) (8.700) (69.098) (8.715) 
Constant 318.030** 69.935*** -447.321 70.885 
 (145.204) (9.295) (289.948) (10.867) 
Data Level Household Village Household Village 
Equation 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.6 
R-square 0.013 0.099 0.028 0.099 
N 5528 346 5528 346 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 5 
percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level. Household (village) in Data Level row indicates the 
regression are examined with household (village) level data. The standard errors are corrected by 
clustering the village and are shown in the parentheses for the estimations at the household level. 
The dependent variable is growth rate of income. Growth rates are rescaled in percentage while the 
income per capita is rescaled in hundred.  
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Table 4A-2 Estimation Results for Model 4.4 – 4.7 with Theil Index 
 Inequality Measure: Theil Index 
Independent Variables (ⅰ) (ⅱ) (ⅲ) (ⅳ) 
𝑦𝑡−1 -11.278** -0.924*** -10.370** -0.978*** 
 (4.490) (0.166) (4.078) (0.180) 
𝑦𝑡−1
2 0.031** 0.003*** 0.037** 0.003*** 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑣  286.073 -40.964 1494.092* -72.433 
 (215.098) (30.949) (872.399) (50.599) 
𝑦𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝑣  - - -13.525** -0.322 
   (7,906) (0.410) 
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 4.431 -8.473 -2.014 -8.209 
 (105.003) (7.111) (105.041) (7.123) 
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 -182.679** -19.952** -177.276** -19.733** 
 (89.717) (8.689) (87.847) (8.698) 
Constant 701.270** 70.173 561.426** 74.469*** 
 (281.562) (9.015) (229.652) (10.554) 
Data Level Household Village Household Village 
Equation 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.6 
R-square 0.007 0.102 0.008 0.103 
N 5528 346 5528 346 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 5 
percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level. Household (village) in Data Level row indicates the 
regression are examined with household (village) level data. The standard errors are corrected by 
clustering the village and are shown in the parentheses for the estimations at the household level. 
The dependent variable is growth rate of income. Growth rates are rescaled in percentage while the 




Appendix 4B. Deficiency in Data at Aggregate 
Level 
 
This section shows the deficiency in macro data when aggregating from its micro 
raw data for certain variables. In this chapter, the economic growth rate at the 
village level is computed as shown in the equation 4B.1, while the quadratic form 






























  (4B.1) 













  (4B.2) 
 
Where the superscript v denotes the variables are aggregated at the village level; h 
denotes the variables are the data at the household level; H is the number of 
households in the village; g is the economic growth and y is initial income level; 
operator ∆ computes the change between t and t-1. The equation 4B.2 also requires 
the assumption that the number of household member is identical across households 
and do not change overtime.  
 
Generally, the aggregated data should be the mean of its corresponding variables. 
One example is the initial income level of village, which could be obtained from the 
mean of the initial household income level. However, for the variables of economic 
growth and the quadratic term of village initial income level, as shown in 4B.1 and 
4B.2, they are not purely the mean of their values at the household level, under the 
condition that the initial incomes of household are not identical across the village. 
This will bring errors to the estimation regression. These errors when aggregating 
data from household level, in the current research, are referred as aggregation 
effect, which is believed to be one of the factors that contributes to conflicting 
empirical results from micro and macro data. However, it is worth to note that the 




Appendix 4C. Various Curvature of Household 
Income Growth Function 
 
To illustrate that the impacts of income inequality are sensitive to the curvature of 
the household income growth function, this section will introduce three cases with 
various curvature regarding the household income function. As discussed in the 
chapter, the fundamental settings of mathematical example also apply to the rest of 
discussion in this section. Suppose that in village v, there are only two households 
(𝐻 = 2) and each household has only one resident in every period (𝑛1
ℎ = 𝑛2
ℎ = 1), 
therefore the total population (𝑁𝑣) of village v is 2. The initial level of household 
income per capita for ℎ1 ((𝑦1
ℎ)−1) and ℎ2 ((𝑦2
ℎ)−1) are identical as 𝑌. To monitor 
the impact of income inequality on economic growth, it is assumed that there is a 
mean-preserving income transfer from household ℎ1 to household ℎ2 by the non-
zero amount of 𝜎. After the income transfer,  ℎ1 has 𝑌 − 𝜎, while ℎ2 has 𝑌 + 𝜎, 
enlarging the degree of income inequality (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑣 > 0). It is worth noting that 𝜎 is 
standard deviation in this case, measuring the dispersion of household income per 
capita from the mean after the income transfer. The larger the 𝜎, the more unequal 
in this village. At the village level, growth rate of income per capita (𝑔𝑣), 
conventionally, can be computed as the growth rate of the mean income per capita 



























Case 1. A less curved case 
If the household growth income function is given as the equation 4C.2, which does 
not allow any degree of curvature at all in the growth regression, the aggregate 
income growth at the village level should be expressed as the equation 4C.3. It is 
not merely the growth rate of the mean household income per capita 𝑔ℎ(?̅?ℎ), but 
also includes an extra term −
𝜎2
𝑌
. By taking the first order partial derivative with 
respect to 𝜎 to the village income growth (4C.3), the result (4C.4) suggests the sign 
of income inequality is negative. It implies that the impact of income inequality is 
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negatively associated to the aggregate income growth, which is consistent to 
majority of traditional empirical literature. 
 
 












[𝛼0 − (𝑌 − 𝜎)](𝑌 − 𝜎) + [𝛼0 − (𝑌 + 𝜎)](𝑌 + 𝜎)
















< 0 (4C.4) 
 
Case 2 A threshold case 
If certain curvature is allowed to be considered in the household income growth 
function, such as the equation 4C.5, through the similar analysis to the case 1 
(4C.6), village income growth equal to the growth rate of mean household income. 
By computing the partial effects of income inequality (4C.7), it can be concluded 
that income inequality has no impact on village income growth, if the household 



















𝑌 − 𝜎 ∗
(𝑌 − 𝜎) +
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Case 3 A more curved case 
If the household growth function is given as equation 4C.8, then the income growth 
at the village level can be expressed as 4C.9. By taking the first order condition 
with respect to 𝜎, the result in 4C.10 shows that income inequality is positively 
















𝑌 − 𝜎 +
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𝑌 + 𝜎















Table 4C-1 summarizes the results for all three cases with different assumptions on 
the household income growth function. It clearly shows that the change of income 
growth rate at the village level is sensitive to the curvature of household income 
growth function. Particularly, when the household income growth is inverse to the 
initial household income per capita, the change in income inequality has no effects 
on the village economic growth at all (case 2). If the household income growth 
function is less curved as specified in case 1 (more curved as specified in case 3), 
then an increase in income inequality will lead to a decrease (increase) in village 
economic growth.  
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Chapter 5. Less is More? An Evaluation of the 
One-Child Policy on Fertility and Education 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 has examined three transmission mechanisms with the village (macro) 
and household (micro) level data and shown that the political economy channel is 
predominant in rural China.1 However, as introduced in the literature review 
chapter, there is another possible channel that could explain the negative impacts of 
income inequality on economic growth in rural China, which is rarely tested in the 
inequality-growth nexus empirical literature. That is the endogenous fertility 
channel. 
 
The endogenous fertility channel has been put forward as one explanation to reveal 
the impacts of income inequality on subsequent economic growth (Galor and Zang, 
1997; Morand, 1999; Kremer and Chen, 2002; de la Droix and Doepke, 2003). 
Assuming income is positively associated to one’s educational level, families with 
higher income level (or higher educational background) will normally prefer less 
children and invest more on each child because the opportunity cost of child rearing 
is too high for them. As time goes by, the children who are invested more from the 
affluent households are more likely to become skilled labour and to earn much 
more, then they will choose less children due to the same reason, the high 
opportunity cost of taking care of children. On the other hand, poor families will 
choose more children and with fixed income, they can only invest little per child. A 
vicious circle can be generated when the poor children enter the labour market as 
unskilled workers and earn tiny salaries. Then again, with various reason apart from 
low opportunity cost, these adults from the poor families will choose more children 
who will be unskilled labour in years later.2 In an unequal economy, at the macro 
                                                 
1 They are the political economy channel, the credit market imperfection channel, and the socio-
political instability channel. 
2 Apart from lower opportunity cost of rearing children, for the poor, choosing more children can 
also be motivated by insufficient old-age-support (Khoo and Dennis, 1999; Morand, 1998), low 




level, the aggregate level of human capital will be diluted due to the increasing 
proportion of unskilled labour, therefore impeding the economic growth. 
Empirically, Perotti (1996) and Kremer & Chen (2002) find that more inequality 
results in higher fertility rate, no matter measured by net fertility rate in Perotti 
(1996) or by differential fertility in the latter research. The hypothesis that fertility 
(or differential fertility) is harmful to subsequent economic growth is also 
empirically supported by Perotti (1996) and de la Croix & Doepke (2003). 
However, due to lack of the inter-generational data that includes detailed 
information of educational background and of income for both parents and children, 
the related empirical analysis at the micro level is still blank.  
 
To address this unsolved puzzle to the literature in this line, this chapter provides an 
indirect way to examine the endogenous fertility channel via an evaluation of the 
One Child Policy. From the previous discussion, what enlarges income inequality 
in the endogenous fertility channel are the increasing unskilled population and low 
human capital investment for each child in extended families. The implementation 
of One Child Policy was exactly to curb the faster population growth rate and 
improve the ‘quality’ of the next generation. In other words, if the One Child Policy 
had successfully interfered the fertility and education participation, then the 
endogenous fertility channel could also explain the effect of income inequality on 
economic growth in China. 
 
The evaluation of the One Child Policy in this chapter involves a main research 
question: has the One Child Policy worked in lowering fertility and in increasing 
the human capital for the next generation? Although the related empirical literature 
on the examination of endogenous fertility channel is rare, there are some research 
investigate the casual effects of OCP on fertility and education, respectively. 
Regarding the effects of the One Child Policy on fertility, the existing literature 
show different views. One group of research (see Poston & Gu, 1987; Ahn, 1994; 
McElroy & Yang, 2000; Zhang et al., 2005) proclaim that the OCP has successfully 
interfered the fast population growth in the 1980s, while another strand of studies 
argue that the drop of fertility is attributed to the socioeconomic development (see 
Cai, 2010) or the birth control campaign years before the implementation of the 




There are also different opinions with respect to the impacts of the One Child 
Policy on human capital. For example, by using the Chinese Child Twins Survey 
data, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) conclude that the fertility reduction caused by 
the One Child Policy had moderate positive impacts on children’s schooling 
attainment at various level. This view is shared by a recent paper of Li & Zhang 
(2017). However, Liu (2014) cannot find the significant effects of the One Child 
Policy on education attainment, but he finds a quantity-quality trade-off in 
children’s height. 
 
To answer the research question of this chapter, I particularly generate a 
retrospective data to recover the birth history for each woman in the sample, which 
has not been done in any of the existing literature. Compared to previous studies, 
the superiority of this practice is to provide convenience in reflecting the entire 
fertility histories of each woman in the sample, which allows one to explore the 
time-dimension variations and improves the accuracy in identifying the treatment 
group within the difference-in-differences framework. With the information of 
children’s and mothers’ age, and the year of survey, this chapter can further dig into 
the information of how many children does this woman have, and does this woman 
give birth to a new child, in a particular year.3 In addition, retrospectively data 
generation allows pooling more survey data in different waves and therefore 
increasing the sample size significantly, which is helpful to observe the birth 
behaviour by different cohort groups. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is 
the first study to investigate the treatment effect of the OCP with the retrospective 
data. In sum, this chapter contributes to the empirically examine the endogenous 
fertility channel with the natural experiment of One Child Policy. Furthermore, with 
the retrospective panel data, this chapter hopes to provide a more accurate 
evaluation of the OCP on the fertility reduction and human capital improvement. 
 
                                                 
3 For example, for the survey question of how many children do you have, previous literature focus 
on the information that a woman has two children by the survey year of 1988. However, in this 
chapter, with the extra information of children’s and mothers’ age, the retrospective data will offer 
the information that a woman had two children by the year of 1988. The first child was born in 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section provides 
a brief review of the One Child Policy. The following section describes the 
empirical strategy of difference-in-differences. Section 5.4 and 5.5 provide 
empirical evidence for the treatment effects of the One Child Policy on fertility and 
on education participation, respectively. The last part concludes. 
 
5.2. One Child Policy (OCP): A Historical Review 
Since the establishment of China in 1949, the population has been increasing 
dramatically under Mao Zedong’s influence.4 Before late 1960s, the Chinese 
government encouraged families to have as many children as possible because Mao 
believed that population growth could promote China’s development. However, 
high population did not convert to high productivity but economic hardship and 
collapsing environment (Sudbeck, 2012). Beginning in 1970s, China started to curb 
its rapid population growth by launching a path of population birth control. Before 
the official implementation of OCP, Chinese central government initially put 
forward the concept of family planning with the campaign slogan ‘Later (marriage 
at later ages), Longer (longer the gaps between giving births), and Fewer (fewer the 
number of children)’ in early 1970s (McElroy & Yang, 2000).5 At this stage, the 
birth control was relatively mild as most of them were mainly conducted via 
persuasions and propagandas. Nonetheless, after the death of Mao and the rise of 
Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, stronger actions were taken to prevent population 
from overgrowing.6 In 1979, Chinese government officially introduced its most 
controversial and unprecedented birth control policies to the whole nation, which is 
known as the OCP. 
 
Apart from controlling for the speedy population growth, another important purpose 
of the OCP is to improve the overall human capital accumulation in China. The 
official slogan of the OCP, ‘you sheng you yu’, delivered the message that giving 
                                                 
4 Mao Zedong was the founder father of the People’s Republic of China, who is also known as 
Chairman Mao. 
5 Explicitly, man from rural area were encouraged to get married later than age 25 while rural 
women should get married after her 23. This standard of marriage age was even higher for urban 
residents. In addition, a couple was encouraged to have no more than 2 children and the intervals 
of giving births should ideally be over 3 years (William, 2014). 




less birth would lead to better care and education for each child (Peng, 1996). The 
underlying rationale of this slogan is partly consistent with the famous quantity-
quality (Q-Q) model proposed by Becker & Lewis (1973) and Becker & Tomes 
(1976). The Q-Q model argues that fewer children or smaller family size is 
preferred for the women whose salaries increase because of the rise of opportunity 
cost of childrearing. With an assumption that limited resources will be allocated 
equally to each child, lowering the number of children will lead to higher average 
quality of children. Although it is controversial, China’s central government 
implemented the OCP to restrict the quantity of children in hope of increasing the 
‘quality’ of the next generation.  
 
Under the OCP, the number of children born after 1979 for each married couple 
should be strictly restricted to one in hope of reducing the expected population 
growth. Although there were variations in enforcement among local authorities 
from different region, the overall implementations of OCP at national level were 
following a ‘carrot and stick’ mode. For any ‘out-of-plan births’, households should 
be penalized by a heavy fine (which is called a ‘social compensation fee’) and 
certain social welfare deprivations. Instead of being punished by violating the OCP, 
local governments encouraged married women to sign a One-Child Certificate. This 
certificate is an incentive contract that guarantees certain benefits including fiscal 
reward and other welfare entitlements. It is worth to note that if the couples violate 
the OCP after signing the One-Child Certificate, the penalties would be even 
heavier compared to the cases without signing the pledge (Sudbeck, 2012; Banister, 
1987) Fulfilling the OCP is not only important for the households, but also for the 
local chief cadres of the Communist Party as well. It is local governments 
responsibility to implement the OCP and to keep the births not exceeding the 
official permits in their jurisdictions. Otherwise, the officers from the local 
governments may be demoted according to the Rule of One Vote Vetoes, losing all 
income and benefits that are associated with government positions (Yang, 2007; 
Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister, 1988; Short & Zhai, 1998).7 
 
                                                 
7 Under the Rule of One Vote Vetoes, the officers who violate the OCP will lost the opportunity to 
be promoted disregarding his/her past contribution, (great) performance, or future potentials.  
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Although local governments comply the general the OCP, they show great 
heterogeneities across regions. Especially, the penalties for out-of-plan birth are 
significantly heavier for urban residents than their rural counterparts. The 
punishments for violations of OCP in urban areas are multi-dimensional. Apart 
from the salary related fine to the above-quota births for urban couples, the urban 
violators who worked in state-owned companies or organizations might face 
permanent denial for future job promotion or instant demotion. In particular, urban 
women may not entitle maternal leave for multiple births. With respect to the 
above-quota children, they were not permitted to attend the public schools, which 
were substantially subsidised by local government (Short and Zhai, 1998; Banister, 
1997). However, for the rural residents, these related penalties are less deterring. 
Firstly, in 1980s, the number of rural people who worked for state-owned 
companies was tiny. Also, majority of rural women were housewives. In this case, 
the job-related penalties such as salary cut and loss right from maternal leave did 
not affect rural residents much. Secondly, the public schools were poorly funded in 
rural areas, which was not only affecting the above-quota children but also for the 
permitted ones. Third, although cash penalties were the main method for fining 
violation of OCP in rural China, it was still ineffective because many rural 
households were too poor to pay the fines (Li et al. 2005). Given the difficulties of 
the OCP implementation in rural areas, for certain rural areas and in certain years, 
the second birth was allowed for Han women whose first child was a girl (Hardee-
Cleaveland & Banister, 1988; Qian, 1997).8 
 
Despite the variations of the OCP implementation in local governments, there were 
some general exceptions that allowed couples to have more than one child. 
Specifically, the central government imposed tighter birth controls to individuals of 
Han ethnicity, who constitute more than 90% of China’s total population, compared 
to that of their ethnical minorities counterparts, who were permitted to have more 
than one child (Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister, 1988; Peng, 1996; Qian 1997).9 
Although supplementary policies that aimed at restricting fertility rate for ethnical 
                                                 
8 There are still enormous differences across rural areas as well regarding the amount of cash fine 
or girl-exception policy (Li, 1995; Short and Zhai 1998). 
9 In general, couples from minor ethnical groups were allowed to have up to two children. 
However, there were still some exceptions such as minority women in Xinjiang province and in 
rural Tibet province (Li, Zhang, & Zhu, 2005).  
111 
 
minority groups with over 10 million population at the end of 1980s, the 
implementations were less strict. Up to 1990, two (out of fifty-six) ethnical 
minority groups, namely Zhuang and Man, were subject to the OCP, as they passed 
through the population policy threshold (Li et al. 2005). This exemption from the 
OCP for ethnical minorities provides a unique natural experiment set up for 
researchers to investigate the policy evaluation of the OCP, treating ethnical 
minority couples as control group and Han women as experimental group.10  
 
To sum up, the OCP was enforced for the purposes of controlling fast population 
growth and improving quality of the next generation. Taking the unique advantage 
of ethnical differentiation of the OCP implementation, the policy evaluation could 
be conducted under a natural experiment context, treating Han Chinese as treatment 
group and other ethnical minorities as control group. The following section will 
explicitly introduce the empirical strategy to investigate if the OCP exerted 
significant impacts on slowing population growth and on enhancing children’s 
education. 
 
5.3 Empirical Strategy 
As discussed in the last section, the OCP was designed for slowing down the fast 
population growth and improve the human capital accumulation particularly for the 
next generation. In an econometric setting, the policy evaluation of the OCP could 
be divided into two stages: the first stage of this chapter is to assess the treatment 
effects of the OCP on birth control; the second stage is to examine the impacts of 
the OCP on education for teenagers. Essentially, due to the ethnical differentiation 
of the OCP implementation, the effects of the OCP could be assessed under a 
difference-in-differences (DD) framework. DD is an identification strategy to 
investigate treatment effects comparing the before- and after- treatment in the 
observable outcomes of experimental/treatment groups and control groups, which 
has been widely used in policy evaluation research. 
 
                                                 
10 Other general exempt cases from the OCP include the situation when the first child cannot join 
the labour force due to non-hereditary disability; when the remarriage couples only have one child 
before their second marriage; when the couples are the only child from their families; when more 
than one child is born within one pregnancy; and when there is an early death of the only child to a 
couple (Liu, Larsen, & Wyshak, 2005). 
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How could DD be applied to evaluate the effects of the OCP? As introduced in the 
last section, the OCP was officially enforced in 1979, specially to Han Chinese 
women, which constituted the biggest natural experiment in human history. In the 
experiment setting, treatments are the restrictions on the number of children per 
household for Han Chinese (treatment group), leaving the ethical minorities 
unchanged (control group). In an econometric setting, the research focus is on 
examining the impacts of the treatment (𝐷𝑖𝑡) on outcome variables (𝑌𝑖𝑡), as in 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗′𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 (5.1) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 are individual time-invariant fixed effects; 𝜆𝑡 are time specific fixed 
effects that will not change across individual; 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable. It equals one 
when the individual is in the treatment group (Han Chinese) and post-treatment 
(post-1979), and equals zero otherwise.11 𝐗𝒊𝒕 are time-varying controlling variables.  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is an outcome variable that should be a measure of fertility in the first stage, and 
that should be a proxy of education situation in the second stage. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error 
term.  
 
The coefficient of interest is 𝜌, the DD estimator. Under the assumption that the 
changes in 𝑌𝑖𝑡 for Han and non-Han would have been identical in the absence of the 
OCP, 𝜌 captures the casual effects of the OCP on outcome variable (measures of 
fertility or children’s education).12 This assumption will be testified in the 
robustness check subsection. In the first stage, it is expected that 𝜌 should be 
significantly negative, suggesting that the OCP has curbed the speedy population 
growth of Han Chinese compared to that of their ethnical counterparts. In the 
second stage, when I examine the treatment effects of the OCP on children’s 
education, the sign of 𝜌 is expected to be positive. If both expectations are 
supported by empirical results, it can be concluded that the endogenous fertility 
channel was predominant in China. 
 
                                                 
11 Empirically, 𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the interaction term Han × Post1979. It equals to 1 only when the treatment 
group (Han=1) receive treatment (Post1979=1). 
12 This is also known as parallel trend assumption.  
113 
 
The key assumption of DD strategy is the parallel assumption. It suggests that both 
control and treatment group should share the same trend on the change of outcome 
variable when the treatment is absent. If the parallel assumption is violated, then the 
estimated treatment effect may not merely capture the casual impacts of the 
treatment on the outcome variable. In this chapter, the pre-trend tests are conducted 
for both stages as robustness checks in the Appendix 5A. 
 
5.4 First Stage Estimation: the OCP on Fertility 
Data 
The data used in the current chapter is mainly derived from CHIP, the same dataset 
that has been used in the last chapter. It was initiated by researchers from Beijing 
Normal University and Australian National University, and is supported by the 
China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and the Institute for the Study of Labour 
(IZA). The surveys were implemented by NBS through a series of face-to-face 
questionnaire-based interviews, covering both rural and urban areas in China in 
1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, 2008, 2013. CHIP collects data at both individual and 
household level, including sources of incomes and expenditures, employment 
status, education level, fertility, and economic characteristics. 
 
To investigate the effects of the OCP in birth control, the outcome variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 
should be a measure of fertility. Ideally, it should be the variable that reflects the 
number of children that a woman has given birth to in her entire life history. 
Unfortunately, CHIP data does not provide this information except for CHIP 2007 
and CHIP 2008.13 Instead, for the first stage the OCP evaluation, the outcome 
variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, is a binary variable that equals to one when a woman ‘i’ gives birth to 
a child in year ‘t’, otherwise zero. Then the regression estimates the impacts of the 
OCP on the probability for a woman to give birth to a child. It is worth to note that 
the woman ‘i’ is referred to the head of household or its spouse while the child is 
referred to the family member who is the biological child of the head of household. 
For example, if CHIP data shows that the respondents from a household include 
head of household, spouse, parents of the household-head, and three children, the 
                                                 
13 In CHIP 2007 and CHIP 2008 questionnaires, women were asked that ‘how many children do you 
have’. But this question did not exist in other waves of CHIP questionnaire. 
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number of children in this case should be counted as three.14 By combining all 
waves of CHIP data (except for CHIP2008), there are 77180 defined women in 
whole sample.15  
 
One potential concern on this measure is that the true number children were born 
will be underreported because CHIP data only report the number of children being 
at home at the time of interview, ignoring the ones who move away from home. 
Going back to the previous example, it is likely that some children who were 
studying or working in other cities in China would have been ignored by CHIP 
data.16 One way to deal with the underreporting issue of this kind is to restrict the 
sample by women’s age. The underlying rationale is that the younger women are 
not likely to have mature children who are old enough to leave home for study or 
work in other cities. In other words, the children that are recorded in CHIP data will 
close to the true number of children that the mother has given birth to. Hence, I 
restrict the sample to women whose age were between 15 and 45 in for all wave of 
CHIP survey. In the whole sample, the data reports that the mean age of the women 
who gave their first birth is 25.3 years old. In addition, children who should 
complete their primary and secondary education will not leave their home city until 
their 18 years old.17 These two facts contribute to the selection of upper bound as 
45 years old of women. The estimation results of younger mothers (15-38, and 15-
30) for the purpose of robustness check are also provided in the following empirical 
evidence subsection. 
 
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking, the pair between the head of household/spouse and their parents could also be 
counted as a parent-child relationship. However, the CHIP data does not provide enough 
information from the mother of the household head/spouse, particularly on the birth history. 
Therefore, I only consider parent-child relationship between the head of household/spouse and 
their children, but not the head of household/spouse and their parents. 
15 CHIP2007 and CHIP2008 traced the same household in these two years, consisting a panel data. 
To avoid the double counting issue, I drop the 2008 wave. 
16 Residential registration system (also known as Hukou system) has less effects on the citizens who 
attend tertiary education and who have a job in other city. In other words, children are more likely 
study in local schools before receiving their tertiary education or pursing their career elsewhere. 
17 It is calculated by author based on the information that the compulsory school age in China is 6 
years old, and that the normal primary and secondary education in China last 12 years in total. Due 
to the Hukou system, student who wants to attend a public funded school cannot go to the school 
that are not in the area where they registered.  
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With these restrictions, I obtain a subsample of 41592 Chinese women. The related 
summary of statistics is shown in the Table 5-1. Overall, in the age-restricted 
sample, the mean values of age are close for both Han and Non-Han women. But 
there are more rural residents (73.5%) in Non-Han group, while the same index for 
Han women is only 55.4%. In addition, the proportion of ethnical minority Chinses 
(Non-Han) is tiny, taking account for only 6.3% of the sample. It is worth to note 
that the mean number of children for Non-Han Chinese women (2.024) is higher 
than the Han Women (1.640). However, it is not sure yet that if it is the result of the 
OCP. 
 
Table 5-1. Sample Summary Statistics for Women Age 15-45 
Variable Overall Han Non-Han 


















No. of observation 41592 39144 2448 
Note: Rural is a dummy variable that equals to one for rural residents, otherwise zero. 
 
To assess the OCP effects on fertility, I regenerate the birth history for the age-
restricted sample by employing their children’s information. Specifically, with the 
age information of their children, it can be inferred that if a woman gives birth to a 
baby in a specific year. For example, CHIP1988 data shows that a 35-year-old 
woman has a 10 years old child. In other words, this woman gave birth to her first 
child when she was 25 in 1978. Following the same logic, the new panel data 
covers 939709 observations from 1958 to 2013, with the cohort group from 1943 to 
1998. 
 
Figure 5-1 describes the number of child per household at different age of women 
who are head of household or its spouse. Each (solid/dash) line represents a group 
of five birth cohorts of these women since 1943.18 The horizontal axis is the age for 
the women in the sample while the vertical axis is the averaged number of child per 
household for each (grouped) birth cohort. At the first glance, each line in the figure 
                                                 
18 The cohorts after 1987 are dropped due to the sparse observations. The related information is 
available upon request. 
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5-1 can be divided into two phases in general. The J-curve or the steep phase 
implies the period when the probability of giving birth to a new baby is increasing 
dramatically, which normally happens between 20 and 30 for each birth cohort 
group. The second phase is shown as the flat part of each line, which suggests that 
the growth rate of probability of having a new child is decreasing and the average 
of number of children converges to a certain level. In addition, the flat phase can be 
explained by the fact that woman has finished her childbearing years when getting 
older.    
 
Figure 5-1. Number of Child per Household by Age in Various Birth Cohort
  
Note: The line plots the average number of child per household at different ages of children’s 
mother. Every (solid/dash) line represents a group of five birth cohorts of children’s mother. 
 
The first message delivered by the figure 5-1 is that the number of child per 
household is decreasing cohort by cohort. The oldest birth cohort group of 1943-
1947 have more than two children at their 30 while the number reduces to just 
above one at the same age for the youngest cohort groups (1983-1987). Particularly, 
it is worth to note that the decrease in number of new born children is not 
happening steadily until two significant drops for cohort group 1948-1952 and for 




































birth to babies, when the OCP was officially introduced. In this sense, the 
significant drops on the number of child per household for the cohort of 1948-1957 
strongly indicate that the OCP has impacts on fertility reduction. In this sense, the 
significant drops on the number of child per household for the cohort of 1948-1957 
strongly indicate that the OCP has impacts on fertility reduction. This will be 
further investigated with DD estimator in the empirical result subsection.  
 
In addition, the peak time for women to give birth to a child is narrowing down 
cohort by cohort, which is suggested by the longer flat part and shorter steep 
component from the older cohorts to the younger ones. For the oldest cohort group 
(1943-1947), the average number of child per household is increasing dramatically 
before plateauing at their 32. However, the same plateaus appear earlier and earlier 
for younger generations. These evidence implies that women will finish their 
childbearing age earlier with less children in general, which again indicates that the 
OCP has effectively intervened the overpopulation. 
 
Apart from the standard DD regressors (treatment group, post treatment, and its 
interaction term), other explanatory variables include women’s age, age squared, 
and the number of child that the woman has in time ‘t’. It is expected that the 
coefficients on the age and age squared are significantly positive and negative, 
respectively, indicating that the probability of having a child is increasing at a 
decreasing rate as they become older. This prediction has visually shown in the 
figure 5-1 as well: the slope of the line is decreasing as age goes up. With respect to 
the quantity of child, I categorize this variable into three groups, namely, none, one, 
and more than one. Under the OCP context, a Han Chinese couple should not have 
new baby if they have child(ren) already before 1979. In this case, it is expected 
that the probability of having a new child will be higher when the couple does not 
have one, the probability which will decrease otherwise due to the OCP 
enforcement.  
 
First Stage Empirical Results 
The first stage empirical results have been summarized in the table 5-2. I initially 
examine the regression 5.1 without other controlling variables as baseline 
regression, which is shown in the column (1) of table 5-2. The coefficient (𝜌) on the 
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interaction term ‘Han × Post1979’ is the treatment effect of the OCP on fertility. It 
has the expected negative sign and statistically significant at 5% significant level, 
suggesting that the probability of having a new baby after the OCP implementation 
will be lower by 1 percentage point, compared to their ethnical minority 
counterparts. Column (2) shows the estimation result with other controls such as 
age, age-squared, and dummies for number of children. Similar to the baseline 
model, the magnitude of estimated 𝜌 is slightly higher (2.8 percentage points) with 
the expected negative sign. Compared to the sample mean probability of having a 
child (0.071), the OCP treatment effects on fertility is large, dropping by almost 
39.44%. With regard to other explanatory variables, the coefficients on age and 
age-squared are strongly significant with the expected signs, indicating that the 
probability of having a new child for Chinese women increases at a declining rate 
as age goes up. Furthermore, as expected, the empirical results in column 2 reveals 
that the probability of having a new child will be 18.5 percentage points higher for 
the couple that do not have child compared to the ones who have one already. In 
addition, the probability of giving birth to a new baby is 37 percentage points lower 
if they have more than one child, compared to the reference group (no child). 
 
One might argue that the upper bound of age 45 is still too old as some children 
will move away from home. If it is the case, then the number of children that have 
been used in this chapter so far still undermeasure the true value. The last column 
of the table 5-2 is the subsample by dropping the women who are over 38 years 
old.19 As shown in the figure 5.1, the number of child per household for each cohort 
group should converge to certain level, suggesting that the women in this cohort 
will not have any new child after certain age. However, there are two significant 
drops for cohort group 1948-1952 and 1953-1957. To make the number of child 
that are being interviewed by CHIP survey conductor close to the true number of 
child that are being born, I keep all the data that are less problematic, that is, before 
age 39. Column (3) in table 5-2 shows that the magnitude of the estimated treatment 
effect of the OCP is exact same as the one obtained by using whole sample. 
                                                 
19 I also test the subsample with the women who are 15-35 and 15-30, respectively. The 
coefficients on the Han × Post1979 for the former case is unchanged and statistically significant at 
1%. The coefficients on the Han × Post1979 for the 15-30 subsample is twice as large as the 
previous results, and significant at 1% level. 
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Considering that the sample mean for the younger cohorts are slightly higher 
(0.079), the treatment effects is relatively weaker when the older cohorts are 
dropped out, accounting for about 35.44% reduction in probability of having a new 
child. Regarding the coefficients on other variables, they are slightly larger in 
magnitude.  
 
Table 5-2. Estimation Results for Treatment Effects of the OCP on Fertility 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables    




























Person fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. observation 939709 939709 425984 
Sample Whole Whole Age<39 
Sample Mean 0.071 0.071 0.079 
𝑅2 0.008 0.043 0.051 
Note: The reported standard errors in parenthesis are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
residual serial correlation. *** Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 5 percent level. * 
Significant at 10 percent level. The number of children is a categorical variable where 0 is no child, 
1 is only one child, other cases should be 2. The reference group is the case with no child. 
 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of the OCP on Fertility 
Empirical results in the table 5-2 verify the hypothesis that the OCP had significant 
impacts on lowering the probability of having a new child of Han Chinese women 
relative to their ethnical minority counterparts. To examine if the results are robust 
across women with different time-invariant characteristics, I test the same model 
5.1 with FE estimator for different subsamples. The related estimation results are 
provided in Table 5-3.  
 
Apart from the purpose of robustness check, it is also interesting to see if the OCP 
has different effects on the women with different educational background. On the 
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one hand, social scientists have long observed that fertility drops with increasing 
women’s education attainment as suggested by Becker & Lewis (1973) and Becker 
& Tomes (1976). If it is the case, then it should be expected that the OCP has less 
impacts on Han Chinese with higher educational background. On the other hand, Li 
et al. (2005) argue that better-educated Han Chinese women are normally 
associated with better jobs and higher salaries. Since the panelties for above-quota 
birth may involve the fines that are proportioinally to one’s salary, and demotion 
from the current position (Short and Zhai, 1998, Banister, 1997), the more educated 
women are more willing to comply with the OCP to avoid higher violation cost. If 
it is the case, then the magnitude of estimated treatment effects should be larger for 
better-educated women. 
 
In the first three columns in the table 5-3, the whole sample is divided by women’s 
educational background. Specifically, I categorize women’s educational 
background into three groups, namely, less educated, medium educated, and 
educated. Less educated is the case when a women’s highest education qualification 
is primary school or lower. Educated is the case when a women’s highest education 
qualification is undergraduate degree or above. Other cases should be counted as 
medium educated. 
 
At the first glance of the table 5-3, the sample mean of the first three columns 
supports the hypothesis that women with higher education attainment are less likely 
to have children. The probability of having a child for the less educated women 
(0.102) are twice as large as the one for the educated women (0.048). 
Correspondently, the estimation of the treatment effects of the OCP on fertility is 
the strongest for the less educated women (-3.7 percentage points less than the Non-
Han Chinese less educated women), and is the weakest for the educated women (-
0.5 percentage points), accounting for about 36.27% and 10.42% reductions for the 
less educated and the most educated women, respectively. These evidence suggests 
that although the OCP has negative impacts on the probability of having a new 
child in general, the elite women are less effected. For the women who are located 
at the medium education category, the estimated 𝜌 is close to the one obtained by 
the whole sample, suggesting that the probability of having a new baby for Han 




Empirical results for other controls are also interesting. From the least-educated 
subsample to the most-educated one (column 1 to 3 in the table 5-3), the empirical 
results show a pattern that the age affects the probability of having a child the most 
to women with lower education background. But such age effects will be mitigated 
with the increase of women’s education attainments. Furthermore, compared to the 
women who have no child, the most-educated group who have already have one 
child shows strong dislike to have a new baby (22.5 percentage points lower in 
probability shown in column 3), but such unwillingness is absent in for the least-
educated subsample (only 9.1 percentage points lower in probability shown in 
column 1).  
 
In summary, although the magnitude of the OCP treatment effects on Han women 
vary with different educational level, they consistently show that the probability of 
having a new child for Han Chinese women is lower than the one for the Non-Han 
Chinese women. In addition, the estimation results from the medium educated 
group (column 2 in the table 5-3), which accounts for more than 70% of the total 
observations, are close to the ones obtained by the whole sample (column 2 in the 
table 5-2). Therefore, it can be concluded that the treatment effects of the OCP is 
robust. 
 
Next, I divide the whole sample into two groups, urban and rural. As discussed in 
the section 5.2, the OCP implementation shows great heterogeneities across regions 
especially for the violation penalty. In general, it is expected that the OCP treatment 
effects affect the urban residents more simply because the penalties for above-quota 
child births are more severe for couples form urban areas. As pointed out by Li and 
Zhang (2004), the OCP enforcement in rural areas are not as efficient as in urban 
areas because many rural households are too poor to be fined for out-of-plan child. I 
examine the regression 5.1 with FE estimator to women from rural and urban areas, 





Table 5-3. Treatment Effects of the OCP on Fertility for Subsamples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. obs. 135420 665226 136577 536743 402966 





Educated Rural Urban 
𝑅2 0.067 0.049 0.062 0.060 0.061 
Note: The reported standard errors in parenthesis are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
residual serial correlation. *** Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 5 percent level. * 
Significant at 10 percent level. The number of children is a categorical variable where 0 is no child, 
1 is only one child, other cases should be 2. The reference group is the case with no child. 
 
At the first glance, although the sample mean of probability of having a child is 
relatively smaller in urban areas (0.051), the OCP impacts for the urban subsample 
(-0.9 percentage points) is much weaker, which is only at 10% significant level. 
This suggests that the probability of having a new child for urban Han Chinese 
women just slightly 0.9 percentage point lower compared to the Non-Han women 
accounting for about 17.65% reduction compared to the sample mean. In addition, 
the same probability is 2.6 percentage points lower in rural areas, which is close to 
the estimation of the whole sample (2.8 percentage points, as shown in column 4, 
table 5-2). Compared to the sample mean, this could be translated as about 30% 
reduction in probability. One possible explanation is that urban residents are less 
likely to have more children even before the OCP. As a result, the women from 




To sum up, the first stage of this chapter is to assess the OCP effects on fertility by 
treating Han Chinese women as treatment group and Non-Han Chinese women as 
control group. With the DD technique, I find that the probability of giving birth to a 
new child for Han Chinese women is 2.8 percentage points lower compared to the 
Non-Han women. After series of test of the OCP treatment effects on women with 
other time-invariant characteristics, it can be confirmed that the OCP 
implementation exerted negative impacts on fertility. However, such effects were 
relatively weaker for women with higher education background (undergraduate 
degree or above), and for women from urban areas.  
 
5.5 Second Stage Estimation: the OCP Effects on Child’s Education 
Data 
To investigate the OCP treatment effects on child’s education, I continue to draw 
on the CHIP data for the waves in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2013. The outcome 
variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 in regression 5.1 in this stage is a binary variable that equals to one 
when a child is attending school that is higher than junior secondary school by the 
time of survey and equals to zero otherwise. This is indicated by the survey 
question of ‘Are you still attending school?’ for the children who are between 14 
and 22 years old.  
 
In China, a typical student normally starts his/her primary stage education no later 
than 6 years old, which takes 6 years to complete in general cases.20 When it comes 
to the secondary stage, both junior and senior secondary education take 3 years to 
finish, respectively. In general cases, it should take four years for one to complete 
the tertiary education in China.21 The primary and junior secondary school 
education composes the nine-year compulsory education. As a result, a child who 
receives the compulsory education from 6 years old should decide whether attend 
senior secondary schools (also known as high schools) at the age of 15 and would 
possibly finish his/her high school at the age of 18, and tertiary education at the age 
of 22. Considering the possibility that some children will start slightly earlier than 6 
                                                 
20 Under certain exceptional circumstances, school age children can attend primary school 
education no later than 7 years old.  
21 It could be more than four years depending on a specific undergraduate program. It is worth to 




years old, the sample also includes all children who ages between 14 and 22 across 
all waves of CHIP. 
 
Then the regression 5.1 estimates the treatment effects of the OCP on the 
probability of attending school for school-age children. Particularly, the children in 
the second stage estimation is defined as the one whose relationship to the head of 
household is ‘children’ in the CHIP survey for two reasons. Firstly, the purpose of 
the OCP is to improve the ‘quality’ of the next generation, which makes the second 
stage estimation focusing on children. Secondly, empirically speaking, the 
probability of attending further education after junior secondary education might 
also be influenced by parents’ educational background. However, this information 
is only available for the observation who is ‘children’ to the head of household. As 
a result, the whole sample includes 38147 children who were born during the 
periods 1966-74, 1973-1981, 1980-88, 1985-93, and 1991-1999. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the sample for the second stage estimation are 
summarized in the table 5-4. From the first glance, majority of the observations are 
rural residents (75.2%) and more than 90% are Han Chinese. With regard to the 
mean of number of siblings, the one for ethnical minority (1.821) is much higher 
than the one for Han Chinese (1.330), which could be explained by the intervention 
of the OCP on fertility. Regarding the education background for the parents, Han 
parents have relatively better education compare to Non-Han parents. Furthermore, 
fathers have relatively higher education background relative to mothers in general. 
Student is a dummy variable that equals to one when the child is attending school 
during the survey, otherwise zero. It shows that ratio of attending school for the 
Han children (0.455) is slightly higher than their ethnical minority, which could 





Table 5-4. Sample Summary Statistics for Children Age 14-22 
Variable Overall Han Non-Han 




































No. of observation 38417 35536 2881 
Note: ‘Student’ is a dummy variable that equals to one when the child is attending school during the 
survey, otherwise zero. Mum and Dad Edu. are categorical variables including 7 categories. 2, 3, 4 
mean the highest education qualification is primary school, middle school, and high school 
respectively 
 
In practice, the baseline model includes only Han, Post1979, the interaction term 
Han × Post1979, and time dummies. Under the DD framework, the coefficient of 
the interaction term should be the treatment effects of the OCP on the probability of 
attending school for the children between 14-22 years old. Based on the first stage 
empirical evidence that the OCP effectively lower the fertility rate for the Han 
women, the coefficient on Han × Post1979 is expected to be positive, suggesting 
that the goal of the OCP of improving children’s quality can be fulfilled.  
 
Apart from the baseline regression, age dummies, number of siblings, and parental 
education background indicators are also included in extended regressions. If the 
famous Q-Q model is in place, then the coefficient on the number of siblings should 
be negative, implying that more children indeed lower the quality of each child. 
Regarding the parental education background, I re-categorize the original variable 
intro three groups: less educated means that one (either mother or father) has the 
highest education qualification of primary school or lower; when educated means 
that they have the highest education qualification of undergraduate degree or above. 
Other cases should be counted as medium educated. The coefficients on parental 
education background should be positive. On the one hand, greater education 
background may lead to higher salary for their parents. In this case, there will be 
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more resources to be invested on each child, increasing the probability of attending 
school. On the other hand, educated parents want their children to have better 
education background for the sake of potential higher salary or successful career.  
 
Second Stage Empirical Results 
Table 5-5 summarizes the second stage empirical results. The baseline regression is 
reported in column (1). The coefficient on the interaction term is 0.048 and 
significant at 1% level, suggesting that the treatment effect of the OCP increase the 
probability of attending school for Han children who are between 14-22 years old 
by 4.8 percentage points. Even when I include other covariates in the model, the 
coefficients of Han × Post1979 are still significantly positive and slightly higher 
(5.6, and 6.1 percentage points, respectively), as shown in the column (2) and (3) in 
table 5-6. These are strong evidence that the OCP exerted positive impacts on 
improving the quality of children of next generation. In addition, compared to the 
sample mean of the probability of education participation (0.439), the OCP 





Table 5-5. Estimation Results for Treatment Effects of the OCP on Education Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables    
























  0.081*** 
(0.010) 




  0.042 
(0.019) 








Age dummy No Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
No. observation 40956 40956 38417 
Sample Mean 0.439 0.439 0.452 
𝑅2 0.195 0.402 0.393 
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets are clustered for the treatment and ethnicity level. *** 
Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 5 percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level. The 
reference groups for the parental education backgrounds are less educated Dad and less educated 
Mum. 
 
The coefficients on other variables also meet the expectations. The regression 
results in column (2) show that the coefficient on the number of siblings is negative 
and significant at 1% level, confirming the Q-Q model. Specifically, the estimation 
suggests that one more sibling will reduce the probability of attending school by 5.2 
percentage points on average. When controlling for the parental education 
background additionally (column 3), the effects of siblings reduces to 3.5 
percentage points and still significant at 10% level. In addition, with the higher 
education background, the magnitudes of the coefficients are larger. For example, 
compared to the reference group when a mother’s highest education qualification is 
primary school or lower, the ones who hold at least a middle school certificate will 
increase their child’s probability of attending school by 8.1 percentage points. This 
increase of probability is even higher (20.6 percentage points) for the mothers who 
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hold the higher education certificate. It is also worth to note that the education 
background for parents are equally important as the magnitude of the corresponding 
coefficients are close.  
 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of the OCP on Education 
The empirical evidence has clearly support the hypothesis that the treatment effects 
of the OCP will increase the probability of attending further study for the children 
who are 14-22 years old. The next question is: do these effects vary across gender, 
region, or age? Traditional Chinese (especially in rural areas) value male over 
female, which has deprived the rights of receiving education for the girls. Given the 
same situation, the family would be more likely to send their son to school, 
generating the gender gap of education attainment in China. This is supported by 
my data as shown in the bottom of the table 5-4. The sample mean of the 
probability of education participation for boys are 4 percentages points higher than 
the probability for girls (0.440). With the help of the OCP, the probability of 
attending school for girls is expected to be higher because the number of sibling is 
decreasing, and the competition with their male siblings is less intense. In other 
words, the treatment effects of the OCP should be stronger for girls over boys. In 
addition, as discussed in the first stage, the OCP treatment effects on fertility is 
much stronger in rural areas. If the OCP indeed has impacts on children’s education 
via the Q-Q theory, then the treatment effects of the OCP on education should be 
again stronger in rural area. This subsection examines the same model in the second 
stage estimation for different subsamples, the results which are reported in table 5-
6. 
 
Column (1) and (2) report the empirical results for the treatment effects of the OCP 
on education across gender. The coefficients on Han × Post1979 are positive and 
significant for boys and girl. Specifically, the results show that the probability of 
attending schools for Han girls will increase by 4.8 percentage points, while the 
same probability increase for Han boys is 7.2 percentage points, suggesting that the 
OCP treatment effects are stronger on boys. It violates the prior guess and suggests 
that the strong gender inequality in China is still persistent even after the OCP 
implementation. This is also can be checked with the coefficients on the siblings. 
When the ones for males indicate that the probability of education participation will 
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be decrease by 2.8 percentage points with one more sibling. However, this 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero for female. This might suggest 
that the family size is not a factor to affect the girls’ chance of receiving education. 
Instead, the treatment effect on education for female is relatively lower is only 
because they are female. Column (3) and (4) show the empirical results for the 
treatment effects of the OCP on education across region. As expected, although the 
coefficient on the interaction term is positive, it is no longer significant for the 
urban residents. This might be the results of small sample for the urban residents. 
The same coefficients for rural residents is 5.4 percentage points, which is robust to 
the results obtained from the whole sample (column 3, table 5-5). These empirical 
evidence across regions again confirms the OCP treatment effects on both fertility 
and education. 
 
Table 5-6. Treatment Effects of the OCP on Education Participation for Subsamples  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables     












































































Age dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observation 19767 18645 9536 28881 
Subsample Male Female Urban Rural 
Sample Mean 0.464 0.440 0.662 0.383 
𝑅2 0.396 0.394 0.481 0.400 
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets are clustered for the treatment and ethnicity level. *** 
Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 5 percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level. The 





The figure 5-2 shows the coefficients on the OCP treatment effects on education 
participation across ages. At the first glance, the positive policy impacts were 
significantly stronger for the Han children who are aged 17-20, whose probability 
of attending school increased around 13 percentage points after the OCP 
implementation. In China, students who are between 17 to 20 are generally 
attending final year of high schools, vocational schools, or universities. Therefore, 
the estimation results indicate that the OCP treatment effects strongly encouraged 
the students to participate the education, especially for the tertiary education. 
However, for the ones who are under 17 years old and over 20 years old, the OCP 
treatment effects were insignificant.  
 
Figure 5-2. Heterogenous Treatment Effects of the OCP on Education Across Ages 
 
Note: The dots depict the coefficients of the treatment effects of the OCP on outcome variables for 
different ages with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Despite the controversy of the OCP implementation, this chapter evaluates its 
casual effects on fertility reduction and education participation improvement within 
a difference-in-differences framework. The estimation results suggest that the 
probability of having a new child for Han Chinese women is lower than their 
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Heterogenous Treatment Effects on Education Across Ages
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Such effect is robust to a series of sensitivity checks. Compared to the sample mean 
of 7.1 percent, the treatment effect is large on fertility, taking account for almost 
40% reduction of the sample mean. However, the influence of the OCP on fertility 
is much weaker for the educated women and urban residents. 
 
The second stage estimation results of this chapter indicate that the casual effects of 
the OCP increase the probability of education participation of Han children aged 
14-22 by about 6.1 percentage points. Compared to its sample mean of 44%, such 
effect takes account for about 14% to the mean. It is worth to note that the policy 
effects on education participation is stronger for boys, suggesting the gender 
inequality on the chance of receiving education. Again, the OCP has exerted 
positive impacts on increasing the probability of schooling is much stronger for 
rural residents. Also, from the OCP treatment effects are specifically stronger for 
the children between 17-20, who are more likely receiving tertiary education. 
 
Based on these estimation results, the fertility elasticity of education is -0.35, 
suggesting that 1% change in the probability reduction of having a child will lead to 
a 0.35% change in probability increment of a child (aged 14-22) to attend school. 
The empirical evidence in this chapter partly supports the finding in Li et al. 
(2005). They find that the probability of having a second child is 11 percentage 
points lower for Han Chinese after the birth control policy. However, they also 
conclude that the treatment effect is much stronger in urban areas, which is not 
supported in this empirical chapter. With respect to the empirical results from the 
second stage, this chapter suggests a moderate policy impacts on education 
participation, which is supportive to the findings in Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) 
and in Li et al. (2017), even though they are not using the same data set and 
estimation strategy.  
 
Most importantly, the empirical results from this chapter solve the puzzle that has 
been left in the Chapter 4, the investigation of the endogenous fertility channel. 
Although the OCP has been abandoned nationally in 2016, this chapter finds that 
the OCP has successfully intervened in overpopulation and human capital dilution. 
These findings confirm that the endogenous fertility channel can explain the 
negative inequality-growth nexus in China.  
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Appendix 5A Robustness Check: A Test on 
Pre-Trend 
 
5A.1 First Stage Robustness Check: A Test on Pre-Trend 
The key assumption of DD strategy is the parallel assumption. It suggests that both 
control and treatment group should share the same trend on the change of outcome 
variable when the treatment is absent. If the parallel assumption is violated, then the 
estimated treatment effect may not merely capture the casual impacts of the 
treatment on the outcome variable. In this chapter, the trend of probability of having 
a new baby for Han and Non-Han women should be identical in the absence of the 
OCP. Otherwise the estimated 𝜌 in regression 5.1 may not only capture the OCP 
treatment effects. However, given the fact that only one type of outcome can be 
observed (pre-treatment or post-treatment), the parallel assumption is not easy to be 
testified directly. 
 
Alternatively, a more practical method is to check the existence of pre-trend right 
before the implementation of the treatment, by including a set of leaded and lagged 
treatment indicators to the regression 5.1, or as shown as regression 5A.1 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=−𝑚
+ 𝐗′𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (5A.1) 
 
Instead of a single treatment effect as in model 5.1, I also add m ‘leads’ and q ‘lags’ 
of the treatment effect in regression 5A.1. 𝜌𝑗 are corresponding coefficients on jth 
lead or lag terms. If there is no pre-trend or anticipatory effects prior to the 
treatment, then all the coefficients on leads should be jointly insignificantly 
different from zero. In practice, I include 2, 5, and 10 leads and lags into regression 
5A.1 and conduct the joint test for all the coefficients on leaded and lagged terms. 
The F-statistic and corresponding p-value are provided in table 5A-1. The results 
from all three scenarios show that the coefficients on leads are jointly zero, 
suggesting that there is no anticipatory effects or pre-trend of the OCP in the model. 
Instead, regarding the joint test for the lagged terms and treatment term (t=0), all 
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results indicate that there is a significant fertility change after the OCP 
implementation.  
 
Table 5A-1. Tests on Pre-trend for Various Leads and Lags 
Number of Leads and Lags 2  5  10  
F-Test (p-value) on Leads 0.47 (0.63) 1.71 (0.13) 1.43 (0.16) 
F-Test (p-value) on Lags 20.27*** (0) 14.04*** (0) 8.70*** (0) 
Note: P values of F-Test are reported in brackets. *** Significant at 1 percent level. ** Significant at 
5 percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that all the 
related coefficients (of leads or lags) are jointly zero. The F-Test on Lags also include the coefficient 
on the year of treatment. 
 
5A.2 Second Stage Robustness Check: A Test on Pre-Trend 
Similar to the discussion of the OCP treatment effect on fertility reduction, it is 
important to verify the parallel assumption when using DD framework. I follow the 
same procedures that have been employed in the first stage pre-trend tests and 
visually present the corresponding coefficients on the leads and lags in the 
following figure 5A.1 with its 95% confidence intervals. Following the same 
practice in Autor (2003), if the coefficients on leads are close to zero, then it 
suggests that there is no evidence for anticipatory effects, and the common trend 




Figure 5A-1. Time Passage Relative to Year of the OCP Implementation 
 
Note: The dots depict the coefficients of the leads and lags and the treatment effects of the OCP on 
outcome variables with 95% confidence intervals.  
 
At the first glance, it can be concluded from the figure 5A-1 that the coefficients on 
the leads are not significantly different from zero, indicating that there is no 
anticipatory effect before the OCP implementation. It confirms that there is no pre-
trend issue in the second stage estimation. However, it happens to the coefficients 
on the lag interaction terms as well. Particularly, the figure 5A-1 shows the 
evidence of a slight policy inertia as the OCP treatment effects are not significantly 
different from zero until 1980, one year after the OCP was implemented.22 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
The widespread increase of income inequality has raised concerns regarding its 
potential impact on societies and economies. From the economic perspective, 
researchers are interested in the effect of income inequality on economic growth. 
Particularly, for scholars who investigate the inequality-growth nexus, China is a 
seemingly promising laboratory because it experienced both high speed economic 
growth and dramatic increase in income inequality after the economic reform. 
Although it is believed that moderate level of income inequality would encourage 
economic growth, there is still no clear definition regarding ‘moderate’. Therefore, 
form the perspective of policy makers, it is important to figure out if income 
inequality is harmful to economic growth in China. In addition, it is equally 
important to know what is the underlying mechanism to avoid wrong remedies. 
Therefore, this thesis provides new empirical evidence on inequality-growth nexus 
in the Chinese context by answering two research questions in three empirical 
chapters: is income inequality harmful to economic growth in China? And which 
transmission mechanism is predominant in explaining the impact of income 
inequality on economic growth? 
 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) examined the long-run impact of income 
inequality on economic growth focusing on data at the provincial level in China. It 
used an improved measure on income inequality which not only mitigated 
measurement error, but also allowed estimation via panel time series techniques to 
deal with non-stationarity, cross-sectional dependence, and heterogeneous 
coefficients. With mean group estimators on cross-sectionally augmented 
(autoregressive) distributed lag models, estimation results suggested that there was 
no significant correlation between income inequality and economic growth in China 
when the tests were conducted for the whole sample as the estimation results were 
consistently insignificant. However, when the whole sample was categorized by the 
economic performance, the results became different. The long-run coefficients on 
Theil index for the richest 10 provinces were positive while those were negative for 
the medium and the poorest provinces. This finding is similar to what have been 
concluded in Barro (2000), the study which points out a non-linear relationship that 
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the inequality-growth nexus is positive for rich countries while the impact of 
inequality on growth is negative for poor countries. But the estimation results 
regarding the long-run effect coefficients of the income inequality were not 
persistently significant across different lag lengths for each subsample. 
 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) demonstrated that empirical studies of the 
effects of inequality on growth that rely solely on macro data might provide 
misleading results. I provided a simple mathematical example that illustrated the 
effects of aggregating data from the level of the household in this case. Then I 
explored the impact of income inequality on economic growth in rural China using 
both village-level and household-level data. Although the results obtained from 
village-level data found that inequality reduced growth, consistent with the 
macroeconomic literature, the results derived from household data told another 
story: income inequality was positively associate to income growth for household 
with low initial income level. But such association became weaker with the increase 
of household income. Specifically, the households whose initial income per capita 
was greater than around 10,000 yuan will suffer from the adverse effects of income 
inequality, while the ones who live below this threshold would have a better income 
growth, keeping other factors unchanged. This result suggested that income 
inequality in rural China was an income growth driver for majority of the rural 
dwellers since the threshold (10,000 yuan) was much higher than the mean of the 
household income per capita. Such seemingly contradictory results agreed with the 
predictions of my mathematical example and suggested that the political economy 
could explain the inequality-growth nexus in rural China. 
 
The last empirical chapter (Chapter 5) evaluated the casual effects of the One Child 
Policy on fertility reduction and education participation improvement within a 
difference-in-differences framework. The estimation results suggested that the 
probability of having a new child for Han Chinese women was lower than their 
ethnical monitories by about 2.8 percentage points, after the OCP implementation. 
Such effect was robust to a series of sensitivity checks. Compared to the sample 
mean of 7.1 percent, the treatment effect was large on fertility, taking account for 
almost 40% reduction of the sample mean. However, the influence of the OCP on 
fertility was much weaker for the educated women and urban residents. In addition, 
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the casual effects of the One Child Policy increased the probability of education 
participation of Han children aged 14-22 by about 6.1 percentage points. Compared 
to its sample mean of 44%, such effect took account for about 14% to the mean. It 
is worth to note that the policy effects on education participation was stronger for 
boys, suggesting the gender inequality on the chance of receiving education. Again, 
the One Child Policy had exerted positive impacts on increasing the probability of 
schooling was much stronger for rural residents. Also, from the OCP treatment 
effects were specifically stronger for the children between 17-20, who were more 
likely receiving tertiary education. Based on these estimation results, the fertility 
elasticity of education is -0.35, suggesting that 1% change in the probability 
reduction of having a child would lead to a 0.35% change in probability increment 
of a child (aged 14-22) to attend school. This chapter found that the One Child 
Policy had successfully intervened in overpopulation and human capital dilution. 
These findings confirmed that the endogenous fertility channel was one of the 
transmission mechanisms that could explain the negative impact of income 
inequality on economic growth in China. 
 
Overall, with the macroeconomic data at the province level, it can be concluded that 
the long-run effect of income inequality is negative on economic growth, especially 
for poor provinces with low GDP per capita. The negative inequality-growth nexus 
also stands robust after dealing with the deficiencies with aggregated data. 
Furthermore, combining the estimation results from both micro and macro data, this 
thesis suggests that the political economy and the endogenous fertility channel are 
predominant. Since the One Child Policy has successfully lowered the fertility and 
improved the human capital for the next generation, policy makers should pay more 
attention to the political economy channel. The findings in the thesis indicate that 
the high level of income inequality encourages the needs for redistribution (such as 
tax). However, it is such redistribution process that causes disturbing effects on the 
subsequent economic growth. 
 
With these empirical evidence, there are several policy implications. First, since the 
income inequality is negatively associated to the economic growth in China, the 
policy design on reduction inequality and maintaining high economic growth can be 
reached at the same time. There is no efficiency-equality trade-off in the China’s 
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context. Second, among all the inequality-reduction related policies, the most 
inappropriate one is using tax as the tool. Based on the empirical findings in the 
Chapter 4 and 5, the negative effect of income inequality on economic growth is 
mainly through the political economy channel. It means that the main reason for 
slowing down the economic growth is the disturbing effects caused by the 
redistribution from the governments. Third, inequality-reduction policies should be 
designed at the regional level, but not a national level as income inequality has 
different impact on provinces with different level of economic development. Last 
but not the least, despite the controversies of the One Child Policy, it indeed 
successfully reduced the fertility rate and improved the education participation. 
However, the policy makers should reconsider the consequences of abolishment of 
the One Child Policy in 2016, which could be another potential research questions 
in the future. 
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